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University of Pittsburgh, 2006
A gender revolution has transformed the institution of asylum in the United States. The 
introduction of gender-based persecution laws and policies in the past decade ushered in a new 
era of politics in asylum decisions. Facilitated by recent laws and policies, immigrant women 
may gain asylum and legal entry into the U.S. by claiming they are persecuted based on factors 
such as female circumcision, honor killings, domestic violence, coercive family planning, forced 
marriage, or repressive social norms. Immigrant advocates have championed these laws and 
policies as reflecting the canonical feminist declaration that women’s rights are human rights. 
The legal recognition that certain human rights abuses are gendered because they 
overwhelmingly happen to women has emerged as the benchmark for gendered equality in 
asylum adjudication. However, legal recognition of gender-related persecution is only half the 
story.  A study of the implementation of gender-based persecution laws and policies makes 
visible certain assumptions about femininity, masculinity, sexuality, race, class, and nation in 
which asylum seekers, immigration attorneys, service providers, immigration judges, and asylum 
officers engage when making, preparing, and adjudicating asylum claims. In this dissertation, I 
offer empirical evidence of how gender structures the legal institution of asylum in the United 
States. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
At the age of sixteen, Rodi Alvardo Peña, a Guatemalan citizen, married a man who beat, raped, 
and sodomized her daily.  Rodi’s husband used his position of power in the military to intimidate 
her by reminding her of the widespread abuses he was accustomed to performing and threatened 
to find her if she left him.  On numerous occasions throughout her marriage, she ran away, even 
to other towns and cities, only to be found by her husband who used his connections as a former 
soldier in the Guatemalan military to locate her.  The threats and violence worsened each time 
she was found; he dislocated her jaw, whipped her with an electrical cord, threatened to cut off 
her arms and legs with a machete, broke mirrors over her head, and pistol-whipped her for 
leaving him.  When running away was no longer a viable option, Rodi sought help from local 
police and even a judge, all of whom responded to her pleas for help in near unity: “We don’t 
involve ourselves in domestic matters” (Wright 2004: 1).  As a last resort, Rodi left Guatemala 
for the United States in an effort to save her own life.  
 Upon arriving in the United States in 1995, Rodi obtained legal counsel who prepared her 
asylum application where she detailed the horrors of the violence she suffered in Guatemala.  In 
accordance with asylum law, Rodi Alvarado demonstrated that she was not safe anywhere in 
Guatemala since each time she attempted to leave her husband, he had been able to find her.  
Moreover, she followed expected legal procedure by seeking help from the local authorities.  In 
1996, less than one year after the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) proposed an 
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internal policy that recognized domestic abuse, in addition to other “gender-based” forms of 
harm as persecution, an immigration judge in San Francisco granted Rodi asylum based on the 
legal argument that she was persecuted on account of her membership in the social group of 
battered spouses.  While this grant appeared to be the end of Rodi’s troubles, the INS assistant 
district counsel who represented the government during her trial reserved the right to appeal the 
judge’s decision (Musalo 2004).   
In a narrow reading of the law, the INS attorneys argued that she was not eligible for 
asylum because she did not establish that the abuse she endured was on account of her 
membership in a particular social group, one of the five possible reasons that someone can be 
persecuted and legally qualify for asylum.1  The INS’ appeal of Rodi’s case seemingly  
contradicts its own policy.  The appeal was not based on whether domestic violence per se 
constituted persecution.  Instead, the issue was whether battered women are a social group.  The 
INS district assistant counsel claimed that the government reserved the right to appeal the case 
because of how the judge applied the law, not because there was any uncertainty regarding the 
facts of the case.  The INS believed that Rodi was beaten by her husband.  The INS 
representatives were satisfied that Rodi had sought safety in other parts of the country and that 
she qualified for asylum because the Guatemalan government was unwilling to protect her from 
her husband.  In its written appeal, the INS concluded that Rodi Alvarado “has been terribly 
abused and has a genuine and reasonable fear of returning to Guatemala” (Wright 2004: 1).  
However, the INS took issue with the judge’s order that granted her asylum based on her 
membership in the social group of battered spouses.   
                                                 
1 The remaining four are race, religion, nationality, and political opinion. 
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In 1999, Rodi’s case was heard by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the appellate 
board for all immigration courts in the United States.  Unfortunately for Rodi, the BIA 
overturned the lower immigration court’s decision and issued a deportation notice.  The judges 
on the BIA agreed with the INS’ reasoning that battered women did not constitute a social group, 
and that therefore, Rodi had no legal ground to seek asylum.  In January of 2001, then-Attorney 
General Janet Reno issued a second order vacating the BIA’s decision, rendering it moot until 
new regulations were to be issued by the Department of Justice.  Yet no such regulations have 
been finalized and issued to date, and Rodi’s status remains indeterminate.  The INS’ appeal of 
Rodi’s case initiated the longest legal battle for a woman seeking asylum for domestic abuse in 
the history of U.S. asylum decisions.  Rodi endured ten years of violence during her marriage, 
and has now waited another ten to learn whether she will be allowed to stay in the U.S. as a legal 
migrant seeking asylum or if she will be deported back to her persecutor in Guatemala.   
Rodi’s case illuminates the complexities of how asylum laws and policies are applied 
when women seek asylum from gender-based persecution.  This case is the example most widely 
covered in the media of a woman fleeing gender-based persecution and seeking asylum from this 
harm in the United States.  It challenges the fundamental principles on which asylum law in the 
U.S. rests because it questions whether gendered harm is persecution; if an intimate, such as a 
husband or family member, can be the persecutor; and if women are a social group.  Gender-
based asylum claims illuminate broader issues of immigration, citizenship, and human rights 
because these cases show how migration is structured by gender; reveal the ways in which 
asylum policies contribute toward nation building; and locate human rights activism both within 
and outside of the nation-state.   
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Asylum is timely because it addresses the recent national anxiety about immigration in 
our post-September 11th world that questions who should be allowed entry into the U.S., 
regardless of the motivation for migrating.  United States policy makers have capitalized on 
American’s fear of terrorists to mitigate immigration policies that admit asylum seekers.2  The 
U.S. is increasingly mirroring the policies and practices of fortress Europe in its anti-immigration 
practices that detain and deport immigrants, including those seeking asylum from persecution.   
I became interested in this topic after reading Rodi’s story and the stories of many others 
who had experienced various forms of sexual violence, had applied for relief, and yet were 
denied asylum in the United States because gender is not one of the legally recognized grounds 
of persecution (Anker 2001).  In preliminary research on gender-based asylum claims, I found 
that academic debates about gender-based persecution and asylum originated and have 
overwhelmingly remained within the disciplinary boundaries of legal studies (Anker, 2001; 
Goldberg 1993; Kelly 1993).  Legal scholars understand gender-based asylum laws and policies 
within the context of U.S. case law, international law, and INS regulations, making the law—not 
people—the subject of inquiry.  Such a focus ignores the social relations and networks of people 
who make, implement, use (and misuse), and rely upon the law.  My training as a qualitative 
social scientist led me to ask different questions about gender-based persecution than those asked 
by legal scholars.  Unlike legal scholars who focus on the outcome of a case, I privilege process 
over outcome in my research questions and design.  By this, I mean that I am less interested in 
laws and policies per se and more interested in how human beings who created, implemented, 
and relied upon these laws and policies understand gender-based persecution.   
                                                 
2 I use the term “American” throughout the dissertation to refer to those living in the United States, not Canadian, 
Central, or South Americans who may identify as “American” because they are located in some part of the 
Americas.  
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Instead of focusing on the passage of gender-based asylum policies and laws as a final 
outcome (a worthy endeavor indeed given the countless efforts of scholars and activists whose 
advocacy brought about institutional change), I take gender-based laws and policies as a point of 
departure to inquire about their implementation.  Three research questions guide this project: 
How are gender-based asylum laws and policies applied by asylum officers and immigration 
judges?  How do differently situated participants, such as asylees, immigration attorneys, 
immigrant service providers, immigration judges, and asylum officers interpret gender-based 
persecution?  How are narratives of persecution created in gender-based asylum claims? 
   In order to answer these questions, I spent two years in Los Angeles, California doing 
participant observation with immigrant service organizations and human rights groups, observing 
immigration court hearings, and conducting interviews with asylees, immigrant service 
providers, immigration attorneys, immigration judges, asylum officers and supervisors, and 
human rights organization employees and activists.  I examine how gender is interpreted and 
negotiated for asylum seekers by providing evidence of how these participants articulate their 
understandings of gendered harm.   
In this dissertation, I draw from a variety of disciplinary and interdisciplinary scholarship 
to argue how race, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, and class mediate understandings of gender-
based harm.  Chapter two, Gendered Harm and State Protection, provides background data on 
asylum in the United States and lays the groundwork for the theoretical arguments about gender 
which I draw from throughout the dissertation.  Because legal scholars were among the first to 
engage debates about gender-based persecution, I address their arguments and situate their 
assumptions about gender within a larger framework of feminist theorizing about gendered harm.  
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Chapter three, Research Methodology, describes the research design and methodology of this 
study. 
Chapter four, Narratives of Persecution, focuses on how narratives of persecution are 
created in asylum claims.  In this chapter, I rely on sociolegal studies, drawing in particular from 
the work of Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, who argue that narratives must conform to a story 
that the law recognizes.  Consequently, the story of persecution that asylum seekers must tell in 
order to gain asylum is often not their own, but rather, one that follows the rules of legal 
implementation.  This chapter reveals the contestation over issues of gender, persecution, and the 
authority to narrate. Because all asylum seekers must be credible (believable) in order to gain 
asylum, I examine what constitutes believability in asylum adjudication. 
Chapter five, Ruling Relations in Immigration Court Asylum Hearings, examines the 
hidden criteria that govern asylum hearings in immigration court.  In this chapter, I rely on 
Dorothy Smith's theory of ruling relations to analyze immigration court asylum hearings.  I argue 
that asylum hearings are governed by extra-legal ruling relations that determine decisions about 
persecution for asylum seekers.  This chapter focuses exclusively on immigration court hearings 
using excerpts from six hearings before five judges that show how gender, race, class, and nation 
structure assumptions about persecution.   
Chapter six, The Gender Regime of Asylum, illuminates the major findings on how 
gender is understood and articulated in asylum discourses and practices.  I use sociologist R. W. 
Connell's notion of gender regime to argue that a gender regime of asylum practices structures 
the process of asylum.  In this chapter, I draw from a variety of scholars, such as Lata Mani, 
Uma Nayaran, and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, whose ideas about gendered, racial, and national 
formations help to illuminate what constitutes difference in gender-based persecution claims. 
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 Chapter seven, the Conclusion, outlines the implications this research has for human 
rights, citizenship, and transnational migration studies and addresses the changes in asylum 
policy, law, and practices in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attack.  Appendix 
A includes tables with data for all interviews.  Appendix B includes the interview schedules for 
all tape-recorded interviews. 
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2.0  GENDERED HARM AND STATE PROTECTION 
This chapter focuses on the gendered character of asylum in the United States through data on 
male and female asylum seekers and laws and policies that circumscribe women’s claims.  The 
first section is an overview of asylum in the United States that includes a discussion of 
international law and data on asylum seekers.  I address how gender-based asylum was 
introduced in the U.S. and identify key gender-based asylum laws and policies.  The second 
section focuses on scholarly work on gender-based harm and state protection.  Because legal 
scholars were among the first to engage debates about gender-based persecution, I address their 
arguments and situate their assumptions about gender within a larger framework that includes 
transnational and postcolonial feminist perspectives found in the scholarship of Inderpal Grewal, 
Caren Kaplan, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, and Uma Narayan. 
2.1  ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Asylum is a form of protection offered to non-citizens who fear they would be persecuted if they 
returned to their home country.  Throughout history, people have migrated en mass from one 
place to another because their group affiliation (i.e. religious, political, or ethnic) placed them in 
such danger that leaving one place for another became their only alternative (Zolberg et al 1989). 
Terms such as “asylum” and “refugee” have been used nearly interchangeably in explanations of 
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persecution-based migrations.  In his discussion of the term “refugee” in early modern Europe, 
Aristide Zolberg (1989) speculates that its use, in the context of granting asylum to foreigners, 
may be traced to the migration of the Huguenots, persecuted Calvinists, from France into 
England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  The term “asylum” originated from the 
French word “asile” that in the Middle Ages referred to a protected place of refuge (Zolberg 
1993).  The term “azilum” was first used in the United States in 1793 by loyalists who feared 
persecution after the French Revolution left France and settled on the banks of the Susquehanna 
River in northern Pennsylvania (Murray 1940).   
   The characterizing feature of asylum seekers and refugees is that their motivation for 
leaving one country for another is based on fear of persecution.  Asylum seekers are 
distinguished from refugees in that they tend to migrate alone while refugees move in larger 
groups.  The legal difference between classification as a “refugee” and as an “asylee” is 
circumscribed by definitions based on where the application is filed: refugees file their 
applications prior to entering the country where they seek protection, and asylees file after their 
arrival.  Asylum seekers—like all migrants—must marshal the necessary resources to make their 
way from one country to another.  They are similar to other migrants in that they, too, often seek 
better economic opportunities and desire reunification with family members living in other 
nation-states.  However, despite these shared economic and familial reasons for migrating, 
refugees and asylum seekers differ from other immigrants in that they either experienced harm or 
feared they would experience harm if they did not leave. 
 Fear of persecution distinguishes asylum seekers from other migrants.   They are treated 
as a special category of immigrants under international law and policy, in part, because 
lawmakers decide to treat this distinction as a significant one that matters in law.  The policies 
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and conventions that protect asylum seekers are derived from those created for refugees.  The 
United Nations’ definition of who gets to claim refugee status determines the procedure for 
adjudicating asylum claims.  Refugee legislation was codified in international law at the end of 
World War II as a response to the exodus of persecuted populations from Nazi Germany.  The 
1951 United Nations Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees serve as the cornerstone of refugee 
legislation.  Although neither document requires members to provide asylum, each explicitly 
prohibits refoulement—forcible return. Refoulement to the country of origin where one’s life or 
freedom would be threatened is a violation of the spirit and the letter of these documents.  
 The United Nations cannot force nation-states that are signatories to the Convention and 
Protocol to admit asylum seekers.  Instead, nation-states decide who may gain asylum and under 
what circumstances.  Nation-states capitalize on the vagueness of the term “well-founded fear,” 
employed to define persecuted populations.  For example, U.S. foreign policymakers during the 
cold war made use of that vagueness to define persecuted populations as those fleeing 
communist governments; from 1951 to 1980, refugees and asylees who gained entry into the 
United States were overwhelmingly from communist nation-states.  In 1980, the United States 
passed the Refugee Act introducing national legal standards for adjudicating refugee and asylum 
claims based on the definition of a refugee found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA 
Section 101a[42]). According to this section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, a refugee is 
defined as follows: 
[a]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in  
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country on which  
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return  
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,  
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on  
account of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social  
  10 
group, or political opinion (Germain 2000: 9–10). 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United 
States was among the top asylum receiving nation-states from 1985 through 2000 (UNHCR 
2002; UNHCR 2000).  Table 1 shows the number of asylum applications for eleven nation-states 
that received the greatest number of applications from 1985 through 2000 in five year intervals 
(UNHCR 2002; UNHCR 2000; UNHCR 1993).  The United States received the third greatest 
number of asylum applications in 1985, the second greatest number in 1990, and the greatest 
number in 1995 and 2000. 
 
Table 1: Asylum Applications in Eleven Asylum-Receiving Nation-States from 1985-20003
Country 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Australia > 50 12,100 7,600 6,700 
Austria 6,700 22,800 5,900 18,200 
Belgium 5,300 13,000 11,400 42,700 
Canada 8,400 36,700 26,100 34,300 
France 25,800 54,800 20,200 38,800 
Germany 73,900 193,100 167,000 117,600 
Netherlands 5,700 21,200 29,300 Data 
Not Available 
Sweden 14,500 29,300 9,000 16,300 
Switzerland 9,700 35,800 17,000 32,400 
United Kingdom 5,500 38,200 55,000 Data 
Not Available 
United States 16,600 106,800 224,000 122,200 
 
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1993, 2000, and 2002. 
 
 
                                                 
3 All data are rounded to the nearest hundreds. 
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Table 1 shows the variation in the number of asylum applications received among nation-states 
and within a particular nation-state from 1985 through 2000.  The variation may be explained, in 
part, by nation-states’ policies on immigration that facilitate or impede asylum seekers ability to 
enter the country and file an application (Roberts 1998). 
While the number of asylum seekers worldwide has increased since the 1970s, the 
proportion of asylum applications granted has simultaneously declined  (Roberts 1998).  Nation-
states have moved away from policies of awarding permanent asylum towards a commitment to 
granting temporary protection.  Between 1985 and 1995, more than five million asylum 
applications were filed in the industrialized nation-states of Western Europe and North America 
(with the exception of Mexico).  Nearly one million of the applications filed are still pending, 
leaving one-fifth of the asylum-seeking population to await the adjudication of their claims 
(Roberts 1998).   
Although industrial nation-states are reluctant to grant formal asylum status to migrants, 
they are also unwilling to deport those who claim persecution.  Consequently, these nation-states 
grant fewer migrants asylum status, a status which would afford them certain rights and 
privileges.  For example, in the United States, asylees are eligible to apply for Legal Permanent 
Residency (LPR) after one year of their asylum grant and may apply for citizenship after five 
years of gaining legal permanent residency (Germain 2000).  Throughout asylum-receiving 
nation-states, many asylum seekers remain in those countries, as illegal migrants, with limited 
access to participating in the polity, and with restrictions on their ability to seek and maintain 
employment that would secure their livelihood in the place where they have sought refuge 
(Roberts 1998). 
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Migrants seeking asylum in the United States apply through two bureaucratic 
organizations that include the asylum office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
and the immigration court of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).  On March 
1, 2003, the INS was divided into three agencies—the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS), the United States Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE), and the Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—and moved from the Department of Justice to the 
Department of Homeland Security.  The INS Asylum Office is now part of USCIS.  Under 
bureaucratic reorganization in 1983, the Department of Justice created the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (EOIR) which established immigration courts independent from the earlier 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  These two bureaucracies are independent of each 
other; each with its own set of internal policies, the implementation of which is required only 
within each agency.  For example, in the next section, I discuss the INS gender guidelines for 
asylum officers that were created for adjudicators within the INS, such as asylum officers and 
supervisors (Coven 1995).  Immigration judges located in the EOIR are not obligated to adhere 
to INS policies.  Likewise, INS asylum officers do not observe internal regulations within the 
EOIR.  Adjudicators in both the INS asylum office and the EOIR immigration courts are 
required to implement immigration laws created by Congress, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), the appellate court for all immigration courts in the United States, U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States.  Figure 1 shows the procedure for 
adjudicating affirmative asylum cases, claims submitted to the INS asylum office.   
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Figure 1: Affirmative Asylum Procedure 
 
  
Application filed with the 
INS Asylum Office 
Interview with an 
INS Asylum Officer 
Asylum Case Granted Asylum Case Denied 
May apply for Legal Permanent 
Residency (LPR) after one year 
May apply for U.S. Citizenship 
after five years of  becoming a legal 
permanent resident
Asylum Case Referred to 
Immigration Court (See Figure 2) 
Source: Winning Asylum Cases, 1998  
The INS asylum office receives affirmative asylum applications which are claims that an 
asylum seeker initiates before an order or deportation has been issued by the INS.  In 1991, the 
U.S. asylum corps was created within the INS to adjudicate asylum claims separate from other 
immigration applications.  After an asylum application is complete, the attorney (or asylum 
seeker) submits it by mail to an INS service center.  The closest INS service center to Los 
Angeles is in Laguna Niguel, located approximately sixty miles southeast of Los Angeles in 
Orange County.  After the application is received, the service center has twenty-one days to enter 
it into the INS asylum office processing system.  The service center schedules the original 
interview for the applicant at the INS asylum office and notifies asylum seekers by mail about 
their appointment.  Two weeks after the asylum interview is completed, asylum seekers return to 
the asylum office where they receive notification of the asylum officer’s decision.  If an asylum 
seeker is granted asylum, she is eligible for refugee benefits (these are discussed in Chapter 3) 
and may apply for Legal Permanent Residency (LPR) after one year of her asylum grant and 
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apply for U.S. citizenship five years after becoming a legal permanent resident.  Asylum claims 
submitted to the INS asylum office are denied only when the applicant has a legal immigrant 
status when the application is under consideration, such as a student visa.  If the asylum officer is 
unable to reach a decision about the claim, it is referred to immigration court.  Figure 2 outlines 
the procedure for defensive asylum cases, claims submitted to immigration court. 
Figure 2: Defensive Asylum Procedure4
 
Application filed in 
Immigration Court
Master Calendar Hearing 
Merits Asylum Hearing 
Immigration Judge Decision 
Grant or Denial with No Appeals: 
Decision Stands 
INS or Applicant  
appeals to the BIA 
BIA upholds or overturns decision with no 
appeals:  Decision Stands 
INS or Applicant  
appeals to a Federal Circuit Court  
Court upholds or overturns decision with 
no appeals:  Decision Stands 
INS or Applicant  
appeals to The Supreme Court 
Supreme Court upholds or overturns 
decision 
Source: Winning Asylum Cases, 1998 
Asylum claims in immigration court include referred cases from the INS asylum office 
and new claims by migrants in INS detention facilities.  Similar to the prompt scheduling of 
interviews at the INS office, immigration courts tend to schedule a master calendar hearing, the 
initial hearing and point of contact for asylum seekers in immigration court, approximately two 
weeks after receiving the application.5  Master calendar hearings are like arraignment hearings, 
plaintiffs enter a plea and have an opportunity to notify the judge of problems such as access to 
                                                 
4 Similar to the affirmative asylum application process, immigrants granted asylum at any stage of a defensive court 
proceeding, with no appeal from the INS, may apply for Legal Permanent Residency (LPR) after one year of their 
asylum grant and for U.S. Citizenship after five years of becoming a legal permanent resident.  
5 The INS and the EOIR are legally bound to commence the initial asylum interview or hearing within 45 days after 
it is filed. 
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legal representation or ability to produce required documentation.  Immigrant representatives 
may request additional master calendar hearings until all problems are resolved and the plaintiff 
is prepared for a merits hearing.   
Merits hearings are scheduled after the master calendar hearing is completed.  There is no 
time requirement for scheduling a merits hearing.  These hearings are scheduled according to the 
judge’s availability and are often done months after the master calendar hearing is completed.  
Merits hearings are like interviews at the INS asylum office where asylum seekers are required 
to disclose why they are applying for asylum and discuss the persecution they faced or fear they 
would face if returned to their home country.  Unlike interviews at the INS asylum office whose 
participants include the asylum seeker, an asylum officer, a legal representative (if the applicant 
has one), and a language interpreter (if needed), an assistant district counsel, the attorney who 
represents the government in immigration court, is also present during merits hearings.  In 
Chapter 6, I discuss the social interactions that take place in immigration court hearings.   
After an immigration judge adjudicates a case, the applicant or the INS may appeal the 
judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  The BIA relies on court transcripts 
and documentation filed in immigration court (by both the INS and the applicant) when 
upholding or overruling an immigration judge’s decision.  There is no oral testimony from 
applicants or the INS during BIA adjudication.  If an applicant or the INS appeals the BIA’s 
decision, the case is heard in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that the immigration court that 
initially ruled on the case is located.  For example, if a case that was adjudicated in the Los 
Angeles immigration court is appealed after the BIA’s decision, the case is referred to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  Applicants or INS representatives who appeal decisions by circuit 
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court judges may bring their case before the U.S. Supreme Court.  If there are no appeals, the 
most recent decision stands as the final judgment on the case. 
Asylum law in the United States derives its authority originally from international law 
based on the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  The Refugee Act 
of 1980, contained within the Immigration and Nationality Act, is the statutory source of 
domestic federal law for asylum found in Section 208 of the United States Federal Code of 
Regulations (Germain 2000).  Asylum officers and immigration judges are legally bound to 
follow the statute, decisions issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and Circuit 
Court of Appeal decisions from the respective circuit where a particular asylum office or 
immigration court is located.  All immigration laws are federal laws, and published federal law 
cases are precedent cases and therefore legally binding. When an immigration case is published 
by the BIA, it is legal precedent for the entire country, and when a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
case is published, it is legal precedent for that circuit. Decisions made in immigration courts are 
not published cases and are not legally binding for those court or any others in the U.S.  When 
BIA cases are overturned by a U.S. Circuit Court, those cases are only “good law” for those 
circuits. For example, in Fatin v. INS (1993), this third circuit published case set a legal 
precedent that feminism is a form of political opinion that is only legally-binding in asylum 
offices and immigration courts in the geographical boundaries of the third circuit.  However, 
during my fieldwork, I noticed that many attorneys cited the Fatin case in applications in Los 
Angeles immigration courts, located in the ninth circuit and not under the authority of the third 
circuit.  When I inquired with one attorney about why she included this in the asylum 
applications she prepared, she responded "you never know what's going to stick."  Yet when I 
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asked the same question to an immigration judge, his response was "I don't know why they 
[immigration attorneys] put that in. It doesn't help the respondent at all."6
Table 2 shows recent data for the number of asylum applications received, adjudicated, 
and the percent granted in the U.S., using data from the Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) from 
2000 through 2003 (INS 2003a; INS 2002; INS 2001a; INS 2000; EOIR 2003; EOIR 2002; 
EOIR 2001; EOIR 2000).7  
Table 2: Asylum Applications in the U.S. from 2000-20038
Application Type 2000 2001 2002 20039
INS/USCIS 
(Asylum Office) 
    
Number Received 46,423 62,984 
 
63,197 
 
46,272 
Number Adjudicated 37,846 
 
46,959 
 
52,336 
 
39,456 
 
Percent Granted 44% 43% 36% 29% 
EOIR 
(Immigration Court) 
    
Number Received 51,900 
 
61,832 
 
74,127 
 
65,153 
 
Number Adjudicated 52,109 
 
47,432 
 
55,353 
 
68,093 
 
Percent Granted 37% 40% 37% 37% 
 
Sources: Immigration and Naturalization Service and Executive Office for Immigration 
Review, 2000-2003. 
 
There is a discrepancy between the UNHCR data and the INS/EOIR data on asylum applications 
in the United States.  This discrepancy is because there are different organizations collecting the 
                                                 
6 I discuss examples like this in chapters 4-6 where immigration attorneys (in addition to other participants in the 
asylum process) make non-legal based decisions when preparing and adjudicating asylum claims.  
7 INS and EOIR data are fiscal year data beginning July 1. 
8 The percent granted is based on the number of adjudicated applications. 
9 In 2003, there were 2,940 more cases adjudicated than received by the EOIR. Asylum applications are not always 
adjudicated in the fiscal year that they are received. Therefore, there may be more adjudicated cases than received 
cases for some years.   
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data and, as each organization indicates in its report, the data are preliminary and collecting data 
on asylum seekers is often inaccurate.  Moreover, the EOIR data includes both primary 
applications of asylum seekers in detention centers and secondary, or referred, applications that 
originated at the INS and were later adjudicated in the immigration courts.    
 The data from Table 2 show three findings.  First, more than one-third of asylum 
applications are approved at the asylum office and in immigration courts.  Second, after the 
September 11th 2001 terrorist attack, which ushered in more stringent policies and screening 
procedures into the INS asylum office, the INS office grant rates dropped from 43% in 2001 to 
36% in 2002 to 29% in 2003.  The rate of court approval, however, remained at about the same 
level as before.  Third, there was a decrease in received cases to the INS and EOIR in 2003.   The 
decrease in the number of received applications may be due to asylum seekers choosing other 
nation-states after the increased security measures in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist 
attacks; indeed, the number of asylum applications in other asylum receiving nations increased 
after that date.  Table 3 shows data for asylum claims in 2001 and 2002 for nine nation-states 
(UNHCR 2004).  The United Kingdom received the most applications and Belgium received the 
least in 2001 and 2002 combined. 
 
Table 3: Asylum Applications in Nine Asylum-Receiving Nation-States in 2001 and 2002 
Nation  2001 2002 Total 
United Kingdom 91,600 103,100 194,700
Germany 88,300 71,100 159,400
France 47,300 51,100 98,400 
Canada 44,000 39,500 83,500 
Austria 30,100 39,400 69,500 
Sweden 23,500 33,000 56,500 
Netherlands 32,600 18,700 51,300 
Switzerland 20,600 26,100 46,700 
Belgium 24,500 43,300 43,300 
 
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2004. 
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Nearly all data on asylum from UNHCR and the INS are available by nation-state in the 
form of sending and receiving countries.  There are few data by sex.   
Table 4 shows data by sex for affirmative applications to the INS from 1998 through 
2002 (INS 2003b).  These are the only INS data on asylum by sex and are not available in the 
statistical yearbook; I was able to procure them from the INS headquarters during my fieldwork.  
These data are preliminary and therefore do not match the data from Table 2. 
 
Table 4: Affirmative Applications for Asylum in the U.S. by Sex from 1998-200210
Sex 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Female      
Number Received 17,388
 
14,785
 
17,312
 
23,261
 
24,036 
 
Number 
Adjudicated 
11,972 12,204
 
15,091
 
21,699
 
22,123 
 
Percent Granted 28% 44% 48% 47% 40% 
Male  
 
    
Number Received 37,564
 
25,977
 
30,686
 
41,135
 
40,608 
 
Number 
Adjudicated 
23,066 19,577
 
25,600
 
37,721
 
36,281 
 
Percent Granted 21% 35% 41% 41% 41% 
 
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2003. 
 
The data in Table 4 show that men submit more applications than women.  For every year, 
approximately one-third of the asylum seeking population is female and approximately two-
thirds is male.  This may be due to men's greater access to mobility, including access to resources 
that would enable them to migrate across national borders (Martin 2004; Indra 1999). A theme in 
the migration literature is that women's mobility is regulated and restricted because of their sex 
(Indra 1999).  For example, there are a number of nation-states with laws that restrict women’s 
                                                 
10 The percent granted is based on the number of adjudicated applications. 
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travel.  Women often need permission of a male relative, usually a husband, father, or brother, in 
order to obtain a passport (Seager 2003).  Joni Seager (2003) names twenty nation-states that 
require women, but not men, gain permission of a male relative in order to travel abroad.11  Of 
the 27,551 asylum applications filed with USCIS (formerly INS) asylum office in 2004, only 
813, just 3 percent of the total, were by applicants from one of these twenty nation-states (USCIS 
2004).  Therefore, nation-states with restrictions on women’s travel comprise significantly less of 
the asylum seeking population than do nation-states without those same restrictions.   
The higher number of male asylum seekers may also be because the INS and EOIR 
nearly always consolidate spousal claims under the husband's application for asylum 
applications.  In my many inquires about this phenomenon, I was told that asylum officers and 
judges are not legally required to consider the spouse with the claim of persecution as the 
primary applicant. However, in practice, judges and asylum officers consider the male applicant 
as primary in the asylum claims of married couples.  Therefore, the gendered method of data 
collection by the INS and EOIR make it nearly impossible to know if women's asylum claims are 
underrepresented.  According to Monica Boyd (1999), who has written extensively on female 
refugees and asylum seekers, “refugee determination procedures frequently reproduce existing 
gender hierarchies where men are considered heads of households and women are viewed as 
dependents” (11-12).  Nancy Kelly (1993) argues that the “claims of women are often presented 
as derivative of the claims of their male partners” and this is problematic because “the woman is 
rendered entirely dependent upon her male partner for her status” and “risks expulsion if the 
relationship fails”   (629, 630). 
                                                 
11 The twenty nation-states Seager lists are Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Gabon, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, Qatar, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, and Thailand. 
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While men comprise a greater percentage of asylum applicants than women, they 
represent a smaller percentage of legally admitted immigrants who enter the U.S. for permanent 
residency and a smaller percentage of those who naturalize to U.S. citizenship.  Table 5 shows 
data for immigrants lawfully admitted to the United States by sex for fiscal years 1998 through 
2002 from the Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS 2002; 
INS 2001a; INS 2000; INS 1999; INS 1998). 
Table 5: Immigrants Legally Admitted for Permanent Residence by Sex from 1998-2002 
Sex 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Female 353,426 355,600 470,854 587,187 577,868 
Male 299,946 290,225 476,876 485,596 378, 259 
% Female 54% 55% 50% 55% 60% 
 
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1998 - 2002. 
  
Immigrants who are legally admitted for permanent residence include those who migrate to the 
U.S. because of family reunification, employment, overseas refugee processing, and who qualify 
for diversity purposes.12   For nearly every year, women comprise just over half of all 
immigrants admitted for permanent residency.  Table 6 shows data for immigrants who became 
U.S. citizens by sex for fiscal years 1998 through 2002 from the Statistical Yearbooks of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS 2002; INS 2001a; INS 2000; INS 1999; INS 1998).   
                                                 
12 Unlike asylum seekers who apply for asylum after their arrival in the U.S., refugees are classified as such prior to 
arriving in the U.S., and therefore, are considered legal immigrants according to the INS.  These applications are 
processed through the Overseas Refugee Processing program of the INS. 
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Table 6: Naturalization to U.S. Citizenship by Sex from 1998-2002 
Sex 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Female 254,958 432,635 452,453 308,502 301,466 
Male 195,882 342,480 391,787 283,754 264,443 
% Female 57% 56% 56% 52% 53% 
 
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1998 - 2003. 
There are five ways that an immigrant may naturalize that includes becoming a U.S. citizen, 
court ceremonies, administrative hearings, derivation through the naturalization of parents, 
acquisition at birth abroad to a U.S. citizen parent, and legislation conferring citizenship to 
specific groups.  The data in Table 6 include all five types of naturalization.  Like the data by sex 
for legal immigrants, for nearly every year, women comprise just over half of all naturalized 
immigrants. The INS does not collect data by sex for other immigrant groups such as 
nonimmigrants and those who are detained, arrested, or deported.13   
Examining data across immigrant categories by sex is interesting because it shows 
variation in sex ratios for different classifications of immigrants.  The practice of consolidating 
women’s asylum claims under their husband’s may occur for immigrants other than asylum 
seekers.  If spousal claims are consolidated for immigrants other than asylum seekers, data on the 
percentage of female immigrants may be underestimated for legal immigrants and naturalized 
immigrants, as well as for asylum seekers.  More importantly, if spousal claims are consolidated 
for immigrants other than asylum seekers, spousal consolidation does not explain why women 
represent a larger percentage of legal immigrants and a smaller percentage of asylum seekers. 
                                                 
13 Nonimmigrant admissions include foreign nationals who enter for a temporary time period, such as tourists, 
students, and business travelers. 
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Women may comprise a higher percentage of legal immigrants and naturalizations 
because women have access to certain forms of mobility, such as marriage to foreigners, that are 
much less common for men (Constable 2005; Constable 2003).  In her study of cross-border 
marriages of Asian women to American men, Nicole Constable (2003) shows that “marriage 
migration to the United States almost tripled between 1960 and 1997, increasing from 9 percent 
to 25 percent of all immigration” (4).  In 1997, well over half (61% of those marrying U.S. 
citizens and 85% of those marrying legal permanent residents) were women (Constable 2003).  
Marriage migration is a new form of mobility for women who enter the U.S. as legal residents.  
Therefore, the higher numbers of women among legal immigrants may be explained, in part, 
because of new gendered global marriage patterns.    
Data by sex are limited in that they only reveal information about the sex of the applicant, 
not the substance of the claim.  No INS or EOIR data are made available by type of harm or 
ground or persecution for men or women.   
2.1.1 The Introduction of Gender-Based Persecution in Asylum Law and Policy  
The idea of including gender-based persecution in asylum law and policy can be traced to the 
mid-1980s when a number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) requested that Carol,14 an NGO employee, 
document gendered violence in refugee camps.  The impetus for this request came from 
employees of NGOs and UNHCR protection officers working in refugee camps who were 
becoming increasingly aware of pervasive rapes of female refugees.  Because protection is a 
chief concern of UNHCR, United Nations (UN) officials were concerned about women's security 
                                                 
14 See Appendix A for this interview and all succeeding interviews. 
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in refugee camps.  The data on gendered violence in refugee camps was used in the UNHCR 
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (1991) which addressed issues of sexual 
violence during displacement.  In this document, sexual violence against refugee women was 
recognized as an effect of migration, not only its cause. 
The UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (1991) were intended to 
protect refugee women who experienced sexual violence during exile and displacement in the 
refugee camps because women comprised the greatest percentage of forced migrants.  The 
guidelines were not intended to serve as a tool for asylum seekers to claim persecution based on 
gendered harm.  However, with their publication, immigrant advocates worldwide capitalized on 
the increasing transnational awareness of gendered harm and began national campaigns to 
implement gender-based asylum laws and policies (Crawley 2001). Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) were particularly influential.  Organizations such as the Center for Gender 
and Refugee Studies, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, The International Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission, The Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, and The 
American Immigration Lawyer's Association, have played an instrumental role in making 
gender-based harm a visible and legitimate form of persecution.  Human rights organizations are 
institutionally different from government organizations, in part, because human rights activists 
and organization employees do not adjudicate asylum claims.  However, human rights 
organizations – Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, in particular – are important 
sites of power in asylum adjudication because these organizations issue reports on human rights 
abuses that asylum officers and immigration judges use when deciding whether someone would 
be persecuted if they returned home.   
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Human rights groups contribute toward awareness and assistance in gender-based asylum 
cases in a variety of ways, including issuing reports and monitoring INS processing centers.  The 
Center for Gender and Refugee Studies (CGRS), housed at the University of California – 
Hastings Law School, has created the most comprehensive database available for gender-based 
asylum cases.   Legal scholars at CGRS assist immigration attorneys with gender-based asylum 
applications, write amicus curie briefs, and make gender-based asylum case information at the 
lower courts available through the aid of attorneys who represented those cases. 
Feminist activism from within governmental bureaucracies was also an impetus for 
policy changes that recognized gender-based persecution.  Carol, a policy analyst for the Institute 
for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, described how gender-based 
asylum policies originated due to women’s leadership in key positions of power: 
Around the time the guidelines [INS gender-guidelines] were introduced, the 
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Assistant Secretary of 
the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular 
Affairs were all women – that’s three women in senior positions on immigration and 
refugee policy in the U.S. government who were clearly concerned for refugee women 
and asylum seekers and made [gender-based asylum] a major issue, not just part of some 
routine bureaucratic process. 
 
These campaigns by media and human rights groups have focused attention on asylum 
seekers fleeing gender-based harm, although this group comprises only a small percentage of all 
refugees.  Based on Carol’s estimate, at the time the 1991 UN Guidelines were published, 99% 
of all refugees were living in developing countries, while only 1% sought asylum in 
industrialized nation-states.  Thus, one outcome of national gendered-based laws and policies 
was to displace focus from migrant women in refugee camps to those seeking asylum from 
gender-based harm.  These groups reflect the global class divide between female refugees and 
asylum seekers who experience gendered harm.  Unlike many asylum seekers who can marshal 
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sufficient resources to migrate to an asylum-receiving country, refugees tend to be poor and 
without resources for migration. 
Legal scholar Alexander Aleinikoff (unpublished paper), argues that the five original 
grounds of persecution (e.g. race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership in a 
social group) reflect the different groups of persecuted populations in Nazi Germany, designating 
the category social group as a euphemism for homosexual.  One immigrant advocate, interpreted 
the absence of gender as the following: "I doubt that they [the drafter's of the UNHCR refugee 
definition] even gave consideration to the concept that you might be persecuted on account of 
your gender." 
In 1985, the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) adopted Conclusion No. 39, the first initiative to address gender-based 
persecution regarding asylum: 
States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the interpretation 
that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their 
having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be 
considered as a "particular social group" within the meaning of Article 1 A(2) 
of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention (cited in Macklin 1999: 274). 
  
The UN cannot enforce this or any other guideline it has issued.  Instead, nation-states decide 
who may gain asylum and under what circumstances.  The first country to introduce gender-
based persecution guidelines was Canada, in 1993, and the U.S. followed two years later in 1995 
with the INS guidelines for asylum officers (Coven 1995).  Currently, nine countries have either 
accepted or introduced gender-based guidelines as part of their asylum adjudication process: 
Canada, the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, South Africa, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, 
  27 
and the Netherlands.15  In 2002, approximately 39% of all asylum seekers submitted their claim 
in eight of the nine countries that have either accepted or introduced gender-based guidelines 
(UNHCR  2004).16
One way to have gender-based asylum claims recognized as forms of persecution, is 
through domestic laws and policy. Domestic law includes congressional acts and judicial case 
law.  Policy refers to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulations and executive 
directives. In 1995, the INS introduced “gender guidelines” in a memorandum that provided 
“guidance and background on adjudicating cases of women having asylum claims based wholly 
or in part on their gender” (Coven 1995). Issued by the INS as guidelines for asylum officers, 
this proposal has not been accepted into the Federal Code of Regulations and currently remains 
as a guideline and not as policy. As of 2006, these regulations are under review by the U.S. 
Attorney General. Although the Department of Homeland Security, the overseer of the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, has recommended acceptance, there has been no final 
approval as yet from the Department of Justice (Swarns 2004).  
After the gender guidelines were drafted, the INS incorporated a lesson plan on Female 
Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims in the required asylum officer training.  The 
following lesson plan from November 30, 2001 is the most recent version.  In this lesson plan, 
the gendered language of harm was changed to include men.  The  lesson plan introduces gender-
based claims as the following: 
 In addressing gender-related issues, this lesson primarily focuses on female 
 asylum-seekers, because these issues most commonly arise in the context of 
 adjudicating women's asylum claims.  However, it is recognized that gender-related 
 issues may also be  present in claims brought by men, and many of the  principles 
                                                 
15 The Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at the University of California Hastings Law School maintains the 
most current information on national and international law on gender-based asylum. This information may be found 
at the following website: http://www.cgrs.uhastings.edu. 
16 No data are available for South Africa. 
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 addressed in this lesson may apply equally to claims raised by male or female asylum 
 seekers (INS 2001b: 5). 
 
Although the policy guidelines were updated to include men, during my interviews with asylum 
officers and judges, none were able to provide me with examples of gender-based claims 
submitted by male asylum seekers.  The inability to recall examples of gendered persecution 
claims by men, on the part of asylum officers and judges, may reflect how the addition of men to 
recent policy directives on gendered asylum claims may exist more in theory than in practice. 
The decentralized and multifaceted legal system in the United States provides other 
arenas for immigrant activists, policymakers, and scholars.  Case law is one area in which 
important decisions regarding gender-based persecution have been made.  For example, when the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the appellate board for all immigration courts in the 
United States, granted Fauziya Kassindja asylum for fleeing female circumcision, it created a 
precedent (Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. and N. Dec. 357 BIA 1996).17  Because the Kasinga case 
was not appealed, it established the legal basis for extending protection to any immigrant woman 
claiming asylum for herself on the basis of a fear of female circumcision (future persecution), the 
occurrence of circumcision (past persecution), or the fear that her daughters would be 
circumcised in the future.18
                                                 
17 The spelling of Kassindja and Kasinga are incongruent. The asylum seeker’s last name is spelled Kassindja and 
the legal case is spelled Kasinga because the INS airport inspector who processed Fauziya’s application spelled her 
last name incorrectly when she arrived in the United States. See Fauziya Kassindja and Layli Miller Bashir’s Do 
They Hear You When You Cry? for details of Fauziya’s interactions with the INS that led to this discrepancy. 
 
18 All immigration laws are federal laws, and published federal law cases are precedent cases and therefore legally 
binding. When an immigration case is published by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), it is legal precedent 
for the entire country, and when a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals case is published, it is legal precedent for that 
circuit. When BIA cases are overturned by a U.S. Circuit Court, those cases are only “good law” for those circuits. 
For example, in Fatin v. INS (1993), this third circuit court of appeals published case set a legal precedent that 
feminism is a form of political opinion that is only legally binding in asylum offices and immigration courts in the 
geographical boundaries of the third circuit. 
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 Congressional law is also an avenue for passing gender-based persecution relief.  In 
1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRRA) outlined stringent changes 
in the asylum system that included the “one-year rule” mandating that immigrants file an asylum 
application within one year of arrival to the United States. This act also created expedited 
removal, or summary removal, of immigrants arriving with false or no documentation who do 
not explicitly express a fear of persecution at their port of entry. Within this generally restrictive 
legislation, however, is a significant gain for those asylum seekers fleeing coercive population 
control.  An amendment to this Act defines forced abortions and involuntary sterilization as acts 
of persecution; a gain made possible by the influence of the pro-life lobby, demonstrating how 
legal advances in gender-based asylum law are made by the right as well as the left. 
The INS gender guidelines and U.S. Congressional law benefit only those who seek 
asylum in the United States.   There has been an international push by scholars and activists to 
include gender, in addition to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership in a 
social group, in the UN refugee/asylee definition (Stevens 1993).  Yet immigration rights 
activists are anxious about adding gender to the list of protected grounds, for both international 
(United Nations Convention) and national (Immigration and Nationality Act) law, at this time 
when anti-immigrant sentiment from the Bush administration and the United States population in 
the aftermath of September 11th may result in more stringent criteria for deciding what 
constitutes persecution and who may be considered eligible for asylum.  Immigration advocates 
in the United States fear that opening the status of the refugee definition would necessitate a 
debate over what constitutes a well-founded fear, currently defined as a “reasonable possibility” 
which translates numerically as a “1 in 10” chance that persecution would happen (Germain 
2000, 28). They fear that the narrower definition of a “more than likely chance” interpreted by 
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other humanitarian forms of relief such as the Torture Convention would instead be included.  
Further, opening the definition of refugee/asylee, they fear, may result in more restrictive 
policies. Under U.S. asylum law, the persecutor may be an agent of the State or an agent from 
whom the State is unwilling or unable to protect a person.  If the definition is opened for 
discussion, it could be restricted to refer exclusively to a person suffering persecution by agents 
of the State, which is the case now for other signatories to the Convention, such as Germany.  
Opening the definition with the intent of adding gender as a basis for persecution could thus do 
more harm than good for all asylum seekers, including women.  Opening the definition allows 
any changes to the current Convention -- changes that may facilitate or impede migrants’ ability 
to gain asylum – to be heard before the signatories to the Convention. 
In the next section, I outline the legal studies literature on gender-based asylum and 
feminist responses to gendered harm.  I draw from the theories and debates in the scholarly 
literature on transnationalism and postcolonialism to critique legal scholars’ arguments about 
gendered harm.  
2.2 TRANSNATIONAL, POSTCOLONIAL, AND LEGAL CRITIQUES OF 
GENDERED HARM 
The passage of gender-based policies and laws were a victory for immigrant advocates.  
However, feminist scholars are critical of the assumptions about the category of “woman” that 
activists and policy makers engaged in order to bring about institutional change for female 
asylum seekers.  In this section, I first outline the legal scholarship on gender-based persecution.  
I rely on non-legal feminist scholars, such as Susan Moller Okin (2000) and Carole Pateman 
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(1992), to explain ideas such as androcentrism and the public/private dichotomy that legal 
scholars use to explain gender-based asylum.  I then argue that transnational and postcolonial 
feminist scholars can provide a more nuanced understanding of gender than most legal 
scholarship.   
2.2.1 Legal Studies and Gender Based Persecution 
Feminist legal scholars have made a number of important critiques of the use of  “gender-
specific persecution” in U.S. asylum law (Boyd 1999; Macklin 1999; Meyer 1998; Ericson 1998; 
Malone 1997; Wilets 1997; Stark 1996; Kelly 1993; Neal 1988).  Three themes are central: 
androcentrism; the public/private dichotomy; and conceptualizing women as a social group.19   
The first theme in the legal scholarship on gender-based persecution is that asylum law is 
androcentric because it assumes that men and their experiences circumscribe the types of harm 
that constitute persecution (Boyd 1999; Malone 1997; Wilets 1997; Kelly 1993; Stevens 1993).  
In her essay that traces the convergences and disparities between international human rights 
covenants and grassroots organizing, Susan Moller Okin (2000) calls for a mandatory 
“rethinking of human rights” given the widespread global attention to women’s human rights 
(26).  Okin argues that the fundamental problem with incorporating women’s human rights into 
an existing human rights framework is that theories, laws, and ideas of what constitute human 
rights follow a male model.  This male model, also referred to as androcentrism, assumes that 
men’s experiences provide the framework for rights under which women’s experiences are 
                                                 
19 One understudied topic in feminist legal studies is how asylum law may not recognize forms of gendered harm 
that tend to happen to men, such as forced conscription.  Instead, the focus on gendered harm is exclusively directed 
at understanding the forms of harm that women tend to experience.  In chapter 6, I discuss how a male asylum 
seeker’s case based on a fear of persecution because of his sexual orientation could also be considered gendered 
harm. 
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subsumed.  Based on Okin’s theory, asylum law is androcentric to the extent that it does not 
recognize as persecution the full range of the types of harm that women face, such as rape, 
female circumcision, forced marriage, domestic violence, and forced sterilization.  If the law 
does not recognize these harms as persecution that necessitate state protection, many women 
who experience gender-based persecution are unlikely to receive asylum. 
A second theme is that asylum law privileges "public" acts of persecution and subordinates 
"private" acts of persecution.  In her critique of liberalism, Carole Pateman (1992) argues that 
liberalism promotes a public/private dichotomy that is gendered, with women’s activities 
relegated to the private realm of domesticity and men’s to the public world of power and politics. 
In her essay on asylum in the United Kingdom, Heaven Crawley (1999) relies on Pateman’s 
notion of a public/private dichotomy to understand gender-based persecution.  According to 
Crawley, liberal human rights’ policies and laws “rest[s] on and reproduce[s] various 
dichotomies between the public and private spheres” (310).  Crawley argues that because 
“traditional rights law has so sharply distinguished the public sphere from the private sphere of 
the home, courts are likely to characterize familial violence as a personal dispute” (319).  The 
implication for women who apply for asylum is that their “experiences are conceptualized as 
‘private’ – private to personal relationships, private to cultures, and private to states – and 
therefore beyond the scope of international protection efforts” (329).  Crawley’s reading of the 
gendered character of asylum is interesting for distinguishing how the state differentiates 
women’s and men’s practices.  If women’s persecution is private and men’s public, it follows 
that international law that only protects “public” persecution will privilege men’s asylum claims. 
The link between a public/private schema of social life and women’s human rights is that the 
types of persecution women face, such as domestic violence, forced marriage, and female 
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circumcision, overwhelmingly take place in “private” institutions such as the family.  If the 
harms women face occur in a sphere of privacy that render these acts invisible, legal redress via 
international instruments is incomprehensible through a rhetoric of rights that only considers 
“public” acts of harm worthy of enforcement.   
The third theme is that persecution becomes a legitimate basis for asylum claims only if 
women are conceptualized as a social group.  Because international agreements, such as the 1951 
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, do not currently recognize gender specific 
persecution as a criterion for granting asylum status, gender persecution has overwhelmingly 
come to be understood under the rubric of “membership in a social group.”  Under asylum law, 
being part of a social group has come to mean “a group of persons all of whom share a common, 
immutable characteristic” that “members of the group cannot change, or it must be one that the 
members should not be required to change because it is so fundamental to the members’ 
individual identity or conscience” (Kelly 1993: 648-9).  There is some dispute considering how 
useful the rubric of social group is for adjudicating gender-based asylum claims.  While some 
legal scholars, such as David Neal (1988), argue that the legal framework for adjudicating 
gender-based claims is already in place if women are conceptualized as a social group, others, 
such as Nancy Kelly (1993), claim that understanding women as a social group is still 
androcentric and that adjudicating gender-based claims under this rubric is thus  problematic.  
David Neal’s and Nancy Kelly assume that it is possible (even if undesirable) to treat all women 
as a social group.  Neither discusses the theoretical implications of viewing women as 
constituting a group.   
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2.2.2 Critiques of Gendered Harm  
Transnational and postcolonial feminist scholars pay particular attention to how gender is central 
to understanding the asymmetries and inequalities of power in global processes such as 
nationalism (Grewal and Kaplan 1994), race (Stoler 2002), citizenship (Ong 1999), culture 
(Narayan 2000; Yeĝenoĝlu 1998; Spivak 1985), democracy movements (Mohanty and 
Alexander 1997), human rights (Grewal 2005), migration (Pessar and Mahler 2003; Hondagneu-
Sotelo 1997), and knowledge production (Mohanty 2003; Bulbeck 1998; Mohanty 1991).   
The term transnational is generally used to explain the movement of capital, goods, 
people, and ideas across national borders (Smith 2001; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Appadurai 
1996; Basch et al 1994).  The term was first introduced to explain the emergence of 
multinational corporations organized by capital ownership in the first world and the search for 
cheap labor in the third world (Guarnizo and Smith 1998).  The transnational movement of 
capital sparked a debate on the role of the nation-state, in particular, the demise of power of third 
world nation-states in the context of global capitalism.   
Postcolonialism is the study of the effects of colonization on societies that are now 
independent nation-states that were once ruled by European countries.  Postcolonial scholars 
have taken literature as their primary focus to show how colonial powers altered indigenous 
cultures by distorting the experiences and realities of those populations (Said 1978; Bhabha 
1990).  These scholars encourage a re-writing of history that emphasizes the subjectivity of the 
oppressed and view their central mission as one that encourages the colonized to articulate their 
own identity and reclaim their past (Mani 1998; Spivak 1985).   
A significant body of postcolonial feminist scholarship critiques Western feminists for 
speaking on behalf of third world women in the name of feminist solidarity (Spivak 1985; 
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Mohanty 1991).20  Similar to the ways in which postcolonial scholars use literature to critique 
colonial imperialism, postcolonial feminist scholars take Western feminist scholarship as their 
point of departure to critique Western feminists for using their own culture as the yardstick for 
measuring third world women’s status.  Transnational feminist scholars challenge U.S.-centric 
feminist scholarship that is uncritical of dualities such as West and nonWest, modernity and 
tradition, and global and local (Grewal and Kaplan 1994).  According to Inderpal Grewal and 
Caren Kaplan (1994), these binaries are problematic for feminist scholarship because they allow 
conceptualizations of gender to operate explicitly within a U.S. framework that "dangerously 
correspond[s] to the colonial-nationalism model that leaves out certain subaltern groups" (11).  
The subaltern groups that Grewal and Kaplan refer to are women outside of the United States.   
Transnational feminists are critical of how American feminists are unreflexive about how the 
United States operates as an invisible uncontested site of power in transnational processes 
(Grewal and Kaplan 1994).  They argue that the U.S. is invisible and uncontested in that 
American feminists assume an ethnocentric view of gender as it pertains to issues of migration, 
human rights, citizenship, and other transnational processes.   
 Patricia Pessar and Sarah Mahler (2003) offer a framework that allows for a critique of 
U.S. hegemonic power in their work on gendered geographies of power.  Pessar and Mahler 
expand on transnational migration scholarship to account for how nation-states and citizenship, 
in addition to migrants and the migration process, are gendered.  They urge advocates of 
transnational frameworks to incorporate what they term a gendered geography of power that 
situates gendered migration in a specific location in transnational space, and emphasizes how 
                                                 
20 Postcolonial feminist theory addresses three critiques of anti-imperialism that include a critique of orientalist 
Western feminism, masculinist nationalisms and ethnocentric patriarchies, and simple and singular binaries that 
ignore intersectionality and the multiplicity of social life.  In this dissertation, I draw primarily from postcolonial 
scholars who critique Western feminism. 
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gender, in relation to other power hierarchies, organizes migration.  While they do not specify 
how the U.S. is a global site of hegemonic power, their framework for understanding states, 
gender, and power hierarchies has great potential for illuminating the hegemonic power of the 
United States which makes it a destination for so many of the world’s migrants. 
The emphasis on androcentrism, the public/private dichotomy, and women as a social 
group subordinates differences based on class, race, and nation to differences based on sex.  
Postcolonial feminist scholars are particularly sensitive to these issues, as evidenced in their 
discussion of the problematic of three themes that include essentialism, views of the third world 
as barbaric, and conceptual Othering that can be used to critique the legal rationale of gendered 
harm. 
The first theme is essentialism.  Scholars such as Nira Yuval-Davis (1993; 1989) and 
Floya Anthias (1989), warn against homogenizing the category of “woman.”  The deconstruction 
of the category “woman” has long been a staple of feminist theorizing (hooks 2000; Collins 
2000; Mohanty 2003; Mohanty 1991).  Chandra Mohanty (1991) states that treating “woman” as 
a category of analysis assumes that “all of us of the same gender, across classes and cultures, are 
somehow socially constructed as a homogenous group,” perpetuates a unified notion of 
“woman” (56).  The term “woman” as a category of analysis need not imply that all women are 
identical nor that they have no other significant attributes. Mohanty is critical of how some 
Western feminists use the term in ways that ignores diversity, such as  national and racial 
differences, within the category.  Scholars of asylum law would benefit from a more integrated 
and nuanced conceptualization of the term woman since gender alone is an insufficient category 
of analysis for examining and critiquing asylum practices. 
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The second theme is idea that the third world is barbaric.  In his celebrated work 
Orientalism, Edward Said (1978) captures a key feature of social relations when he states that the 
“development and maintenance of every culture require[s] the existence of another” (331).  
Throughout the text, Said argues that an image of the Orient emerged in relation to an image of 
the West (specifically, Great Britain and France).  The West created images of the East through 
literature, travel essays, journalism, and scholarship, among other venues of communication, that 
revealed how the West viewed Eastern culture vis-à-vis Western culture.  In Said’s vision, the 
complexity of Orientalism, which he describes as “a way of coming to terms with the Orient that 
is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience,” can only be understood 
when East and West are analyzed in relation to each other (1).   
Postcolonial feminists build on Said’s argument about knowledge and power and extend 
it to argue that Western feminists assume that Western democracies are safe havens from a 
barbaric and torturous third world.  In Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s (1991) essay “Under Western 
Eyes,” she critiques Western feminist scholarship for creating an “average third world woman” 
and thus implying a universal non-western experience (56).  Mohanty outlines numerous 
dimensions that render third world women “victims” (57).  The implication for gendered harm 
and asylum is that women from third world countries are automatically assumed victims of 
backward, pre-modern practices.   
For example, in 1996, when the Board of Immigration Appeals, or BIA , the appellate 
board for all immigration courts in the United States, granted Fauziya Kassindja asylum from 
Togo for fleeing female circumcision, it created a precedent and established the legal basis for 
extending protection to any immigrant woman claiming asylum for herself on the basis of the 
occurrence of circumcision (past persecution), a fear of female circumcision (future persecution), 
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or a fear that her daughters would be circumcised in the future.  The court found that intact 
genitalia are a characteristic so fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that she 
should not be required to change it.  The board also ruled that female circumcision results in 
permanent disfiguration and poses a risk of serious, potentially life threatening, implications, and 
as such, serves as the basis for a claim of persecution.  Three months later, in September of 1996, 
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which made 
the practice of female circumcision on a person under eighteen years of age a crime in the United 
States.   
One analysis of Fauziya's case is that the United States recognized a private practice as 
persecution, reflecting the canonical feminist declaration that women’s rights are human rights.  
The legal recognition that certain human rights abuses are gendered because they are 
overwhelmingly experienced by women has emerged as the benchmark for gendered equality in 
asylum adjudication.  Yet an alternative reading is that the U.S. government was distancing itself 
from “foreign” cultural practices.   
This alternative interpretation is understood through the third theme of Othering.  Similar 
to the ways in which Edward Said argued how Orientalism “has less to do with the Orient than it 
does with ‘our’ world,” Fauziya’s case tells us more about what it means to be an American 
based on the cultural practice of female circumcision: female circumcision is not something 
“Americans” do.  As Janet Dench, a member of the Canadian Council on Refugees, states “the 
more different a practice is from what’s done in our society, the easier it is to call it a human-
rights abuse” (Davidson 1994: 24).  While Dench’s interpretation of how practices are 
understood as human rights abuses may be true in some instances, human rights organizations 
often recognize and work toward eradicating domestic practices as human rights abuses.  For 
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example, Amnesty International treats capital punishment, a U.S. practice, as a human rights 
abuse.    
Uma Narayan (2000) argues that notions of culture, tradition, and gender are inextricably 
linked in ways that make any comprehension of one as an independent dimension nearly 
impossible.  She focuses on Western constructions of third world societies as “totalizing 
cultures” that depict an essentialism of cultural practice tied to place.  She traces the ahistorical 
and apolitical appropriation of sati by Western feminists as endemic to women’s subordination 
in India.  The problem with equating sati with female oppression is not grounded in a defense of 
the practice per se, according to Narayan, but in a plea for understanding the ways in which sati 
is deployed as an example of the subjugation of Indian women by certain Western feminists.  
The simultaneous gendering and Othering of third world women by some Western feminists is 
captured by Mohanty who purports that third world women become “objects-who-defend-
themselves” and third world men as “subjects-who-perpetrate-violence” (58).  The significance 
of Mohanty’s analysis is that Western feminists often make an “analytic leap” from descriptive 
practices, to generalizable assumptions of women’s universal oppression.  The “leap” is 
problematic because Western feminists often ignore the social and historical specificity that give 
meaning to violence in a particular context.   
For example, some Western feminists depict female circumcision as a patriarchal practice 
that men perpetuate in order to control women’s sexuality (Lightfoot-Klein 1989; Hicks 1993).  
The problem with this analysis is that ignores how women facilitate acts of violence by 
performing circumcisions on women and girls.  Moreover, Mohanty argues that the practice 
itself need not signify oppression because not all women (in particular those who have been 
circumcised) may consider female circumcision an act of violence.  I discuss Mohanty’s 
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argument again in chapter 6 where I offer examples of women who gained asylum because of 
female circumcision as a form of persecution and show the different ways that they understand 
the practice. 
Some scholars disagree with postcolonial, poststructural, and postmodern scholars’ 
critiques of essentialism (MacKinnon 2006; Collins 1998).  Patricia Hill Collins (1998) argues 
that the value of an essentialist position is that it serves to support political claims of the 
oppressed.  The potential for women to lose their ability to claim asylum in the absence of an 
essentialist narrative of harm could be viewed by these critics as one way that a postcolonial 
view on gendered harm could undermine women’s asylum claims.  In chapter 6, I address how 
female circumcision claims are often based on essentialist stereotypes of third world women as 
victims of barbaric practices and how the ability to grant claims on this basis does not necessitate 
a narrative of victim status. 
In this section, I have argued that postcolonial critiques of gendered harm offer a more 
nuanced framework than that posed by legal feminist scholars for understanding gender-based 
asylum claims.  These critiques are more nuanced because of their potential for showing how 
essentialist and ethnocentric understandings of gender and gender-based persecution permeate 
the asylum adjudication process.  Relying on postcolonial feminist arguments, I will show how 
gendered understandings of race, class, nation and sexuality inform the practices of asylees, 
immigration attorneys, immigrant service providers, asylum officers, and immigration judges 
when applying for, preparing, and adjudicating gender-based asylum claims.  I situate the United 
States in global and local space by offering empirical evidence of how the United States is a site 
of transnational practices regarding migration and gender based harm.  In the next chapter, I 
describe the research methodology.   
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3.0  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In order to learn how gender-based asylum policies and laws are applied and interpreted, I 
designed a multi-method ethnographic study based in Los Angeles that included participant 
observation through volunteer work with immigrant service organizations and human rights 
groups; observations of immigration court hearings; semi-structured interviews with asylees 
(persons with a grant of asylum), immigrant service providers, immigration attorneys, 
immigration judges, asylum officers and supervisors, and human rights organization employees 
and activists; and document analysis of asylum application materials, asylum officer training 
manuals, and human rights organizations' detention-monitoring reports.  I collected data in Los 
Angeles from August 2001 to April 2003, and completed interviews with human rights 
organization employees and policy makers in Washington DC, New York, and San Francisco in 
June 2003.  I supplemented my fieldwork with interviews with policy analysts at the Institute for 
the Study of International Migration in Washington DC, human rights organization employees at 
Human Rights Watch and the International Rescue Committee in New York, and the 
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, and legal 
scholars at the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies in San Francisco.  
I chose a multi-method study in order to gain greater insight into how persecution is 
articulated by differently situated participants in the implementation and responses to asylum 
laws and policies.  Participant observation allowed me access to the workplace bureaucracy of 
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immigrant service provider and human rights organizations.  Observations of immigration court 
hearings gave me unique insight into the structure of asylum hearings and the interactions among 
asylum seekers, judges, attorneys, and language interpreters.  Documentation such as asylum 
applications provided textual narratives and information on the various components of what 
constitutes evidence of persecution.  
I chose Los Angeles as the fieldwork site because of its high volume of asylum 
applications.  In fiscals years 2001 and 2002, the Anaheim asylum office and Los Angeles 
immigration court received the highest number of asylum applications in the United States.    
Table 5 shows the number of asylum applications received and the percentage of the U.S. total in 
Los Angeles in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 (INS 2003a; 2002; EOIR 2003; 2002).  
Table 7: Asylum Applications Received and the Percentage of U.S. Total in Los Angeles in 2001 and 200221
Application Type 2001 2002 
INS 
(Asylum Office) 
  
Number Received (U.S.) 62,984 
 
63,197 
 
Number Received (Los Angeles) 18,184 16,213 
Los Angeles Applications as 
Percentage of U.S. Total 
29% 26% 
EOIR 
(Immigration Court) 
  
Number Received (U.S.) 61,832 
 
74,127 
 
Number Received (Los Angeles) 18,056 19,341 
Los Angeles Applications as 
Percentage of U.S. Total 
29% 26% 
 
Sources: Immigration and Naturalization Service and Executive Office for Immigration 
Review, 2002-2003. 
 
                                                 
21 Percentage granted is rounded to the nearest tenths.  
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Asylum applications in Los Angeles comprise nearly one-third of all asylum applications 
submitted to the INS asylum office and immigration court.   
Applications submitted to the INS Los Angeles office for other types of immigration 
adjustment statuses, such as those for permanent residency and those for naturalization to U.S. 
citizenship, comprise a smaller percentage of the total of all U.S. cases.  The following table 
shows data for the number of immigrants admitted to the U.S. and to Los Angeles in 2001 and 
2002 (INS 2002; INS 2001).   
Table 8: Immigrants Admitted by Area of Intended Residence in the U.S. and Los Angeles in 2001 and 200222
INS 2001 2002 
U.S. 1,064,318 1,063,732 
 Los Angeles23 98,997 108,613 
Immigrants Admitted to Los 
Angeles as Percentage of U.S. 
Total 
9% 10% 
 
Sources: Immigration and Naturalization Service 2001-2002. 
 
Unlike applications filed in the INS asylum office and immigration court, which are done after 
the immigrant enters the U.S., immigrants request consideration to enter the U.S. for permanent 
residency prior to their arrival.  The number of applicants who expressed Los Angeles as their 
intended area of residence comprised 9% of the U.S. total in 2001 and 10% of the U.S. in 2002.   
The following table shows data for the number of people who naturalized to U.S. 
citizenship in the U.S. and Los Angeles in 2001 and 2002 (INS 2002; INS 2001). 
                                                 
22 Percentage granted is rounded to the nearest tenths. 
23 Data includes Long Beach, California. 
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Table 9: Naturalization by Metropolitan Area in the U.S. and Los Angeles in 2001 and 200224
INS 2001 2002 
U.S. 608,205 888,788 
Los Angeles25 77,331 136,892 
Naturalizations in Los Angeles as 
Percentage of U.S. Total 
13% 15% 
 
Sources: Immigration and Naturalization Service 2001-2002. 
 
Of the total number of naturalizations to U.S. citizenship in 2001 and 2002, Los Angeles 
represented 13% and 15%, respectively.  Yet for those same years, asylum claims in Los Angeles 
comprised nearly one-third of all asylum claims submitted to the INS (29% in 2001 and 26% in 
2002). 
There is a similar pattern for claims submitted to the Los Angeles immigration court.  
The following table shows data for the total number of immigration court matters in the U.S. and 
Los Angeles in 2001 and 2002 (EOIR 2003). 
Table 10: Total Immigration Court Matters in the U.S. and Los Angeles in 2001 and 2002 
EOIR 2001 2002 
U.S. 282,584 290,652 
Los Angeles 24,820 28,299 
Court Matters in Los Angeles as 
Percentage of U.S. Total 
9% 10% 
 
Sources: Executive Office for Immigration Review, 2003 
 
Approximately one-tenth of all immigration court matters in the U.S. were submitted in the Los 
Angeles immigration court in 2001 and 2002 (9% and 10%, respectively).  Yet the Los Angeles 
                                                 
24 Percentage granted is rounded to the nearest tenths. 
25 Data includes Long Beach, California. 
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immigration court received nearly one-third (29% in 2001 and 26% in 2002) of all asylum claims 
submitted in the U.S. for those same years. 
In addition to the high volume of asylum claims submitted to the Los Angeles INS 
asylum office and immigration court, it is difficult to know whether and how Los Angeles may 
differ from other potential sites for research on gender-based asylum.  Los Angeles is distinct 
from New York City, the site that receives the second highest number of asylum applications, 
regarding policies on detention.  Prior to March 2003, asylum seekers in detention facilities in 
Los Angeles were released until the time of their asylum hearing.  Conversely, asylum seekers in 
New York City have been held in detention centers for months, and sometimes years, before 
their court hearing prior to the March 2003 changes in the Los Angeles INS processing center 
(Dow 2004).  The implication for this research is that I may have had greater access to asylum 
seekers if fewer migrants were detained in Los Angeles.   
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
I chose a qualitative approach for this study because my research questions cannot be answered 
with the available INS and EOIR data.  Data such as that found in INS and EOIR statistical 
yearbooks provide information on how many women and men apply for and either gain or are 
denied asylum, but not on how gender-based persecution laws and polices emerge, how they are 
implemented, or how law and policy makers, asylees, and human rights activists respond to 
them. 
 During my interview with Michael, an asylum supervisor at the Anaheim office, he 
explained that "in our database, asylum officers have to mark which grounds the person claimed.  
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If you want to know how many gender persecution cases were granted or denied, you are not 
going to get any usable figures out of this system because it only says race or nationality.  I 
granted a domestic violence case once for religious reasons.  If you searched the database for that 
application, it would show religious persecution, not domestic violence."  By "marking the 
grounds," Michael refers to the five legally accepted grounds of persecution that include race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, membership in a social group.  His example of domestic 
violence demonstrates that type of harm is not recorded, only the ground on which that harm is 
based.  This means that the INS and EIOR have no publicly available data on how many types of 
gender-based asylum claims, such as female circumcision, honor killings, or domestic violence, 
are adjudicated.   
In this project, I examine gender-based persecution at multiple levels of analysis.  I use a 
micro-approach, focusing on individual experiences, by interviewing individuals, observing 
behavior, and analyzing documents about those who gain asylum.  I also approach this project 
from a macro-level perspective by exploring laws, policies, organizations, and social 
movements.  I analyze data on individuals and the structures they negotiate to show how gender-
based persecution is articulated at different levels of analysis. 
I situate this study in what sociologist Barry Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) termed 
grounded theory, a mode of inductive inquiry.  This method of inquiry begins with observations 
and then seeks to discover patterns based on those observations.  There are no dependent or 
operationalized variables.  However, my initial notions about gender-based persecution guided 
the data collection (as demonstrated in the next section on my interactions with immigration 
attorneys) process.  I attempted to let as many possible understandings of gender-based harm 
emerge during by asking opened-ended questions during interviews that allowed participants in 
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the asylum process to describe how they engage practices that define gender and persecution.  I 
focus on struggles over the meanings of gender and persecution instead of offering 
operationalized definitions of these concepts. 
The sampling method was purposive, with the sample size determined by availability of 
subjects, sampling of legally recognized gender-based claims, and multiple-sites of snowball 
sampling.  Probability sampling was impossible for at least two reasons:  First, because of how 
the INS and EOIR collect data, there is no way to know how many or what types of gender-
based claims are received.  No list of all gender-based asylum claims is available in the United 
States to serve as a sampling frame.  Second, asylum seekers who have experienced legally 
recognized gender-based harm do not reveal this information in their application.  Rape, for 
example, is form of harm asylum seekers often exclude in their applications.   
3.2 ENTRÉE INTO THE FIELD 
Upon arriving in Los Angeles, I made contact with the following people and organizations who 
work with asylum seekers.  I emailed the district director of the San Francisco INS asylum 
office, whom I met during a summer program on refugee studies at York University.  The 
director put me in touch with a supervisor at the Anaheim office, who facilitated my interviews 
with asylum supervisors, and an administrator at INS headquarters in Washington, D.C., who 
provided me with data on asylum by sex through the INS asylum database system.  When I 
inquired whether data were available for gender-based claims, the administrator replied that "the 
INS is not a research center. We don't keep that kind of data."  Michael, the supervisor at the 
Anaheim asylum office, put me in touch with another supervisor who met with me in October of 
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2001, and made arrangements for me to have copies of the asylum officer training materials, 
memos and letters regarding gender-based asylum claims, and other documentation such as 
copies of the Code of Federal Regulations pertaining to asylum.  I met with Michael in 
November and he agreed that I could interview him and other supervisors, but would need 
approval from  INS headquarters before he would allow me to interview current asylum 
supervisors.  By September of 2002, there was no reply from INS headquarters and Michael 
made arrangements for me to interview him and five other supervisors, all of whom had 
previously served as asylum officers in their career. 
In September of 2001, I contacted four refugee resettlement organizations in Los Angeles 
and inquired whether they serve asylees.  Of the four organizations, two served asylees through 
direct services, one provided a legal clinic for asylum seekers detained in INS processing 
facilities, and one only served refugees.  I met with personnel of the two resettlement agencies 
that provide direct services in October and made arrangements to work as a volunteer for the 
organizations.  One immigrant service provider whom I met with, Snezana, a case manager for a 
resettlement agency that serves refugees and asylees, provided me contact information for three 
immigration attorneys employed by a non-governmental organization that provides free legal 
services for asylum seekers.  I also met with the clinical director of a domestic violence shelter 
that offers services for immigrant women.  She provided me with contact information for an 
attorney employed by a University legal clinic who works in the area of family law.  From this 
contact, I was given the name of the director of the asylum program employed by the same 
University clinic.  The director of the resettlement agency that served refugees exclusively, 
provided me with contact information for an organization that serves torture survivors to which 
she refers asylum seekers.  I met with the clinical director of the torture survivor program in 
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October and made arrangements to work as a volunteer.  During our meeting she provided me 
with the names of three private practice immigration attorneys who represented clients of the 
organization.  After a few weeks of leaving telephone messages, I was able to contact a Priest 
who works for the organization that provides legal services for detained asylum seekers.  He 
provided me with contact information for two immigration attorneys employed by the 
organization.   
These five organizations served as initial sampling points from which I was able to locate 
asylees and immigration attorneys.  I located other immigration attorneys through a website 
database of gender-based asylum cases supported by the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies.  
This database included names and locations of immigration attorneys.  I contacted three 
attorneys from the Los Angeles area from this database.  The attorney from the University Clinic 
provided me the name of an INS processing center administrator who served as my contact for 
interviewing supervisors at the detention center in San Pedro.  After many months of data 
collection, I made contact with immigration reform activists who provided me with contact 
information on former INS border patrol agents whom I later interviewed over the telephone. 
I contacted Amnesty International in September of 2001 and was provided with the 
names of two activists, Thomas, who organized a detention monitoring team, and Phyllis, who 
organized a women's rights conference.  The Amnesty activists told me told me about their 
meetings and upcoming events.  I contacted Human Rights Watch in March of 2002 through a 
paralegal contact, and immediately began attending their meetings and events.  I located other 
human rights groups through activists in Amnesty International and immigrant service providers. 
All asylees were contacted through immigration attorneys, immigrant service providers, 
human rights activists, and other immigrants.  While I only conducted interviews with asylees, I 
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met with asylum seekers through volunteer work with immigrant service organizations and 
observed asylum seekers in immigration court hearings. 
In an effort to understand the patterns that structure everyday social exchanges, 
sociologist Harold Garfinkle (1967) advanced ethnomethodology as a reflective method of data 
collection.  Garfinkle demonstrated how taken-for-granted understandings of concepts operate in 
verbal exchanges among friends, students and parents, consumers and store clerks.  Throughout 
this study, my exchanges with INS supervisors, judges, attorneys, service providers, and activists 
took the form of Garfinkle's questioning techniques regarding the meaning of gender.  For 
example, an exchange with one attorney over the telephone was as follows: 
 
Connie: I was given your name by _______ because I am writing a dissertation on  
gender-based asylum.  He/she mentioned that you've represented these 
types of cases. 
 Attorney: What do you mean by gender-based claims? 
Connie: I mean cases like honor killings, female circumcision, or domestic  
violence. 
 Attorney: I've never had a domestic violence case. 
 Connie: What about other types of gender claims? 
 Attorney: I've never had any of those cases.  
Connie: Do you know other attorneys who have had those type of cases who you  
could put me in touch with? 
Attorney (Pauses before responding):  I've had clients who were raped, is that  
what you mean? 
 Connie: Yes, I'm interested in rape cases. 
Attorney: I don't know if I would call that a gender case, most of my clients have  
been raped. 
This exchange supports Garfinkle's contention that familiar social interactions are 
structured by assumptions that merit a sociological inquiry in its own right.  While my contacts 
with attorneys and service providers were for the purpose of gaining access to asylees with 
gender-based claims, these exchanges also provided data by answering my research question 
regarding what constitutes gender-based harm.  This example reveals a paradox about gender-
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based claims by showing how rape, a legally recognized form of gender-based harm, is not 
initially understood as such because of its pervasiveness across all asylum claims.  Moreover, in 
my insistence that rape cases should be included, this exchange reveals my pre-conceived 
notions about what types of acts are considered gender-based harm.  Responses by attorneys who 
did not inquire what I meant by gender also gave responses that indicated that gender is a narrow 
dimension of asylum.  For example, one attorney described a case of a client who gained asylum 
because of female circumcision as "it wasn't a strict gender case, I went outside the guidelines,” 
and another described an asylum case of a client based on honor killing and domestic violence as 
"unusual because not many cases are strictly based on gender.”   
Throughout the project, I presented myself as a graduate student writing a dissertation on 
gender-based asylum claims.  There were no circumstances when I engaged in covert research 
tactics to mislead anyone about my intentions as a researcher.  While I did not communicate all 
interactions with each person I came into contact with during the research process, on numerous 
occasions I informed judges and INS asylum supervisors that I volunteered with immigrant 
service organizations and human rights groups and told immigrant advocates and immigration 
attorneys that I was interviewing judges and INS personnel. Although I was open about my 
reasons for volunteering, after working with organizations extensively and establishing contacts 
with many of those interviewed in this project, I suspect that some interviewees and others I 
discuss in this study "forgot" that I was a researcher, evidenced by examples of confiding to me 
information about themselves and others that could prove problematic for their asylum case.  In 
her essay on ethnographic methodology, feminist sociologist Judith Stacey (1996) illuminates the 
limitations of reflexivity in social science research.  According to Stacey (1996), ethnographic 
methods "can expose subjects to far greater danger and exploitation than more positivist, 
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abstract, and masculinist research methods.  And the greater the intimacy, the apparent mutuality 
of the researcher/researched relationship, the greater the danger" (92).   
Throughout the study, few people requested that I provide identification documentation.  
Two of the immigrant service organizations for whom I volunteered photocopied my driver's 
license and one photocopied my automobile insurance card to ensure that I had accident 
coverage while providing transportation for their clients.  One former asylum supervisor 
requested that I bring identification to our initial meeting.  No current INS asylum supervisors, 
immigration judges, immigration attorneys, immigrant service providers (except those with 
which I volunteered), or human rights organization employees or activists requested I that 
provide identification or proof that I was a Ph.D. student.  With no proof of identity, I gained 
access to asylees, their asylum applications, and to those who serve asylum seekers solely on the 
basis of my explanation of being a student researching gender-based asylum claims.  It is 
difficult to know why some immigration attorneys and immigrant service providers did not insist 
that I provide identity documentation, especially those whose with whom contact was restricted 
to telephone communication.  I suspect that busy schedules and lack of staffing may account for 
why some attorneys and service providers did not request identification.  In the section on 
asylum application materials, I discuss how I handled case files that were mailed to me that 
included the applicant’s personal information.   
3.3 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
I used participant observation, interviews, and document analysis as the three methods of data 
collection.  I was unable to tape or video record most observations and took field notes during 
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and after observations of immigration court hearings, INS asylum office visits, and meetings and 
functions at immigrant service organizations and human rights groups.  These notes were 
essential for recalling conversations and behavior for times when I could not record what was 
said or how people were acting and interacting.  In this section, I discuss the challenges in 
collecting ethnographic data.  My goal was to collect data across sources; ideally, I would 
observe an asylum seeker's hearing, interview her after she gains asylum, obtain her application, 
and interview her attorney, service providers, and the judge who adjudicated the case.  
Unfortunately, this was not possible for at least three reasons.  First, the time span between filing 
an asylum application and its adjudication in immigration court can take years and the data 
collection was limited to eighteen months.  Second, all subjects in the project were willing 
participants and some asylees, attorneys, and judges whom I approached refused an interview.  
Third, I was unable to locate some participants for interviews: attorneys lost contact with clients, 
asylees couldn't remember their judges' names, and human rights activists were no longer in 
touch with the detainees they assisted.   
3.3.1 Participant Observation 
In order to gain access to asylees, I volunteered with three organizations that assist asylum 
seekers.  These organizations included a domestic violence shelter that served immigrant women, 
a resettlement agency that assisted refugees and asylees, and a clinical program for torture 
survivors.  I attended meetings and functions hosted by other immigrant service provider 
organizations for which I did not volunteer.  I did limited volunteering and attended meetings, 
fund raisers, speaker and film events with human rights groups and sponsors including Amnesty 
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International, Human Rights Watch, Captive Daughters, and the Visual Artists Guild.  I also 
attended asylum hearings at the Los Angeles immigration court. 
3.3.1.1 Immigrant Service Organizations 
The first of the immigrant service organizations I volunteered with was a domestic violence 
shelter for immigrant women.  I located the shelter through a web-based search on refugees in 
Los Angeles that produced the organization's information.  The domestic violence shelter is one 
of many programs sponsored by a local resettlement agency.  I met with the clinical director of 
the shelter in October of 2001 and she informed me that in order to qualify as a volunteer in the 
State of California, it was necessary to pass a forty hour training course on domestic violence.  
Because I agreed to volunteer for the shelter, the organization paid my $100 fee for the training 
which I completed in January of 2002.  I volunteered with the shelter from February 2002 
through March of 2003.   The clientele at the domestic violence shelter were migrant women of 
various legal statuses including U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, refugees, asylees, 
asylum seekers, VAWA claimants, and those who were undocumented.26  Women located the 
shelter through personal contacts, their affiliation with the resettlement agency, or referral from 
other shelters.  I typically volunteered one day per week, from February 2002 through March 
2003.  I also attended a five week domestic violence training course in order to volunteer with 
the agency and thirteen functions hosted by the organization that included immigrant support and 
informational sessions on post-September 11th INS policies, speakers from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office, fundraisers, and domestic violence 
awareness events.   
                                                 
26 The 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) has a prevision for immigrant women who are abused by their 
husbands if he is a U.S. citizen or a legal permanent resident.  VAWA claimants are women who may adjust their 
legal status independently of their husband's immigrant or citizen status. 
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As a volunteer, I was responsible for providing transportation for clients to family court 
hearings, documentation offices to obtain birth records and criminal records, benefits offices 
such as CALWORKS (the California State aid agency) women, infants, and children (WIC), 
Social Security Administration offices, and meetings with their attorneys.  I was also responsible 
for making phone calls to various bureaucratic offices and helping women negotiate state and 
local agencies, attending group sessions, completing paperwork on the day's activities, and being 
available to talk and listen to the clients and their children.  The shelter was a long-term 
(typically a nine month stay) transitional shelter.  Unlike emergency shelters that provide 
immediate assistance for domestic violence survivors and temporary shelters that provide short-
term assistance, transitional shelters provide long-term assistance.  Clients in transitional shelters 
are expected to establish housing and employment arrangements upon completion of the program 
making them independent from their batterers.  Women who experience domestic violence often 
leave their batterers temporarily before severing the relationship permanently.  Women in 
transitional shelters are more likely to have previously been in emergency and temporary shelters 
only to return to their batterers until they arrive in a transitional shelter.  The shelter housed as 
many as six women and their minor children at any given time.  During my thirteen months of 
volunteering, there were a total of thirteen women and fourteen children housed at the shelter.  
Of the thirteen women, two were U.S. citizens, three were refugees, six were VAWA claimants, 
two were undocumented, and one was an asylum seeker.  I interviewed two of the six VAWA 
claimants, one refugee, and one employee who had gained asylum because of domestic violence 
from the shelter for this study.27
                                                 
27 I interviewed immigrants other than asylees (VAWA claimants, refugees, and a trafficking survivor) in order to 
make comparisons about different types of immigration statuses for women who experience gendered harm.  While I 
do not make use of these interviews in this dissertation, I plan to use them in future research projects and 
publications. 
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The second organization I worked with was a voluntary refugee resettlement agency 
(VOLAG).  I was familiar with the organization from my master's thesis research on refugees 
and made initial contact with the Los Angeles office in October of 2001. The clientele at the 
resettlement agency were migrants who were legally classified as refugees or asylees prior to 
contact with the Los Angeles office.  In June of 2000, the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR), located under the Department of Health and Human Services (DHH), announced that 
asylees would be eligible for refugee assistance and services beginning on the date they are 
granted asylum.  Refugee clients tended to be those who were resettled by the organization prior 
their entry into the United States and were given contact information of the local office in the 
city where they were resettled.  Unlike refugees who are familiar with resettlement agencies, 
because it is these organizations that facilitate their arrival from the refugee camps to the United 
States, asylees discover resettlement agencies by referrals from their attorneys, case workers, or 
in their own immigrant communities. 
The primary project of the agency was its matching grant program structured by the goal 
of making refugees and asylees economically self-sufficient in the United States.  Under the 
program, ORR provides $2.00 for every $1.00 raised by the agency designating 20% of the total 
in cash assistance and 80% in volunteer services for refugees and asylees.  Clients are 
encouraged to enroll in the matching grant program which replaces the refugee cash assistance 
program.  The matching grant program provides cash assistance for 120 days.  Because day one 
of the first 30 day period begins with the first day of arrival in the United States, the first 30 days 
are covered by the refugee cash assistance program and $750 is allotted for the second 30 days, 
$550 for the third 30 day period, and $340 for the remaining 30 days of the program for a single 
adult.  In exchange for the assistance, clients are expected to seek and retain employment with 
  57 
the aid of job placement and skill services provided by the organization.  The ORR 
documentation on the matching program states that eligibility requires ability to communicate in 
English, desire to work, and a cooperative attitude.  Enrollees will be dismissed if they fail to 
attend job counseling, training programs, and office appointments; accept appropriate job 
interviews and placement; keep appropriate jobs without cause; or are fired for lack of 
attendance or poor performance.  
Part of my work as a volunteer was helping asylees locate employment.  In addition to 
helping refugees and asylees locate employment, I also assisted with phone calls to the Social 
Security Administration office that issued social security numbers to refugees and asylees with 
"Valid for Work Only with INS Authorization" stamped on the card.  The Office of Refugee 
Resettlement issued several letters to resettlement agencies alerting them that the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) was issuing restrictive cards to refugees and asylees and that their clients 
should return the card to the issuing office, along with a copy of the SSA policy manual, and 
request a non-restricted card be issued to the client (DHH 2000).  The improper restriction stamp 
on refugees’ and asylees’ social security cards reflects the problems with decentralized 
bureaucracies and national assumptions about the welfare state.  Because bureaucracies tend to 
be decentralized in that agencies are responsible for specific tasks, any particular agency is 
limited in knowing the policies and practices of other agencies.  Unlike ORR, whose population, 
at least initially, are all non-citizens, the SSA assumes that its population is exclusively U.S. 
citizens, and therefore is presented with a conundrum over refugees regarding their eligibility to 
work.  Moreover, the SSA is managing the mobility of newly arrived refugees and persons 
granted asylum by interfering with their ability to gain employment.   
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I volunteered with the resettlement agency from January to July of 2001.  During this 
time, I worked with seven refugees and asylees in the matching grant program.  I interviewed 
one refugee and four asylees who were clients, and two employees of the resettlement agency, 
one of whom was a refugee, for this study.  I also attended four events that included two 
fundraisers and two information meetings about the organization. 
The third organization I volunteered with was a clinical program that provided 
psychological services to torture survivors.  I was referred to the program by a refugee 
resettlement agency that did not work with asylees.  My initial contact with the organization was 
in October of 2001 and my first volunteer assignment was in January of 2002.  The clientele at 
the clinical program were migrants, regardless of legal status, who had been tortured.  Asylum 
seekers overwhelmingly find out about the program because their attorneys refer them for a 
psychological evaluation to include in the asylum application.  Clients also discover the program 
through personal contacts in their own immigrant communities.  The program's primary focus is 
to provide psychological services to survivors of torture which include individual, family, and 
group therapy sessions.  In addition, the organization also orchestrates free medical services 
provided through community clinics for their clients.  Therapists write reports for asylum 
applications and testify on behalf of their clients in immigration court.  Upon gaining asylum, a 
case manager refers clients to a resettlement agency so that they may receive their asylee benefits 
and receive assistance locating employment.  Throughout the time when I served as a volunteer, 
the majority of the clientele were asylum seekers.  While the staff encourages clients to continue 
their therapy after they gain asylum, the staff reported that clients tend to discontinue their visits 
soon after a grant of asylum.  As a volunteer, I was responsible for providing transportation 
to/from INS asylum interviews in Anaheim, asylum hearings in immigration court, and medical 
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visits.  I also assisted one client with locating employment.  I volunteered from January 2002 
through March 2003.  I provided transportation to asylum interviews at the Anaheim INS office, 
asylum hearings in immigration court, medical appointments, and employment assistance.  I also 
attended functions sponsored by the organization that included speakers and torture survivor 
awareness events.  From this organization, I interviewed five clients after they gained asylum, 
two therapists who provided psychological counseling, one case worker, one administrator, and 
one medical doctor responsible for documenting physical evidence of torture.     
In addition to these three organizations, I also attended functions with ten other 
immigrant service organizations including meetings, fundraisers, speakers, films, and 
informational presentations.  I interviewed five service providers, five attorneys, and two 
paralegals employed by eight immigrant service organizations.  I also interviewed four asylees 
and one trafficking survivor from three of these organizations. 
 Because of the extensive volunteering that I did with three of the immigrant service 
organizations, participant observation as a method of data collection was often centered on the 
workplace.  In this sense, my data was similar to what I would have collected for an ethnography 
of workplaces rather than asylum claims.  Ironically, the most frustrating aspect of volunteering 
as a means of data collection was when I was treated as an employee of an organization.  One 
supervisor, in particular, treated me with the same lack of professional ethics as she did paid 
employees at the organization.  For example, many employees told me that they were regularly 
asked to "volunteer" their time when they had worked the required forty hour work week so that 
the organization would not have to compensate for overtime pay, perform duties not in their job 
description such as providing transportation for clients, and to withhold legal complaints 
regarding late and irregular paychecks.  Because I was not an employee, I was not on the 
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organization's payroll and consequently never had problems with late checks.  However, I was 
asked regularly to volunteer more days than in my original negotiation with the clinical director 
of the shelter, and to provide monetary donations to the shelter.  Fortunately, these activities 
were restricted to one organization and the other two organizations with which I volunteered did 
not have these problems.      
Volunteering afforded me the opportunity to observe extensive interactions between 
asylum seekers and their service providers.  In the spirit of client advocacy, I was occasionally 
drawn into disagreements between clients and their service providers and attorneys.  While 
organizations expect employees and volunteers to support their clients, I was sometimes 
presented with situations in which I was expected to concur with service providers and attorneys 
concerning the assumed best interests of their clients.  While volunteering for one organization, I 
was drawn into the following conflict between an asylum seeker and her attorney.   
During a master calendar hearing for a woman seeking asylum from Cameroon whom I 
accompanied to court, her attorney requested a continuance in anticipation of documentation that 
her client had been employed in Nigeria just before she fled to the U.S.  This documentation was 
important as evidence that the claimant had filed her asylum claim within the legally accepted 
time frame.  The 1996 Illegal Immigration and Reform Act legislated the "one-year rule" that 
requires all asylum seekers to file an application within one year of their arrival in the United 
States.  The judge offered a hearing date three days from the calendar hearing, advising that the 
documentation might not matter in that the greater issue was one of resettlement in Nigeria, not 
of timeliness in filing the application.  However, at the attorney's insistence, the judge issued a 
continuance for three months, and the applicant, attorney, and I retreated to a nearby waiting area 
outside the courtroom.   
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The applicant became angry with her attorney and yelled for her to "go back in there and 
tell the judge I want to be heard in three days.  I am tired of waiting."  The attorney responded 
with a similar sentiment, yanked her cell phone from her briefcase and began dialing the number 
for the asylum seeker's psychologist, curtly telling the applicant that it was her responsibility to 
make sure her therapist was available to testify, that her testimony be ready, and that all 
documentation be available.  I witnessed this exchange with the assumed gaze of invisible 
researcher until the attorney turned to me and exclaimed:  "Tell her. Tell her that there is no way 
I can prepare her case in three days with all that I would have to do. I don't even have her work 
papers from Nigeria and I still have to prepare her testimony.  If we go forward in three days we 
will lose. Tell her it is better to wait. You have been to court.  You know how asylum works."  I 
turned to the Cameroonian woman who stood in silence with tears pouring down her face and 
told her that I knew that she was frustrated for having to wait, but that postponing a hearing 
could not hurt her case, but a premature hearing could prove problematic.   
In this exchange, my expertise in having "been to court" was invoked by the attorney in 
an effort to persuade the applicant to continue her hearing in three months, not three days.  
Throughout the data collection process, I was presented with the challenge of responding to 
conflicts among asylum seekers, their attorneys, and service providers, which rendered my role 
as researcher indistinguishable from the research.  One challenge of ethnographic data is the 
imperative for the researcher to remain cognizant that her presence affects and is part of data 
collection.  
The immigrant service organizations I encountered in Los Angeles were narrowly 
focused in that each served a specific population.  Organizations tend to serve groups by singular 
dimensions of identity such as nationality, religious affiliation, or type of migration, for example.  
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Service providers cite limited resources as the primary reason for this phenomenon.  Rarely are 
organizations financially able to include the variety of services required for the diverse 
population of all asylum seekers.  Consequently, some asylum seekers may fall through the gaps 
when no organization can accommodate their needs.  For example, one attorney employed by an 
organization that serves gay, lesbian, and transgender asylum seekers revealed during our 
interview that the organizations that provide mental health assistance for sexual minorities are 
unfamiliar with asylum and cannot complete the required assessment for asylum applications.  
Additionally, organizations that provide mental health services for asylum seekers, in this 
attorney's opinion, were often homophobic and always transphobic making them incapable or 
unwilling to assess persecution based on sexual orientation.  Clients suffer the repercussions of 
these service organization gaps as they are shuffled among organizations.   
 The last feature of immigrant service groups are conflicts between organizations.  
Organizations that receive certain types of funding, such as resettlement organizations, are 
required to produce evidence of clients in order to receive federal funds.  If an organization 
refers its clients to another organization, then the organization may lose funding for that client.  
During my fieldwork, there was one resettlement organization that put asylum seekers in touch 
with immigration attorneys who were associated with the agency.  The attorneys would charge a 
reduced fee for filing an asylum application for the agency's clientele.  When I inquired with 
immigrants and service providers who were familiar with this particular organization concerning 
why asylum seekers did not seek legal assistance with one of many organizations in Los Angeles 
that provided free legal services, I was told that the agency could not include referred clients in 
their reports requesting funding, and therefore would not refer clients to other organizations. 
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3.3.1.2 Human Rights Activism 
Many immigrant service organizations make the claim that they are engaging in human rights 
work in their services and programs.  I separate immigrant service groups from human rights 
groups based on whether the organization provides direct services to immigrants, such as legal 
aid, counseling, or employment assistance.  The human rights groups I volunteered with do not 
provide direct services to asylum seekers. 
During my fieldwork, I volunteered with Amnesty International (AI), and Human Rights 
Watch – Young Advocates (HRW-YA).  The Young Advocates (YA) are a group of 
professionals in their twenties and thirties interested in participating in HRW activities, but who 
do not have the financial means to pay the required $5,000 annual dues to become a member of 
the Southern California Committee (HRW's Los Angeles office).   
 I attended ten meetings with local AI groups and Amnesty's Greater Los Angeles District 
(GLAD) administrative body, eight meetings with HRW women's division and HRW-YA, and 
was active in protests that AI organized after September 11th concerning the treatment of 
immigrant communities in Los Angeles.  I attended functions sponsored by human rights groups 
that included AI, HRW, HRW-YA, Captive Daughters, Friends of Tibet, Friends of Nepal, and 
the Visual Artists Guild.   
 I made contact with Amnesty International in September of 2001 after arriving in Los 
Angeles.  The director of the Los Angeles office gave me contact information for two local 
members, Thomas, who was active in Amnesty's refugee campaign and had organized a 
detention monitoring team for the INS processing center in San Pedro that housed all detained 
female immigrants in Los Angeles, and Phyllis, who was active in Amnesty's women's human 
rights campaigns and organized a women's rights conference.  I interviewed them both and they 
provided additional contacts within the organization.  I was referred to Human Rights Watch 
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through a paralegal who was familiar with the organization and informed me that the Los 
Angeles office was primarily a fundraising office, unlike the main offices in New York and 
Washington DC.  My initial contact with Human Rights Watch was through an invitation to a 
fundraiser by an intern employed by the organization.  At the fundraiser, I met a member of the 
YA's who put me in touch with Barbara, a YA member who organized a detention monitoring 
team in the INS Processing Center in San Pedro in 1999.    
 Unlike the California Committee of HRW, an organization that did not build coalitions 
with other organizations while organizing and sponsoring events, AI was active in coalition 
building and it is through their contacts that I located Captive Daughters, Friends of Tibet, and 
the Visual Artists Guild.  Captive Daughters disseminates information on global child trafficking 
movements through informational and fundraising events and speaker series.  I attended two 
events sponsored by Captive Daughters and interviewed a board member for this study.  Friends 
of Tibet and The Visual Artists Guild, a group that organized a Tiananmen Square Memorial 
event, are organizations that sponsor limited informational speaker events.  I attended two events 
sponsored by these organizations.  I interviewed a total of four human rights activists in Los 
Angeles, two from Amnesty International, one from Human Rights Watch-Young Advocates, 
and one from Captive Daughters.  I interviewed three asylees, one former employee of Amnesty 
International, and one former employee of the Justice department through contacts from activists 
in human rights groups in Los Angeles. 
3.3.1.3 Immigration Court 
There are a total of fifty-two immigration courts in the United States.  California has the greatest 
number, with eight immigration courts.  The Los Angeles immigration court is located in the 
downtown area and shares space with other commercial businesses housed in the same building.  
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The Los Angeles court has the greatest number of immigration judges in the United States.  Over 
the course of my observations there were approximately twenty-five judges at any time.  The 
fluctuation in the number of judges was due to retirement, relocation, or stepping down from the 
bench.  At the end of my data collection in March 2003, there were nine female and fourteen 
male judges.28  There are approximately eighty assistant district counsels assigned to the Los 
Angeles immigration court, with slightly more women than men.  Assistant district counsels 
represent the U.S. government in immigration court.  According to an assistant district counsel 
supervisor who serves as one of four supervisors to the assistant district counsels, 60% of the 80 
assistant distinct district counsels are female and all are U.S. citizens.  No data were available for 
the race or national origin of the assistant distinct counsels. 
 I observed a total of sixty-eight immigration court hearings, including seventeen asylum 
merits hearings, three asylum oral decision hearings, two cancellation of removal hearings, three 
adjustment hearings, seven master calendar hearings, and thirty-six continuances.  Of the 
seventeen merits hearings, four were seeking asylum based on gender-based persecution 
including two female circumcision claims, one domestic violence, and one coercive family 
planning claim.  Currently, asylum cases in immigration court are mostly referred affirmative 
cases.  An affirmative case is a claim that the immigrant initiates prior to being placed in 
deportation proceedings and is adjudicated by an asylum officer.  A referral to immigration court 
is neither a grant nor a denial but used when asylum officers are unable to make a decision on a 
claim due to lack of information or documentation.  Cancellation of removal is a form of relief 
created by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996) that 
replaced Suspension of Deportation.  Cancellation of removal allows migrants to remain in the 
                                                 
28 The data on the number and sex of immigration judges are from my field notes.  The EOIR website 
(http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/) maintains a list of current immigration judges. 
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United States legally by canceling their deportation order.  Cancellation offers no status 
adjustment opportunities such as the ability to petition to become permanent residents or citizens 
that asylum offers.  Cancellation of removal may be granted for an asylum seeker who has 
committed certain crimes that render the applicant ineligible for asylum.  Adjustment of status 
hearings are a change in immigrant status, usually to permanent resident.  None of the 
cancellation of removal cases or adjustment hearings I attended was asylum-related.  An oral 
decision is the judge's final order on a case that is read before the court.  A continuance occurs 
when the hearing cannot be completed during one session.  Master calendar hearings are like 
arraignment hearings where migrants enter a plea and other administrative matters may be 
attended. 
I was able to observe as many as sixty-eight hearings because multiple hearings are 
scheduled simultaneously in immigration court.  For example, one day I was able to observe 
twelve hearings that included one oral decision, one adjustment of status, and ten continuances in 
two different courtrooms.  Continuances are ordered by immigration judges for a variety of 
reasons, including bureaucratic problems on the part of the INS such as lost case files and 
incomplete identity checks, mandatory rescheduling of non-asylum cases that take legal 
precedence over non-asylum immigration claims, and absenteeism of claimants and their 
attorneys.  The Illegal Immigration and Responsibility Control Act (1996) created expedited 
removal that legislated a 180-day time limit for asylum adjudication.  Because asylum takes 
precedence over all other immigration cases, judges are legally bound to adjudicate asylum 
claims and consequently schedule continuances for all non-asylum cases so that an asylum 
merits hearing may proceed.  
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During my observations, a number of claimants and attorneys did not appear in court for 
their scheduled hearings.  Of the thirty-six continuances I observed, seven were due to 
absenteeism of the claimant and five were due to absenteeism of the claimant's attorney.  
According to the EOIR Statistical Yearbook (2003), in 2002, 25% of all claimants in U.S. 
immigration courts failed to appear during their scheduled hearing.  In addition to the 
absenteeism, I observed attorneys who were late for their client's hearing, attorneys who would 
schedule simultaneous hearings in different courts, and attorneys requesting continuances for a 
variety of reasons the most common of which was not feeling well the day of the hearing.  When 
attorneys were absent or late for their clients' hearings, judges were overwhelmingly sympathetic 
toward the immigrants, demonstrated in their responses to claimants such as "I'm not going to 
deport you, it's not your fault" and "Don't worry, I won't take this out on you, I never do."  While 
most judges schedule a continuance when this occurs, some proceed with the hearing and begin 
by asking the claimant questions that typically would be asked by the attorney.  When I asked 
one judge about what I interpreted as unprofessional behavior among many immigration 
attorneys, he summarized with the following quote embellished from Woody Allen: "Most 
immigration attorneys are operating under the principle that ninety percent of life is just showing 
up.  I wish more had the courtesy to at least show up."   
It’s difficult to know why many attorneys did not appear in court for their clients’ 
hearings.  Some immigration attorneys I interviewed were appalled by the absenteeism of their 
colleagues, but did not offer any explanations for their behavior.  While I observed numerous 
accounts of absenteeism and tardiness, I also witnessed many instances of dedicated immigration 
attorneys whose behavior was exemplary of professional ethics evidenced by their punctuality 
and pre-trial preparation of clients and their asylum applications.  
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I gained entrée into immigration court through immigration attorneys.  While 
immigration court hearings are public, I initially observed only those for which I had 
experienced prior contact with the attorney and claimant.  I chose this format in order to ensure 
the asylum seekers' consent to my presence and as a means of locating gender-based asylum 
claims.  Unfortunately, immigration attorneys never contacted me before appearing in court, 
although I requested this many times and of numerous attorneys, the first seven asylum merits 
hearings I attended resulted from fortuitous timing when attorneys mentioned an upcoming court 
case during our phone conversation or meeting.  Eventually, I decided that attending without pre-
authorization of attorneys and clients was necessary in order to observe hearings.  For cases in 
which I was not in touch with asylum seekers, their attorneys, or service providers prior to the 
hearing, I introduced myself in court before the proceedings to obtain verbal consent.  When it 
was impossible to gain consent prior to the hearing, I spoke with the attorney and asylum seeker 
during a recess or after.  All the asylum seekers gave verbal consent for me to observe their 
hearings.  I introduced myself as a student researching asylum and explained that I would not use 
their real names in the study.  Only one asylum seeker requested that I did not use his case in the 
study, nearly begging me not to include his testimony as he paced in the hallway outside the 
courtroom wringing his hands and shouting: "You don't understand. If they find me they will kill 
me. You cannot write about me."  I did not include his hearing in the seventeen asylum merits 
hearings I discuss in this study. 
  Some judges inquired about my identity and reason for attending.  Most, however, never 
asked, so during a recess or at the end of the trial, I identified myself as a student writing a 
dissertation on gender-based asylum claims.  One judge responded by giving me upcoming dates 
of "gender-type" claims on his calendar while another made a point to tell me that there was no 
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way I could write a dissertation on a legal subject without a law degree.  After I observed several 
hearings with one judge who became familiar with my project, he stated "I was looking for you 
yesterday; I had a rape case in the afternoon."  Many judges assumed that I was a law student, 
and during the recess of an asylum hearing in which an Armenian man was questioned about his 
stay in Azerbaijan in an effort to determine whether he had permanently resettled, the judge 
directed the following to me: “Do you understand what the problem is?  It's an issue of firm 
resettlement.  It's in the Statute. The Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 207 and 208.”  The 
judge proceeded to explain the statute regarding resettlement while the applicant, attorneys, and 
interpreter turned and watched the "pupil" seated in the observation area of the courtroom.  
While most judges were readily available to discuss court proceedings informally and 
extensively in the courtroom and their chambers, they would not agree to a tape-recorded 
interview; the reason most often given was a fear of being misquoted.  As a result, I was able to 
tape-record interviews with only two judges, one of whom had retired from the bench. 
 During my second observation of immigration court, I approached an assistant district 
counsel and asked if she could meet with me or put me in touch with her supervisor.  She gave 
me her supervisor's information and after contacting her supervisor, one of four deputy district 
counsels for the Los Angeles immigration court, we scheduled an interview.  The supervisor 
informed me that I would not be given permission to interview any assistant district counsels for 
this project, limiting my interactions with assistant district counsels to responses to their inquiries 
of my presence in their courtroom and observations of their interactions prior to and during the 
hearings. 
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3.3.1.4 INS Asylum Office 
The INS would not allow me entry into the asylum office to observe the workplace bureaucracy, 
but  I was allowed to interview asylum supervisors.  On nine different occasions, I drove asylum 
seekers to their interviews and waited outside the asylum office for them.  According to Michael, 
a supervisor at the INS asylum office, most of the employees at the Service Center are employed 
by a contractor and are not employees of the U.S. government, unlike the employees of the INS 
who are federal employees.  Although he indicated that the service center was efficient, the LA 
Times reported that two clerical workers were indicted for allegedly shredding thousands of 
documents in an effort to eliminate mounting paperwork (Morin 2003; McDonnell 2002).  While 
volunteering for one organization, I drove an asylum seeker to her interview in Anaheim only to 
discover that the INS had lost her application.   
Asylum seekers are responsible for arranging transportation to their interviews at the INS 
asylum office which is located approximately twenty-five miles southeast of Los Angeles in 
Orange County.  Unlike immigration court, which is located in downtown Los Angeles and is 
accessible by public transportation, the INS Anaheim office is nearly inaccessible without an 
automobile.  Part of my volunteer responsibility with one organization was to drive asylum 
seekers to and from their interviews.  On many occasions, asylum seekers would show me a bus 
schedule from Los Angeles to Anaheim and question how they could make a 7:00am 
appointment when the bus didn’t arrive in Anaheim until much later in the morning.  Asylum 
seekers are also responsible for providing their own language interpreters.  Unlike immigration 
courts located within the geographical boundary of the U.S. Court of Appeals 9th Circuit which 
provides translators located through the transnational service Berlitz International Inc., the INS 
asylum office provides no such service.  Immigrants often bring family members or friends to 
translate their testimony. 
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The Anaheim INS asylum office is the largest asylum office in the U.S., in terms of the 
volume of applications and the number of employees.  The Anaheim office received 18,184 
applications in 2001 and 16,213 in 2002 (INS 2003a; INS 2002).  At the time of my interviews, 
there were eighty-two asylum officers, with an additional seventeen in the process of being hired, 
and sixteen asylum supervisors.  Asylum officers are hired at a GS level between 9 and 12 
depending on their education and previous work experience.29  Their salaries range from $40,000 
to $65,000 depending on their GS level.  Upon gaining employment with the INS, asylum 
officers receive six weeks of training in Glenco, Georgia at an INS training facility.  There are no 
educational or previous work experience requirements for the position of asylum officer.  At the 
time of my interviews, all asylum officers at the Anaheim office had a college education and 
approximately one-third held a law degree. 
3.3.2 Interviews 
I conducted a total of 102 tape-recorded interviews.  I interviewed 21 asylees, 3 refugees, 2 
VAWA claimants, 1 trafficking survivor, 12 immigrant service providers, 10 immigration 
attorneys, 2 paralegals, 1 immigration judge, 1 former immigration judge, 3 INS processing 
center employees, 6 INS supervisors/former asylum officers, 1 INS assistant district counsel 
supervisor, 1 former INS supervisor, 2 former asylum officers,  4 former INS border patrol 
agents, 10 human rights activists and organization employees.  I conducted 12 other interviews 
with legal scholars, policymakers, United Nation officials, language interpreters, a U.S. attorney, 
and 15 interviews with immigration reform activists and organization employees (4 of whom are 
                                                 
29 GS refers to the General Schedule level for federal employees. 
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former INS border patrol agents).  All former INS border patrol agents are also immigration 
reform activists.   
 Ten interviews were conducted over the telephone.  I conducted one interview by phone 
because of a scheduling problem, and nine others with people living outside of the Los Angeles 
area.  Of the ninety-two tape-recorded interviews, twelve were conducted with individuals who I 
had discussed my project with without a tape-recorder and then we later scheduled a tape-
recorded interview.  Most of the unrecorded meetings took place in the first few months of the 
project and were informational meetings that served as an entrée into the field, and that guided 
my decisions about future contacts for the project.  All of the interviews with immigrant service 
provider employees of organizations I volunteered with were conducted after I had volunteered 
for numerous months.  The remaining interviews were conducted in single visits where I only 
met with the interviewee once.  One exception was an interview with Rivka, who worked with a 
human rights group while she was detained at the INS processing center in San Pedro.  My 
contact from the human rights group did not know that Rivka was also an asylee and upon 
discovering this information in our first interview, which was structured around her work with 
the human rights group and the detention facility, I made arrangements to interview her again to 
discuss her asylum application.  Appendix A includes tables with data for all interviews. 
 I designed multiple interview guides to glean knowledge from differently situated 
participants.  For example, I did not ask immigration attorneys and human rights activists the 
same questions, but I did ask similar questions of all attorneys and all activists.  Having learned 
the value of a flexible interview guide from my master's thesis research, I asked different 
questions across the respondents.  This tactic was useful for interviewing members of a 
vulnerable population (persecuted migrants) who varied in terms of their willingness to discuss 
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the harm they experienced.  For example, during my interview with Miriam, an asylum seeker 
from Iran, as soon as I turned on the tape recorder she exclaimed: "I come from a very political 
family. The Shah killed my uncle and all of my cousins!"  In this interview, Miriam set the tone 
and pace of the interview by introducing her family's political activities at the beginning of the 
interview.  Conversely, while interviewing other asylees who did not initiate with stories of 
detention and torture, I asked about their departure or early experiences in the United States.  My 
goal was to get interviewees talking about what it means to be persecuted because of one's 
gender.  The order and wording of the questions were less important than their articulation of 
how they understood gender-based harm.  Appendix B includes the interview schedules for all 
tape-recorded interviews.   
 In addition to the tape-recorded and phone interviews, I also conducted short interviews 
with thirty-two immigration attorneys, service providers, and Consulate officials over the 
telephone.  These abbreviated interviews were conversations about former and current clients 
with regard to the types of claims I was interested in locating.  In addition to the immigration 
judges, only one respondent, Nadine, refused to allow me to tape-record our interview.  Nadine 
had gained asylum because her family threatened an honor killing and after arriving in California 
a relative had attempted to kill her.  An organization in Los Angeles raised money for Nadine 
and her baby to legally change their names and relocate outside of the Los Angeles area. 
 With the support of funds from the National Science Foundation, I was able to offer ten 
of the asylees a payment of $50.  Because the funds were not available until August of 2002, I 
could not offer a payment to asylees who were interviewed before that date.  I offered the 
payment to subjects who were initially reluctant to schedule the interview and to those whom I 
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believed less economically solvent than others, such as those living in the U.S. without other 
family members, whom I had interviewed.  No payments were made to non-asylees.   
I was unable to interview many immigration attorneys, service providers, and their clients 
for a variety of reasons.  The most common response I was given regarding not being able to 
meet for a tape-recorded interview, mostly by immigration attorneys, was their busy schedule 
and that they could not make time for me.  A total of seven potential respondents would not 
agree to a tape-recorded interview because of time constraints.  Of these seven, I met informally 
with two and spoke over the phone with the remaining five.  The gendered nature of caregiving 
accounts for why some female respondents were unable to schedule interviews. Five female 
immigration attorneys were unavailable for interviews because they were on maternity leave, 
caring for aging and ill-health parents, or caring for a special needs child.  I was able to interview 
two asylees and was referred to other attorneys by three of these five attorneys.  One supervisor 
at the INS refused an interview because of discomfort with how she might be portrayed.  During 
one of my visits to the Anaheim asylum office she stated: "I know how they made people look in 
that film. I just don't want that."  The film she is refers to is the documentary A Well Founded 
Fear (Robertson and Camerini 2001) that chronicles asylum hearing interviews and interviews 
with asylum officers in the Newark, New Jersey asylum office.30   
Of all interviews that were scheduled, only one interviewee did not appear and never 
returned my phone calls.  There were seven immigration attorneys who agreed to an interview or 
meeting for themselves, but were unable to put me in touch with their clients.  Of these seven, 
three could not get in touch with their former clients, two clients declined an interview because 
they were still traumatized from the harm they had endured, one was unable to meet because it 
                                                 
30 The supervisor’s fear of how she may be portrayed is not unfounded. The film focuses on examples of how 
asylum officers are often distrusting of immigrants. 
  75 
was inconvenient, and one attorney told me that her client was paranoid and that there was no 
way she would talk to me.  I do not know if the attorney contacted the client directly, although I 
had requested that she do so.  The most disappointing refusal was that INS headquarters would 
not allow me to interview current asylum officers.  After one year of persistent phone calls and 
office visits to the Anaheim asylum office, Michael, a supervisor, yielded to my request to 
interview him and five other supervisors whose previous employment included serving as 
asylum officers.  When I met Michael for an interview, he explained INS headquarters reluctance 
to allow me to interview current asylum officers: "I've left many messages trying to get approval. 
I don't think it's about your project.  They just have a lot going on."  Personnel at INS 
headquarters had "a lot going on" indeed during this time; my year-long persistence continued 
from September 2001 though 2002, a year marked by upheaval within the INS and its responses 
to the September 11th terrorist attacks. 
Of the twenty-seven interviews with asylees, refugees, VAWA, and trafficking claimants, 
I gained access to fourteen interviewees through the organizations which I volunteered, eight 
through immigration attorneys who handled the case, three through human rights groups, and 
one through a service organization which I did not volunteer.   
Typically, I would discuss my project over the phone or in person and request that 
attorneys or service providers ask their clients whether they were willing to speak with me.  
Some would contact clients immediately, whereas others took weeks or months before returning 
my phone calls with news that clients had agreed or declined to be interviewed.  Once a client 
had agreed, attorneys and service providers gave me their clients' phone numbers and I contacted 
the client directly to arrange an interview.  I allowed all respondents to choose the place of the 
interview and whether or not they wanted others present.  Interviews were conducted in people's 
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homes, places of employment, and in public venues such as restaurants and coffee shops.  Some 
interviewees requested privacy and did not want anyone else to attend the interview, while others 
brought along family members and friends. 
All of the interviewees spoke English and two interviews were conducted in English and 
also with the aid of an interpreter because the respondent was uncomfortable with his/her English 
competency.  In both of these cases, the interviewee provided the translator.  All interviewees are 
assigned pseudonyms and before tape-recording the interview, I would explain what a 
pseudonym is, and allow the respondent to choose any name they desired.  Initially, I asked 
people to choose names that were appropriate to their nationality and age, but during one 
interview at an organization, a respondent informed me that she was the only Latina in the office 
and that if she chose a Mexican name, she would remain identifiable.  After this encounter, I 
allowed people to choose any name they wanted, regardless of whether it seemed to match their 
identity. 
Because I gained access to asylees through their attorneys and service providers, I was 
often given extensive information about their asylum application prior to meeting them.  Some 
attorneys and service providers revealed that their clients had been raped, circumcised, 
kidnapped, and detained (in their country of origin and in the U.S.).  Sometimes asylees would 
discuss the same information with me in our interview, but, overwhelmingly, interviewees did 
not discuss instances of rape documented in their applications.  For example, Mary, an asylee 
from the Congo, did not mention a gang rape that her attorney discussed with me in detail, and 
instead focused during our interview on the two assassinations carried out against her family.  
Conversely, asylees have also given me information during our interview that they did not 
discuss with their attorney.  Miriam, an asylee from Iran, discussed how she was raped 
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repeatedly while detained after a protest for women's rights.  During our interview she told me 
that she did not discuss the rapes with her attorney, an Iranian man, because she "knew what men 
from my country would think about such things." 
These examples present a challenge of data recording in ethnographic research.  If an 
attorney or service provider reveals that a client was raped but the asylee does not mention the 
rape during the interview, should the researcher record "rape" as an example of gender-based 
persecution in the data?  Instead of regarding this seeming conflict as a discrepancy in the data, I 
include both accounts as data.  Because I am interested in knowing ways in which differently 
situated participants understand and articulate gender-based harm, I consider both the attorney's 
discussion and the client's silence about her rape data.     
When I first began interviewing asylees, I anticipated emotional outbursts, mostly in the 
form of uncontrollable sobbing.  This happened on occasion, but the more common emotional 
outbursts were what I initially interpreted as anger.  During an account of persecution, in 
particular when interviewees discussed the worst of their torture, asylees' tones transformed from 
a flat affect to shouts as they sometimes began to reenact the events they were recounting.  I 
noticed this phenomenon in immigration court as well, and after many months of fieldwork, I 
inquired with a psychologist at one of the organizations which I was volunteering.  She explained 
to me that these were flashbacks, and that they commonly occur in her sessions when clients talk 
about torture.  Emotions were not limited to interviews with asylees, however.  During my 
interview with Margaret, a physician responsible for examining patients and documenting 
evidence of torture, she began crying as she revealed that her husband told her that she can't 
bring her work home and discuss it with him.  During my interview with Nicole, the therapist 
who had informed me about flashbacks, she discussed how professionals who work with 
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persecuted populations suffer what is clinically referred to as secondary PTSD.  Immigration 
judges, attorneys, asylum officers, language interpreters, and service providers are traumatized as 
a result of having to witness and observe documentation and narratives of torture as part of their 
everyday work. 
After the tape-recorder was turned off, interviewees continued to discuss their lives 
through stories about their families, politics, and how they were adjusting to life in the United 
States.  During these after-interview conversations I let the interviewee lead the conversation and 
stayed for as long as seemed appropriate without imposing on the interviewee and their families.     
3.3.3 Documentation 
I was able to collect documentation on asylum applications, INS asylum officer training lesson 
plans, a civil rights lawsuit brief filed on behalf of asylum seekers who were asked for bribes by 
a former asylum officer at the Anaheim office, memos and letters from various government 
agencies concerning asylees and refugees, unpublished decisions on sexual orientation cases and 
HIV status as a basis for asylum from the Los Angeles immigration court, human rights INS 
detention monitoring reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and 
immigrant service organization materials. 
3.3.3.1 Asylum Application Materials 
Through the assistance of immigration attorneys, I was able to procure a total of nineteen asylum 
applications, four of which are from asylees I was able to interview.  Ten of the applications are 
complete and nine include the applicant's declaration and select materials, but not the full 
application.  Immigration attorneys also gave me copies of judges' oral decisions, INS 
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regulations on gender-based asylum, and news and journal articles on asylum.  While I requested 
that all attorneys secure permission from their clients, and all attorneys verbally acquiesced over 
the phone or in person, I never met some of the asylees for whom I have case files.  All asylum 
application materials were redacted (personal information such as names, addresses, and phone 
numbers was marked out), yet some attorneys used markers that highlighted instead of obscured 
their clients' personal information.  When I received highlighted case files, I redacted them 
myself, marking out personal information such as addresses, phone numbers, alien numbers, and 
detailed information about spouses and children.   
 Two attorneys allowed me access to files and agreed that I could hand copy notes, but 
would not allow me to photocopy the entire file.  I have handwritten notes on four asylum cases 
from these two attorneys.  I also have medical affidavits from thirteen clients, four of whom I 
interviewed, who gained asylum because of female circumcision obtained through the assistance 
of the medical doctor who issued the reports.  I interviewed seven of the nineteen attorneys who 
gave me various forms of asylum documentation, met with nine in their offices, and spoke with 
three over the telephone.  
The asylum applications include the I-589 INS asylum form, declarations, which are the 
written testimony of the applicant, copies of identification records, if available, such as birth 
certificates, marriage certificates, and employment records, clinical and medical evaluations, 
human rights reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and country condition 
reports from the State Department.  For six applications, I was also able to procure the 
handwritten notes of the attorney taken in meetings with their clients.  I was able to obtain these 
notes because I was given permission to photocopy the files myself, in their offices, instead of 
relying on material prepared by the attorneys and their staff. 
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3.3.3.2 Immigration and Naturalization Service Documents 
With the assistance of an asylum supervisor in the Anaheim office, I was able to obtain asylum 
officer training materials and lesson plans.  These lesson plans are updated regularly and I have 
selected lesson plans from dates as recent as June, 2003, although most are from October of 2002 
and 2001.  These documents are what INS officials refer to as FOIAable, meaning that they are 
public documents because they may be requested through the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).  During my visit to INS headquarters in June of 2003, the supervisor who referred to the 
asylum lesson plans as FOIAable told me while I could request them on my own, that due to the 
current state of upheaval within the Justice Department, it was possible that I would never be 
allowed to see them.  She then proceeded to reference a Now with Bill Moyers' episode in which 
Moyers showcased a memo from John Ashcroft stating that he was denying all FOIA requests in 
the aftermath of September 11th as a security measure. 
In addition to the lesson plans, the supervisor from the Anaheim office also provided me 
with copies of memorandum from INS officials, executive orders, federal code of regulations, 
and the Immigration and Naturalization Act, all regarding gender-based asylum policies.  With 
the assistance of two supervisors at INS headquarters, I was able to obtain copies of the 
Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual Office of International Affairs Asylum Division from 
February 2003, asylum applications by sex for 1998 through 2002, asylum application by 
nationality from 1997 through 2001, fiscal year quarters by nationality for 1997 through 2002, 
asylum office workload by fiscal year from 1991 through 2002, top ten nationalities for filed 
from 1995 through 2001, and the workload by office for March 2003.    
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3.3.3.3 Human Rights Documentation 
In addition to the detention monitoring reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch regarding the INS processing facility in San Pedro, I also examined copies of Amnesty 
International USA's Detention Report that outlines national guidelines on immigrant detention, 
action alerts and case work examples of detained immigrants, detention center information, lists 
of resources and contacts for detained immigrants, country condition reports, and newsletters and 
reports on women's human rights and refugees.  During my fieldwork, the Los Angeles Amnesty 
office relocated and during one visit the staff generously gave me the above mentioned 
documents for which there were extra copies in order to lighten the moving load.  From Human 
Rights Watch, I analyzed their detention monitoring report, copies of correspondences with local 
and national INS officials, newsletters, and reports that were issued during my fieldwork.  From 
other human rights organizations, I received copies of newsletters and State Department figures 
on trafficking.   
3.3.3.4 Immigrant Service Organizations 
I have organizational information from twelve immigrant service providers including program 
brochures, newsletters, immigrant rights information, eligibility information for refugees, 
asylees, trafficking, and VAWA claimants, in-take forms for organizations that provide direct 
services, memos and letters from the Office of Refugee Resettlement and the United Nations, 
correspondences with state bureaucracies over local issues such as driver's licenses for 
undocumented migrants, organization reports, articles on immigration, T and S visa fact sheets 
from the Department of Justice for trafficking claimants, and information on programs offered by 
these organizations. 
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3.3.3.5 Other Documentation 
During one visit to the INS Anaheim office to interview a supervisor, I was informed that the 
interview was cancelled because the office was having an emergency meeting concerning a news 
story in a local paper that broke that week about an alleged bribery ring in the asylum office 
(Hamilton 2002).  Another supervisor told me where I could locate the news article and reported 
that "unfortunately, some of it is true."  After reading the article, I contacted the paper and was 
able to speak with the reporter who put me in touch with those discussed in it.  From these 
contacts, I was able to locate a copy of the civil rights lawsuit brief filled on behalf of two 
asylum seekers concerning sexual and monetary bribes that were requested in exchange for a 
favorable decision on their application by an asylum officer.  In addition to this brief, I also have 
documentation from the California Department of Social Services regarding asylee benefits, 
decisions on HIV status as a basis for asylum issued by a judge from the Los Angeles 
immigration court, and materials on select gender-based asylum cases. 
3.4 LEAVING THE FIELD 
One challenge of research is deciding when to stop collecting data.  In January of 2003, I decided 
that I had obtained enough data to answer my research question about the implementation and 
responses to gender-based asylum claims.  I had interviewed asylees with claims of female 
circumcision, honor killing, domestic violence, rape, repressed social norms, and forced 
marriage, and had witnessed immigration court hearings of asylum seekers with claims based on 
rape, domestic violence, female circumcision, and coercive population control.  From January 
through March of 2003, I followed up previous leads, but did not make new contacts except with 
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activists in the immigration reform movement.  In February of 2003, I notified immigrant service 
organizations with whom I had volunteered, asylum seekers I had assisted through those 
organizations, and immigration attorneys and human rights activists with whom I remained in 
contact that I would leave Los Angeles at the end of March.   
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4.0  NARRATIVES OF PERSECUTION IN ASYLUM CLAIMS 
In this chapter, I rely on sociolegal studies to illuminate the expectations that INS asylum 
officers and immigration judges have about how narratives of persecution should be told in 
asylum interviews and hearings.  Narratives are the stories that migrants tell to attorneys and 
service providers who help them prepare their asylum applications, and to asylum officers and 
immigration judges who determine whether they are eligible for asylum.  Narratives have a 
written component that includes asylum seeker’s declaration and other materials such as 
supporting documents from service providers.  Narratives are also spoken when asylum seekers 
testify during their interviews and hearings.  The stories that asylum seekers tell must detail harm 
that is recognized as severe enough to constitute persecution according to the standards of 
asylum law.  In this chapter, I focus on interviews with INS asylum supervisors, former asylum 
officers, and asylees whose claims were adjudicated by the INS asylum office.  The chapter that 
follows will focus exclusively on immigration court hearings.   
4.1 NARRATIVE FRAMEWORKS 
Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey (2003) argue that stories are social events.  By social event, they 
mean that telling a story, particularly one in a legal setting, is more than its reenactment – it is 
itself an event.  Narratives are social events in that they are told in a social context that Ewick 
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and Silbey (1995) term “situationally produced."  According to Ewick and Silbey (1995), stories 
are situationally produced because they are told "within particular historical, institutional, and 
interactional contexts that shape the stories’ telling, their meanings, and their effects" (206).  The 
institutional setting within which the story is told defines what constitutes a "successful 
narrative" (1995: 207).  Institutions regulate narratives through various rules, and consequently, 
those who tell stories within those institutions create narrative strategies in order to establish 
agency (2003).  Ewick and Silbey (1995) outline four elements that organize storytelling in legal 
settings:  selective appropriation of past events and characters; temporally ordered events; an 
overarching structure that relates the events and characters to one another; and closure.  During 
the process of narration, storytellers are expected to engage in performative features that include 
repetition, vivid concrete details, and a coherence of plot.  Ultimately, narratives are assumed by 
those who elicit them to reveal truth about a particular event. 
Ewick and Silbey discuss the ways that in law there are hegemonic stories.  They argue 
that narratives must conform to a story that the law recognizes.  According to Ewick and Silbey, 
the content of a particular story tends to be legally recognizable when it reproduces existing 
power relations and unrecognizable when the content challenges taken-for-granted hegemony.  
Therefore, the narrative itself emerges as either hegemonic or subversive.  Narratives contribute 
to hegemony through social control and conformity and through their ability to colonize 
consciousness through believable plots when the events seem to speak for themselves.  
Conversely, narratives are subversive when they break silences and resist institutional power.  
Subversive narratives are important because they undermine hegemonic institutional power 
through resistance.  According to Ewick and Silbey (1998), resistance is defined by three 
features:  
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First, resistance entails a consciousness of being less powerful in a relationship of power. 
Resistance thus implies a particular understanding or positioning of self and other, of 
being up against something or someone. Second, resistance requires a consciousness of 
opportunity, a situation in which one might intervene and turn to one's advantage. Thus, 
resistance represents a consciousness of both constraint and autonomy, of power and 
possibility. Third, resistant acts involve assessments that power has produced unfair 
constraints and opportunities. It involves a justice claim and an attribution of 
responsibility for the unfair situation (1998: 183).  
 
Ewick and Silbey's definition of resistance attempts to overcome the difficulty (and contradictory 
potential) of conferring meaning from acts.  Resistance is recognized as such when actions are 
accompanied by a conscious effort to undermine injustice from the viewpoint of the less 
powerful:   
Resistance acts make claims about justice and fairness . . . through everyday practical 
engagement individuals identify the cracks of institutionalized power. An act of 
resistance can be understood as a conscious attempt to shift the power dynamics or 
openly challenge the givenness of situational power relations (2003: 1337). 
 
    Ewick and Silbey’s binary of hegemonic/subversive storytelling is a useful starting place for 
thinking about how power is central in narrative production during asylum hearings.  However, 
Ewick and Silbey limit their examples to those that they argue “fit” neatly into one category or 
the other without offering explanations of how stories may be in both categories at the same 
time, how stories may be in neither category, and how stories may be hegemonic in some 
situations and counter hegemonic in others.  Ewick and Silbey’s understanding of power and 
resistance appears to assume that these two choices – hegemonic or subversive – of narrative 
production are mutually exclusive.  
In his work on totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, Juan Linz (1975) demonstrates the 
nuances of the spectrum between two extreme categories of total support and total opposition of 
a political order.  His examples show how allegiance and dissent are not dichotomous binaries, 
but instead represent multiple spaces along a continuum of political complexity.   His analysis is 
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useful for understanding how categories such as hegemony and subversion (or counter 
hegemony) are not rigid binaries, but instead are two extremes on a complicated and shifting 
continuum of power.  Another example that moves beyond binary explanations of narratives, or 
accounts, is Charles Tilly’s (2006) explanation of why people give the reasons that they do for 
any particular event.  Tilly offers a typology that includes stories, technical accounts, codes, and 
conventions.  He argues that there is often a variety of explanations of the same event because 
those who account for why something has happened are located in different social spaces.  For 
example, Tilly shows the varied explanations that politicians, air traffic controllers, and anyone 
watching the September 11th terrorist attack gave that explained why the U.S. was attacked.  
Moreover, he argues that the same person may give different explanations to different people 
regarding the same event.  According to Tilly, this occurs because people are situated in different 
hierarchies of power and therefore have different relationships with people who accept or 
challenge certain explanations.  Juan Linz and Charles Tilly’s models are useful for 
understanding the complexity of how stories are crafted and the variation that exists between the 
categories of hegemonic and subversive narratives.   
In this chapter, I show the complexity of how narratives contribute toward hegemonic 
and counter hegemonic power. I complicate Ewick and Silbey’s binary logic of 
hegemonic/subversive and show how the way that a story is told, in addition to its content, 
makes its categorization more complex than simply hegemonic or subversive.  In asylum 
hearings, there are rules about what stories should be told and about how those stories should be 
told.  In order to gain asylum, asylum officers and immigration judges expect asylum seekers to 
tell stories with hegemonic content and tell those stories in such a way that too contributes 
toward what they believe is the required way of telling the story.  Immigration attorneys and 
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service providers practice resistance (and sometimes accommodation) by using the rules of 
asylum to their advantage by teaching asylum seekers to tell hegemonic stories.  In this chapter, I 
show how expectations about hegemonic story-telling affect credibility determination in asylum 
interviews and hearings.      
4.2 NEGOTIATING ASYLUM 
Immigration law treats asylum seekers as a special category of migrants.  It enacts a boundary 
reserving refuge for those who articulate persecution as the motivating decision to cross a 
national border.  Consequently, a narrative of persecution is necessary in order to gain asylum.  It 
is this narrative that distinguishes those who are eligible for asylum from those who are not.  In 
this study, nineteen of the twenty-one asylees conveyed during our interview that they left their 
country because they feared persecution.  Yet it is impossible to discern to what extent 
persecution was their actual motivation for migrating.  Because I interviewed only migrants who 
had been granted asylum, by the time of our interview, they had considerable experience 
constructing legally accepted narratives of persecution.   
While nearly all of the interviewees articulated a fear of persecution as a motivating 
factor for migrating to the United States, few were aware prior to emigrating that they were 
eligible for asylum.  Of the twenty-one asylees, only three left their countries with the expressed 
intent of coming to the United States to apply for asylum.  The remaining eighteen asylees 
learned that they were eligible to apply for asylum after arriving in the U.S., from family 
members, friends, other immigrants, or through immigrant service organizations.  Therefore, 
most asylees were initially unaware of the legal narrative that they would be required to 
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articulate in order to gain asylum when they arrived in the U.S.  Asylum seekers learn how to 
articulate the required narrative of persecution from their attorneys and service providers.  
Below, I show how attorneys and service providers often facilitate such hegemonic narratives 
and discuss the complexity of how asylum narratives are created.     
4.2.1 Immigration Attorneys 
All but one of the twenty-one asylees interviewed for this project had legal representation during 
their asylum interview or hearing.  The only exception, Samy, an asylum seeker from Egypt, 
discovered he could apply for asylum through an immigrant service organization.  The 
organization assisted him with his application, which he completed without the aid of a legal 
representative.  Overwhelmingly, it is through contact with members of their own immigrant 
communities that asylum seekers discover they need the assistance of an immigration attorney.  
For example, Amina escaped Ethiopia and fled to Saudi Arabia after the military murdered her 
father and threatened to kill other family members.  During our interview, she described the 
slave-like conditions of her domestic employment with a Saudi family and how she escaped at 
her earliest opportunity: 
When we got to the airport [LAX], I told them [her employers] that I had to go the 
bathroom.  But instead, I ran away. I didn’t even take my bag. I just left. I had no money. 
I had nothing.  I saw a man who looked like he was from Africa and asked him to help 
me call my sister in Australia. He took me to stay with an Ethiopian family and I stayed 
there until my brother-in-law came from Australia to help me. 
 
The Ethiopian man whom Amina identified in the airport was familiar with a local immigrant 
service organization that serves asylum seekers and torture survivors.  It was this organization 
that helped Amina locate legal assistance for her asylum interview and court hearing.  Similar to 
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other asylum seekers I interviewed, Amina found legal assistance through the help of members 
of immigrant communities and immigrant service organizations.   
 Amina was fortunate in that the organization and attorney she used were what many 
asylum officers, immigration judges, and immigration attorneys refer to as “legitimate.”  By 
legitimate, they mean that the organization and attorney did not purposefully deceive Amina by 
promising her asylum while preparing false statements on her application.  In Los Angeles, as in 
many cities with large immigrant populations, there are preparers with little or no legal 
background who assist asylum seekers with their applications for the sole purpose of financial 
profit.   Preparers from Mexico and Central and South American countries refer to themselves as 
notorios.  In Spanish, notorio means “notary public” and notary publics in nation-states south of 
the U.S. border perform legal tasks similar to those attorneys perform in the U.S..  Many 
notorios capitalize on the Spanish understanding of the term by presenting themselves to 
immigrants as legitimate legal representatives.  In the U.S., notorios perform comparable work to 
that of a notary public.  They do not have law degrees, and unfortunately, often engage in 
deceitful actions regarding asylum applications.31  During my interview with Marcos, an 
immigration attorney, he described the role of notorios as unscrupulous in Los Angeles:  
I think the creation of notorios emerged after the regulation of the work force that took 
place after IRCA.32 I would say that you still find some of those old fashioned notorios, 
some old guy who has a notary license and for years has filled out papers for people, 
done their taxes and immigration consultation, and is genuinely respected in the 
community. But after IRCA, I don’t think you can say there are any good notorios in Los 
Angeles. Because people needed work permits, that set up the situation. You need 
something bad enough and someone will sell it to you whether it’s legal or not. 
 
                                                 
31 Unethical behavior is not exclusive to non-U.S. nationals and preparers.  U.S. nationals and attorneys with law 
degrees also engage in deceitful behavior. 
32 IRCA refers to the Immigration and Control Act of 1986. This Act punished employers who hired undocumented 
immigrants through various sanctions. The conventional wisdom among immigrant advocates is that one unintended 
consequence of this law was that by requiring immigrants to prove that they were legal, illegal document factories 
were born that allowed undocumented immigrants to purchase various forms of false identity papers.  
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 The greatest disservice that notorios do to asylum seekers is to prepare “boiler plate” 
applications.  A boiler plate application is one that details legitimate examples of persecution 
such as violence, torture, and various tactics of state repression and which is then used for many 
different applicants.  In addition to being problematic because they provide illegal and unethical 
services, notorios are problematic because they do not facilitate the story of persecution in a  
hegemonic way.  Asylum officers and immigration judges are expecting a personalized account 
of persecution – not a general report of country conditions.       
While false applications prepared by notorios are specific to Latino migrants, the 
problem of unethical practices and boiler plate applications among immigrant community 
members exists across other nationalities.  For example, during my interview with Chen, who 
was granted asylum for his pro-democracy activism in China, he detailed the problem with 
Chinese immigrants who seek asylum even though they were not persecuted in order to remain 
in the U.S.: 
They [Chinese immigrants] find ads in newspapers with attorneys who conduct learning 
class. They purchase Falun Gong books and tapes and learn the exercises. Sometimes 
they go to church to learn Bible and get baptized too. They have to remember the church 
address and pastor name. When the officer asks, they also know how many disciples 
Jesus had. They make up stories about being part of an underground church in China.  
 
Chen’s account shows how a narrative of persecution based on Falun Gong or association with 
Christianity emerged in boiler plate applications for Chinese immigrants.  However, because 
these tales are not specific to the individual who is telling them, they are often viewed as 
fraudulent by asylum officers.  For example, during my interview with Deborah, an asylum 
supervisor, she estimated that half of the Chinese asylum claims were fabricated because of the 
lack of detail outlined in their application and testimony: 
I’d say about 50% have a case based on self expression. The Chinese are very well 
prepared, extremely well prepared [during their interview].  I mean they take classes, they 
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take classes on asylum. Only these classes never address anything in particular, it’s all 
too general and then you have someone who can’t answer questions about dates and 
where they where when something happened.  If they can’t remember, well, these are just 
not real cases. 
 
Preparers often create asylum applications by using standard, hegemonic tales of persecution.  
However, because preparers do not specify how the story should be told, asylum seekers are 
often denied asylum because they did not tell the story in a way, such as with precise dates, that 
would satisfy the asylum officer.        
Asylum seekers are dependent upon their attorneys to negotiate the legal system and 
facilitate the process of applying for asylum.  When meeting with clients, attorneys look for 
certain facts that lend themselves to a narrative of persecution.  During my interviews with 
immigration attorneys, I asked them how they decided whether to represent an asylum seeker.  
Mai, an attorney employed by an NGO that represents asylum seekers in detention, articulated 
two crucial factors she considers when deciding whether to represent clients: “their story has to 
be compelling and they need to be able to qualify for asylum.”  Her answer was echoed by many 
attorneys who pride themselves on their ability to identify clients with genuine claims of 
persecution.  Sarah, an immigration attorney with an NGO, included availability of resources and 
the extent to which someone would be harmed as additional criteria: 
The first requirement is that there’s some merit to the case. We have to believe that we 
can prevail – or maybe we can’t prevail but we should be able to if the law were properly 
applied. The second thing is the great intangible because probably nine out of ten people 
who need our help are sent away because we don’t have enough resources. To some 
extent it’s assessing the extent of the harm. I’m going to take someone who I think is 
going to be killed over someone who may or may not be discriminated against in the 
workplace.  
 
Attorneys use legal criteria when considering whether to take on a client.  They consider 
whether a case fits the rules of asylum law based on one of the five legally accepted grounds.  
Deciding to take a case based on its legal merits is what John Conley and William O’Barr (1990) 
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referred to as having a rules orientation rather than a relationship orientation toward the law.   In 
their study of the use of language in legal settings, John Conley and William O'Barr (1990) show 
how people analyze their legal problems through either a "rules" or a "relationship" paradigm. 
Those who are rule oriented "evaluate their problems in terms of neutral principles whose 
application transcends differences in personal and social status." (1990: ix). Those with a 
relational orientation toward the law "come to the legal system seeking redress for a wide range 
of personal and social wrongs. In talking about their problems, they predicate rights and 
responsibilities on a broad notion of social interdependence rather than on the application of 
rules" (1990: ix).  Conley and O’Barr argue that plaintiffs with a rules approach to articulating 
their grievance are more likely to receive a favorable decision in court than those who articulate 
a relationship approach.   
Their mutually exclusive categories of “rules” and “relationships” is problematic because 
it neglects the social interaction between clients, who tell their stories, and attorneys, who are 
responsible for molding those stories into legally presentable narratives.  Asylum seekers may 
construct their stories according to a relationship orientation toward the law, such as telling 
stories of harm that do not specify whether the harm was because of one of the five legally 
accepted grounds.  However, in order to prevail in court, immigration attorneys must turn asylum 
seekers’ narratives into rule-based narratives of harm.  To do so requires multiple visits with the 
client.  Attorneys may require that asylum seekers meet with them three or more times before 
they submit their applications.  During these meetings, attorneys ask general questions about 
what happened and why they left their country.  After eliciting an initial narrative, the attorney 
follows up with questions that mold the narrative into a rules-oriented approach that conforms to 
the rules of asylum law.    
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4.2.2 Service Providers  
Immigrant service providers assist asylum seekers by providing the documentation necessary for 
successful applications.  Of the twenty-one asylees interviewed for this study, fourteen were in 
contact with immigrant service providers during the preparation of their asylum application.  
Many immigration attorneys refer their clients to immigrant service providers to provide 
psychological counseling.  The service provider meets with the asylum seeker and then writes a 
report which is included in the asylum application.  Service providers often testify in 
immigration court as expert witnesses regarding the asylum seeker’s mental health status.   
In this section, I show how two service providers, Nicole and Margaret, assist asylum 
seekers by preparing legally expected stories of persecution.  Nicole and Margaret are similar in 
that they both consider themselves advocates who work toward the goal of helping immigrants 
gain asylum.  What is interesting about these stories is that they show how different motivations 
for engaging in tactics that encourage asylum seekers to tell expected stories can contribute to 
hegemonic narratives. 
Nicole, a psychologist who is employed by an organization that works with torture 
survivors, provides counseling for asylum seekers, writes reports that are included in her clients’ 
applications, and often testifies on their behalf in immigration court.  The organization she works 
for is funded by a federal grant through the Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998.33  Federal funds 
cover approximately 75% of the organization’s operating costs, with private donations making 
up the remaining costs. During our interview, Nicole discussed how she diagnoses Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and its relevance in asylum applications: 
                                                 
33 Funding for this Act was not available until 2000. 
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Clients come to us with many psychosocial problems that typically include major 
depression and panic attacks.  PTSD is just one of the possible diagnoses that someone 
might have.  But it’s a diagnosis that the adjudicators, the INS, and the judges seem to be 
looking for. 
 
In her authoritative position on psychosocial disorders, Nicole conveyed that she emphasizes 
PTSD in her reports because she knows that it is the diagnosis with which INS officers and 
immigration judges are familiar.  She was clear that she does not fabricate reports or embellish 
testimony, but that she merely emphasizes PTSD in clients who have multiple psychosocial 
diagnoses in order to facilitate their ability to gain asylum.  Nicole’s behavior contributes toward 
reproducing a hegemonic narrative about PTSD as the primary clinical diagnosis for asylum 
seekers.  Her justification is rooted in her social position as an advocate for asylum seekers, not     
because PTSD is the only or primary diagnoses that explains her clients’ behaviors.  Nicole’s 
motivation may not be to reproduce a hegemonic narrative, yet that is the outcome based on the 
reports she submits in asylum applications.  
Margaret encourages hegemonic narratives too in an effort to facilitate asylum seeker’s 
ability to gain asylum.  A physician who documents torture and writes affidavits that are 
included in asylum seeker’s applications, Margaret, works with an immigrant organization that 
serves many female clients who have been circumcised.  During our interview, she discussed 
how she documents these cases and her own response to this practice: 
Most of my cases are with women who have been raped after they were circumcised. 
They have so much scar tissue and it’s just horrifying and sorrowful to see that. When the 
labia is removed, you see nothing, it’s just smooth between the vaginal opening and the 
rectum. And when I see that I feel like crying. I walk out of the room to collect myself. 
I’ve actually looked at my own anatomy more to appreciate it and just say: Oh my God, 
they have destroyed the rose, they have depetaled the rose.  
 
Margaret explained how she often gives her patients a copy of Alice Walker’s (1993) Warrior 
Marks, a book that chronicles Walker’s documentary film on female circumcision and makes 
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clear that the practice is torture.  She continued with her position on female circumcision by 
articulating the mother’s responsibility in this practice, and her own anxiety about treating the 
“torturer”: 
It’s usually the mother or another female relative who performs it [circumcision]. 
Sometimes it’s not the mother, but she is implicated by virtue of her facilitating the 
taking of the child [to the circumciser]. I’ve had a few families where I knew the mother 
and I heard the story [from the daughter] and it really angered me. I thought how am I 
going to deal with this mother? What if they bring her to me as a patient?  
 
Margaret insists that women tell stories of female circumcision in ways that portray them as 
victims of a barbaric practice.  Although Margaret did not indicate that she refuses to treat 
women who have circumcised their daughters, her grave disapproval of the practice and of the 
mother’s compliance makes her reluctant to work with certain immigrants.  Like Mohanty’s 
critique of some Western feminists who perpetuate notions of “other” women as victims, 
Margaret too insists that women who have been circumcised articulate a victim status in order to 
be worthy of gaining asylum.  In chapter 6, I address the claims of women who gained asylum 
because of female circumcision. 
Nicole’s and Margaret’s description of how they assist torture survivors provides insight 
into how asylum seeker’s narratives, in their reporting of persecution, are remolded to fit a 
hegemonic narrative, in these cases by suggesting PTSD symptomology as a psychosocial 
disorder and female circumcision as torture compared with the experience of an “anatomically 
normal” uncircumcised woman.  Nicole and Margaret share a spirit of client advocacy and desire 
to see their clients gain asylum.  They act on the asylum seeker’s behalf by emphasizing legally 
recognizable forms of harm that those who wield institutional power, such as asylum officers and 
judges, “are looking for” in asylum applications.  Yet in doing so, they contribute toward 
hegemonic power by reproducing legally accepted narratives of harm.  While their motivation 
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for contributing toward a hegemonic narrative may differ in that Nicole’s appears intentionally 
strategic and Margaret’s seems naively orientalist, their behavior is one of accommodation, not 
resistance of hegemonic power.    
4.2.3     INS Asylum Officers 
The shaping of persecution narratives can involve not only asylees, their attorneys, and 
advocates, but even those who are supposed to be impartial, like asylum officers and 
immigration judges, some of whom were previously activists for asylum. One argument among 
scholars of transnational human rights movements is that human rights activism emerges from 
outside of the state.  Sociologists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) trace the rise of 
non-state actors through international, non-governmental, and human rights organizations that 
make demands on nation-states through their advocacy role as pressure groups.  In their 
discussion of human rights as a transnational social movement, Keck and Sikkink (1998) 
articulate a basic tenet of what has appeared as a widely accepted dichotomy between universal 
human rights and state sovereignty.  The tension between human rights and state sovereignty, as 
articulated by scholars such as Yasemin Soysal (1994), Saskia Sassen (1998a; 1998b), and Keck 
and Sikkink (1998), is that international law and policy provide universal standards of 
personhood and notions of humanness that transcend how any particular nation-state might 
conceptualize these terms.  Consequently, state sovereignty is eroded because power and control 
emerge from outside the nation-state.   
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the diversity within the state or within 
human rights organizations and consequently treats each as monolithic.  Unlike other 
departments within the INS, the asylum corps has a large number of employees who identify as 
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human rights advocates.  The introduction of the INS asylum corps in 1991 restructured the 
hiring process for asylum officers to include the transfer of bureaucrats previously employed by 
INS as well as the new hire of human rights advocates, most of whom were trained in human 
rights law.   
During my interviews with INS asylum supervisors and former asylum officers, they 
described how the human rights advocates clashed with INS bureaucrats, whom they referred to 
as the "old guard," over the politics of immigration.  Many of the INS asylum supervisors and 
former asylum officers I interviewed considered themselves activist bureaucrats in that they 
actively worked toward granting asylum cases. 
During my interview with Walter, a former asylum officer at the New York INS office, 
he described the division between the old guard bureaucrats and the human rights advocates: 
In the beginning, in New York, all of the supervisors were former airport inspectors from 
Kennedy [JFK airport]. These were old guard INS and they didn’t trust people. All of my 
supervisors were jaded people from inspections from JFK. They didn’t think that most 
[asylum seekers] were credible. A person whose background was INS inspections was 
cynical. They assumed most of the people coming in were lying. These people were 
much more reluctant to sign off on a grant [of asylum]. In the beginning, it was the 
lawyers versus the airport people. In my office there was a culture. It was us against 
them.   
 
Walter’s understanding of the division within the asylum office, the “us against them” culture 
between asylum officers who understand asylum within a human rights framework and those 
who view adjudicating claims as a gatekeeping function, demonstrates the multiplicity of ways 
that asylum officers view their position.  This example supports Linz’s (1975) model that shows 
the numerous possibilities between total support and total rejection of a political order.  The 
variation among how asylum officers view their role within the state apparatus, in part, 
determines how one judges asylum applicants during interviews.  Asylum officers can facilitate 
or impede asylum seekers ability to gain asylum. 
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4.3 CREDIBLE NARRATIVES 
How stories of persecution are told can determine whether the story itself seems credible.  In 
order to gain asylum, an applicant must be viewed as credible by an asylum officer.  Legal 
scholars argue that credibility, which includes “demeanor, specificity, detail, and consistency,” is 
the most important determinant of success in gaining asylum (Anker 1999:160-167).  Three 
themes emerge from my interview data about how credibility is determined in asylum interviews 
and hearings.  The first theme, memory, reveals the expectations about recall.  The second 
theme, knowledge, refers to asylum seeker’s understanding of events or practices.  The third 
theme, narrative performance, describes the expectations INS asylum officers have about how 
asylum seekers tell stories of persecution.  In this next section, I show how the content and ways 
of telling persecution shape perceptions of the asylum seekers.   
4.3.1 Memory  
Asylum officers determine whether an applicant is credible based on the applicant’s ability to 
recall and describe certain events.  In the absence of proof, asylum seekers rely on memory when 
telling their stories  of persecution.  Testimony often is the sole available source of evidence for 
those who flee, leaving behind identity documents and proof of harm.  Thus, assumptions about 
memory are embedded in credibility determination.   
My interviews with Ann and Alice, asylum supervisors at the Anaheim office, best 
describe expectations about recall.  According to Ann, she conducts interviews by asking asylum 
seekers to recount events in chronological order: 
I like to ask questions that keep them focused. When were you born? Let’s talk about 
1970, and then move to 1980, and then now. If they are consistent, if they have enough 
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details that they lead me to believe that they actually experienced what they’re talking 
about then I’m obligated to find them credible. 
 
The expected narrative requires asylum applicants to recall events in the order in which they 
occurred.  Asylum seeker’s testimony may be deemed non-credible if they do not explain past 
events in a linear fashion, even if they can account for all events.  The hegemonic story telling is 
one that recalls the past in chronological order. These officers, however, do not expect 
themselves to remember as, for example, Jeffrey, an asylum supervisor at the Anaheim office, 
who told me that he “can’t remember dates. I always need a cheat sheet.”  Jeffrey’s statement 
reveals the contradictory expectations of those located in different positions of power than 
asylum seekers.  This example supports Tilly’s (2006) thesis that differential access to power 
shapes which accounts are acceptable by certain people and which ones are not.      
The section on cross-cultural communication in the asylum officer training manual states 
that “time is measured differently and holds different importance in various cultures. Time in 
some cultures may be measured in terms of planting seasons rather than months, weeks, and days 
as it is in other cultures” (INS 1998a: 12).  Yet, asylum officers often rely on their own 
understanding of time when eliciting testimony.  For example, Alice articulated that she looks for 
detailed accounts when asylum seekers discuss traumatic events: 
They have to be able to remember the details. When something horrible happens to 
someone, they know where they were right before that. They’ll know extraneous details; 
what day of the week it was, what time of the day it was, where exactly they were, even 
what they were wearing, you’ll remember things like that. 
 
Alice’s criteria for what constitutes credibility, like so many other examples I offer, demonstrates 
the preposterous character of such reasoning that some asylum officers and immigration judges 
rely upon when adjudicating asylum claims. 
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 Asylum seekers often conveyed to me problems they had with recalling events during 
their asylum interviews. During my interview with Billy, an asylum seeker from Guatemala who 
was raped repeatedly during his childhood by a government official, he recalled the difficulty in 
meeting the expectations of the INS asylum officer about memory and dates, such as those 
articulated by Ann and Alice.  He described his fear of denial at the INS asylum interview 
because of his inability to remember when he was raped: 
The INS is really strict and sometimes your memory is just not perfect. The human mind 
tends to change things, alter little things, like a date and you must be exact. INS wants 
you to say, “okay this is what happened and on such and such a date.” And you have to 
get it right. When they [his INS asylum officer] asked me about when I was being 
abused, I couldn’t remember. I couldn’t even remember how old I was the first time it 
happened. 
 
In this case, however, Billy’s inability to recall the dates he was raped did not result in a denial, 
and he was granted asylum by the asylum officer.  The hegemonic story telling is one that locates 
events with dates.    
4.3.2 Knowledge  
Specific forms of knowledge are also important during asylum interviews.  Asylum seekers are 
often asked to identify political and religious figures to determine whether they are 
knowledgeable about a particular place or practice.  During my interview with Amina, an 
Ethiopian asylum seeker, she discussed how she was questioned during her INS asylum 
interview about the current government in Ethiopia.  During her asylum interview, which was 
conducted with the aid of an interpreter, she relayed the following story of how her interpreter 
translated her answer incorrectly which shows how her own knowledge of English enabled her to 
act on her own behalf during her interview. 
  102 
He [the asylum officer] asked me about the new government but after I went to Saudi 
there was another government. I gave him the one I knew before I went to Saudi. During 
that time, there was a new president every three or four months.  Even right now I don’t 
know who the president is. And the translator told me he’s not the president now [during 
the interview]. When he [the asylum officer] was asking me, I told her [the translator] the 
answer. But she [the translator] told a different answer. I was getting angry and said no to 
the interview guy, “that’s not what I said. I understand English.”  
 
Language ability can determine the outcome of a case. Interviews are often conducted with the 
aid of an interpreter.  According to the INS lesson plan, the role of the interpreter is to “interpret 
verbatim as much as possible, using the asylum officer’s and applicant’s choice of words, rather 
than using the interpreter’s choice of words” (INS 1998b: 7).  This statement (along with other 
criteria) is read to the interpreter at the beginning of the interview.  It is nearly impossible for 
asylum officers to know whether the interpreter is translating correctly.  Unlike immigration 
court hearings which are recorded and in which a transcription of the proceedings is made 
available to the judge, no such recordings are made available during INS asylum interviews for 
the applicant’s attorney and the attorney representing the INS. Therefore, asylum seekers with 
limited or no English skills cannot intervene on their own behalf regarding correct translation.   
Amina’s familiarity with English gave her the opportunity to intervene on her own behalf 
by correcting the translator’s answer about the President of Ethiopia.  In this example, Amina 
was able to tell the expected narrative because of her fluency in English, and therefore could 
correct the interpreter during her interview.  She had a consciousness of opportunity which she 
turned to her own advantage.  While Amina’s claim was denied at the asylum office, in part, 
because of her incorrect answer about who occupied the Ethiopian presidency, her claim was 
granted in immigration court. 
While I was conducting interviews with asylum supervisors, I inquired whether they 
intervene during interviews when they think there may be problems with language translation.  
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While all of them cited the INS policy regarding adequate translation during interviews, they 
indicated that intervention may be problematic in practice.  During our interview, Walter 
described how uncooperative responses by asylum supervisors discouraged intervention by 
asylum officers: 
There were times when I thought that the translator was not competent, and I told them 
[the asylum seeker] that this isn’t to your advantage; you need to come back and bring 
somebody with you who can translate properly. When I did this, supervisors frowned on 
it, especially when I had a big backlog and the pressure was to move cases. Others of us 
[asylum officers] did this as well, but those who routinely did it were talked to. 
 
Walter’s willingness to intervene on behalf of asylum seekers is an example of how he engaged 
in resistance against institutional authority.  His identification of translation incompetence shows 
how he attempted to shift the power dynamic in favor of asylum seekers.  Ewick and Silbey 
(2003) argue that “through everyday practical engagements, individuals identify the cracks and 
vulnerabilities of institutionalized power” (1330).  Walter is an example of how asylum officers 
work within the INS to resist hegemonic power, not reproduce it.   
4.3.3 Narrative Performance 
Asylum seekers are deemed credible according to how emotive they are when recounting stories 
of sexual violence.  Rape provides a vivid example of gendered persecution that involves 
contradictory expectations about performing narratives in asylum interviews.   
Throughout the 1980s, asylum officers often did not consider rape to be persecution.  For 
many who did grant asylum based on rape, they only did so when narratives of sexual violence 
were told with a tearful account of the rape.  During my interview with Linda, an attorney with 
the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, she described how asylum claims by women from 
Central American countries such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala who experienced 
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sexual violence were denied on the grounds that rape was not persecution.  Her description was 
reflective of other immigrant advocates I interviewed who emphasized the struggles they had 
before INS officials and immigration judges who did not think that rape was persecution.   
Moreover, many rape claimants were deemed non-credible witnesses if their stories of 
sexual violence were related with little or no emotion.  Linda was among the first immigration 
attorneys to introduce psychological assessments in the applications she prepared on behalf of 
asylum seekers. In response to the denial of asylum claims on the basis of rape, she argued that  
rape survivors experienced PTSD from the trauma of sexual violence.  Linda’s response is what 
Ewick and Silbey (1995) term a narrative strategy.  A PTSD diagnosis is used to lend credibility 
to an asylum seeker’s non-emotive account of rape, and thereby resists the hegemonic narrative 
that one must be tearful while recounting  these stories. 
The inclusion of rape as a form of persecution was a hard won battle for immigrant 
advocates.  Too, the idea that a claimant may not be emotive while telling a story of sexual 
violence as a result of PTSD was also a significant milestone that benefited asylum seekers.  
However, while asylum laws and policies do not necessitate a specific way of telling stories of 
rape in order to be credible, asylum officers and judges still have expectations about how stories 
of sexual violence should be told.  Crying during rape testimony continues to guide decisions 
about whether a story is real.  Because different asylum officers articulate different 
interpretations of rape, the act of crying during an account of rape can not be categorized as 
simply hegemonic or counter hegemonic.   
Alice, an asylum supervisor at the Anaheim office, articulated how she views emotions as 
credible during a female asylum seeker’s account of rape: 
When they start talking about rape, they start off very normal, like you and me talking 
here today.  All of sudden, when they start talking about the rape, they start crying, 
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sobbing, it’s like a waterfall.  To cry with real tears is credible. Unless the person is a 
good actor, it’s very hard to cry on cue. And not crocodile tears, but real tears. When they 
are wailing, you know it’s credible. 
 
Alice’s description of a tearful account of rape shows how she expects this reaction during 
testimony about rape.  By stating that “when they are wailing, you know it’s credible” implies 
that those who do not cry when recalling stories of rape are not credible.   
Some asylum officers and judges relayed stories of their own emotions during rape 
testimony.  Jeffrey, an asylum supervisor at the Anaheim office, discussed how one account was 
so horrific that it brought him to tears, making clear that the applicant must be credible or else he 
would be not crying: 
At one point, I did refugee overseas processing. I was in Belgrade, Yugoslavia and was 
interviewing a mixed ethnic couple. One was Serbian and the other was Muslim. The 
wife had been raped and I knew from the file that it was going to be a horribly emotional 
interview. Before long, everybody was crying. Everybody was in tears. The applicants 
were in tears. The interpreter was in tears. I was in tears. Interviews like that, you know 
those are real stories. 
 
Jeffrey’s assumption that “real stories” are the ones where not only the applicant cries, but ones 
that bring the asylum officer to tears shows how crying during rape testimony makes the 
applicant appear credible.  Jeffrey’s and Alice’s  expectations about rape testimony are examples 
of how crying during rape testimony contributes to a narrative that reinforces the notion that 
crying is expected during rape testimony, regardless of the hard won work of immigrant 
advocates.   
 A counter example to Jeffrey and Alice, who expect that credible rape stories be told 
while crying is Deborah, another asylum supervisor at the Anaheim office.  Deborah’s 
understanding is that credible rape victims never cry during their testimony.  While her position 
could be interpreted as resistance in that she does not expect the hegemonic way of telling rape 
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stories by crying, her suspicion of asylum seekers as non-credible if they do cry reveals a 
different hegemonic expectation of rape narratives: 
Ninety percent of the stories I hear are embellished.  I think more of what we see are 
people embellishing and thinking that they have to say they were raped, but they have 
never been raped.  When they talk about the alleged rapes, there are always tears 
involved. To me, that isn’t genuine. I have dealt with too many rape victims and the thing 
is that they don’t burst into tears. At this point, six months or even years later, there is 
usually never a breakdown. 
 
For Deborah, a non-emotive account is expected during rape testimony. These examples reveal 
the complexity of understanding the way that stories must be told.  Rape is an example of a 
narrative that requires a specific performance of the content.  Asylum seekers who tell stories of 
rape are being judged  not by the content of their story as much as by the emotions they show (or 
fail to show) while telling it.  
      Immigration attorneys work with clients to shape their narratives of persecution.  When I 
questioned immigration attorneys about rape cases, they voiced frustration with their clients who 
would not reveal stories of rape during their asylum preparation meetings, yet told these stories 
during their interview in front of an asylum officer or immigration judge.  The attorneys were 
frustrated because failing to include rape in the asylum application made the asylum seekers 
appear non-credible during their interviews.  Moreover, this meant the attorneys could not 
prepare their clients for questioning about the rape.  In her study of how rape survivors prepare to 
testify in U.S. courtrooms, Amanda Konradi (1996) underscores the importance of what she 
terms emotion work, relying on Arlie Hochschild’s (1983) argument about expectations about 
emotional labor, which Konradi defines as the “efforts that survivors made to produce feelings 
and emotional displays that they deemed appropriate to the courtroom before they entered it” 
(1996: 415).   
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Many attorneys relayed stories of how they assisted asylum seekers with telling stories of 
rape during their hearings and interviews. During my interview with Michael, he discussed a 
client he represented at the San Francisco INS asylum office when he worked for a local NGO as 
an example of why women do not convey stories of sexual harm during their meetings with their 
attorneys :  
I was representing an Eritrean woman and my practice was to always spend a lot of time 
with the client trying to understand the story so that I could put together a very detailed 
declaration in the application. We met three times prior to her interview and I read it back 
to her and she confirmed it. At no time had there been any mention of sexual harm. In the 
interview, she starts talking about her rapes while in custody. Now I hadn’t heard this 
before and was concerned that it would be held against her on credibility, that she is 
adding things that aren’t a part of her claim.  Fortunately, the officer involved understood 
that it didn’t undermine her story and did grant her. We [the asylum officer and Michael] 
sat and discussed the issue and realized that in the meetings in my office her relative was 
always there translating. In this interview, they hired a professional to come in and 
translate.  
 
Michael’s depiction of female asylum seekers’ reluctance to discuss sexual violence in front of 
friends and family members resonated across many of my interviews with asylees who omitted 
their rape as part of their persecution narrative.  Ewick and Silbey (1995) argue that narratives 
are situationally produced in that they are told within a particular context.   For female asylum 
seekers who tell stories of sexual violence, the presence of male relatives often determines 
whether they are willing to divulge information about their rape.  Consequently, female asylum 
seekers who were raped are often non-credible applicants when appear to change their story.  
The narrative during the oral interview is one that replicates the content of that found in the 
written application.  When asylum seekers include additional testimony in their oral narrative 
they are suspect as non-credible.   
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4.4 HEGEMONIC AND NON-HEGEMONIC STORY-TELLING 
 
How stories of persecution are told is as important as the story itself.  In this chapter, I 
demonstrated the complexity in story telling that contributes to a legally accepted narrative of 
persecution.  My data on asylum contributes to sociolegal scholarship by arguing that story 
telling is as important as the story itself.  I have expanded Ewick and Silbey’s focus on narrative 
content by arguing that stories, and how they are told, are not simply hegemonic or counter 
hegemonic.  Moreover, unlike Ewick and Silbey’s work that emphasizes agency and resistance 
among the claimants who bring forth grievances, I have included how differently situated 
participants, such as asylum officers, immigration attorneys, and immigrant service providers, 
engage acts of resistance and confront institutional power structures on behalf of those who are 
unfamiliar with the INS asylum bureaucracy.   
In this chapter, I identified the extra-legal criteria that constitute a convincing story of 
persecution in asylum interviews and hearings.  Asylum seekers may be deemed non-credible if 
they cannot recall the date they were persecuted, if they are unfamiliar with the current 
governmental administration in their country, and if they do not display emotions during rape 
testimonies.  These criteria contribute to hegemonic story telling in asylum adjudication.  They 
are hegemonic through their social control and conformity regarding how stories of persecution 
must be told.   
Yet not all asylum officers expect a hegemonic narrative of harm.  Nor do they all expect 
a narrative be told in way that is hegemonic.  In this chapter, I offer examples of how asylum 
officers, attorneys, and service providers engage in acts of resistance in order to undermine 
hegemonic power.  In his role as asylum officer, Walter alerted asylum seekers to problems with 
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language translation.  As an immigration attorney, Michael engaged with an INS asylum officer 
about why his client introduced her rape during her asylum interview and not during her 
preparation.  Nicole, a psychologist with an immigrant service organization, diagnosed PTSD as 
the primary disorder in order to facilitate a grant of asylum.  These examples show how asylum 
officers, attorneys, and service providers work against institutional power on behalf of asylum 
seekers, even when doing so means encouraging hegemonic stories.  Consequently, a pro-
immigrant position does not preclude one from encouraging hegemonic narratives of harm.   
Some of these participants do so, in part, because they identify as human rights activists working 
within, not outside of, the state.  And in doing so, they work toward reproducing, not 
undermining institutional power.   
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5.0  RULING RELATIONS IN IMMIGRATION COURT ASYLUM HEARINGS 
Defining persecution in asylum law is like Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's directive about 
obscenity: “I shall not attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced 
within that short-hand description [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in 
intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is 
not that” (Jacobellis v. Ohio 1964).  I use the full quotation because the often abbreviated 
circulation of “I know it when I see it” implies that once an example of pornography 
materializes, it is clear that it is obscene.  Justice Stewart’s conclusion, however, is the opposite: 
seeing the film provided ample evidence that it was not pornography.  Like Justice Stewart’s 
observation that understanding pornography depends on a specific example, interpreting 
persecution is contingent upon an asylum claim that is made before an immigration judge.  
Moreover, immigration judges' justification for denying asylum claims often mirror Justice 
Stewart's conclusion when empirical evidence of harm presented in court is deemed insufficient 
to constitute persecution.   
In this chapter, I examine how persecution is determined in U.S. immigration court 
asylum hearings.  I focus particularly on the hidden criteria that affect the determination of 
persecution, drawing on Dorothy Smith’s (1987) theory of the importance of ruling relations, the 
“complex of organized practices, including government, law, business and financial 
management, professional organization, and educational institutions as well as the discourses in 
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texts" that exert power in social life (3).  Smith (1990b) also urges sociologists to “develop 
sociological inquiry from the site of the experiencing and embodied subject as a sociology from 
the standpoint of women” (1).  I expand these two ideas to explore a legal institution structured 
by ruling relations that diminish agency for immigrants.  
Immigration court is a good venue for the examination of ruling relations because it 
allows us to examine how migrants' subjectivity can be circumscribed by the practices and 
interactions that comprise its ruling relations.  Moreover, consistent with Smith's (1987) 
argument that gender is pervasive as an invisible "subtext" in ruling relations, a study of 
immigration court makes it possible to explore how race, class, and nation are inserted in the 
ruling relations in determinations of persecution (4). 
Dorothy Smith (1987) examines unequal ruling relations with regard to gender through 
the analytical concept of invisibility.  She argues (1987) that society's ruling relations are 
androcentric, as evidenced by the biases and discrimination "in law, in business, in jobs, and so 
on" that render women's experiences invisible (4).  Her solution is to make gender visible.  I 
build on Smith’s idea of invisible subtext by showing how non-legal criteria emerge in the ruling 
relations of immigration court asylum hearings.  Specifically, I rely on the metaphors of visibility 
and invisibility to show how the ruling relations in immigration court are based on legal (visible) 
criteria and non-legal (invisible) criteria.  The non-legal criteria are hidden if asylum is 
understood exclusively in terms of laws and policies.  I argue that understanding the social 
relations and interactions  in immigration court are crucial for making visible the concealed non-
legal criteria that contribute to the implementation of asylum law.      
In this chapter, I focus on the immigration court asylum hearings, especially six asylum 
adjudications before five judges.  I selected these hearings because they show how concealed 
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criteria guide the implementation of asylum law.  This chapter is divided into two sections that 
reveal different aspects of the ruling relations of immigration court.  In the first section, I discuss 
spatial arrangement, interpretation of cultural acts, and the scheduling of hearings as ways in 
which the ruling relations of immigration court are constituted, over and above the visible 
exercise of legal authority.  In the second section, I excerpt six hearings that reveal the ways in 
which non-legal criteria, in addition to legal criteria, contribute to immigration judges’ 
determinations of persecution in asylum hearings.  I conclude with a discussion of the ruling 
relations in immigration court.  While I use Smith's concepts of “standpoint,” “institutional 
ethnography,” and “objective knowledge” to demonstrate how immigration court asylum 
hearings are structured, I rely primarily on her notion of invisible subtexts to show how the 
ruling relations operate in asylum proceedings.  I argue that asylum decisions are bound by a set 
of ruling relations that comprise both the visible, legal authority and invisible relations of ruling 
based on other criteria. 
5.1  AUTHORITY IN IMMIGRATION COURT ASYLUM HEARINGS 
Max Weber (1978) talks of legitimate domination to describe how power can be concentrated in 
bureaucracies such as legal institutions.  Institutional ethnography is particularly good for 
locating such relations of power (DeVault 1999; Diamond 1992; Smith 1990a; 1990b; Townsend 
1998).  Immigration judges have the ability to grant or deny asylum, adjust migrants' status so 
that they may later apply for citizenship, or order their deportation.  Immigration laws confer 
upon judges what Weber describes as legitimate authority.  However, judges have other sources 
of authority, bound in their bureaucratic positions.   
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5.1.1 Spatial Arrangement  
One example of such authority is the spatial arrangement of immigration court.  The Los Angeles 
immigration court is located in the downtown area and shares space with commercial businesses 
housed in the same building.  As early as seven-thirty in the morning a line snakes down the 
entrance stairs onto the sidewalk.  Migrants, their attorneys, expert witnesses, language 
interpreters, and visitors enter through the front of the building making them often late if they do 
not arrive well in advance of their scheduled time.  Once inside the building, people are directed 
into four elevators.  INS assistant district counsels, clerks and other court personnel, and 
employees of the commercial businesses have privileged access to the elevators: others wait for a 
security guard's cue that they may enter an elevator.   
Higher level officials can avoid the long lines altogether.  In the basement, there is a 
parking garage for judges and select court employees who avoid the main entrance lines by 
entering the elevator on a lower floor.  During one proceeding when an Armenian asylum seeker 
was late for his eight-thirty A.M. hearing, he told the judge that he had arrived at eight A.M. but 
due to the long line did not arrive in court until nine A.M.  The judge replied: “I was here at 
eight-thirty and did not have a problem.  If I did not have a problem with being on time, why do 
you have a problem with being on time?  Everyone takes the same elevators.”  The judge was 
correct that everyone takes the same elevators; however, he was able to enter the elevator in an 
uncrowded floor due to his parking privileges and thus arrived on time.  One dimension of the 
ruling relations in immigration court is that, like other institutions, employees tend to have 
limited knowledge of other components of the workplace bureaucracy, or, as this case shows, of 
the client’s experiences.  As W.E.B. DuBois (1989) demonstrates in The Souls of Black Folk, 
limited knowledge is on the part of those at the top of the hierarchy, not at the bottom.   
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Immigration judges may issue an “in absentia” order for deportation if an asylum seeker 
does not appear in court (Silverman 1998).  The law is clear regarding the treatment of 
immigrants who fail to appear in court.  However, there are no laws or policies regulating 
punctuality in the courtroom.  Initially, the judge was reluctant to proceed with the hearing and 
threatened to dismiss the case (hence placing the asylum seeker in deportation proceedings).  
After much pleading from the asylum seeker, the judge adjudicated the case that morning.  
Ultimately, the judge denied him asylum. It is difficult to know whether the asylum seeker’s 
tardiness impacted the judge’s decision not to grant him asylum.  In this example, a judge’s 
preconceptions about punctuality and access to the courtroom is a non-legal criterion that the 
judge attempted to use to dismiss a case.  This example of how a judge invoked authority is 
particularly troubling because it shows how little immigration judges know about the everyday 
life, or even the courtroom experiences, of those they make decisions about. 
Michel Foucault's (1978) affirmation that "power is everywhere; not because it embraces 
everything but because it comes from everywhere" provides a post-structural account of 
institutional power (93).  Foucault's argument about the circulation of power as ubiquitous is 
germane to identifying its sources in immigration court.  Power in immigration court is dispersed 
in that it circulates through multiple sites.  The multiplicity of the possibilities of points of 
conferral of power, however, does not necessitate its equal dispersion.  While power is 
everywhere, its distribution and depth is disproportionate among its multiple sites.  Power in 
immigration court is concentrated among those who implement the laws, immigration court 
judges.  However, in addition to judges, who exert the greatest power over claimants, language 
interpreters, and immigration attorneys are also present in the courtroom during asylum hearings 
and engage tactics that reveal a contestation over authority.  Similar to the examples of 
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hegemonic stories and storytelling in INS asylum interviews offered in the previous chapter, I 
draw from excerpts from field notes of immigration court hearings to show how power operates 
in asylum adjudication.   
Immigration judges and assistant district counsels, along with court clerks, have offices in 
the immigration court building and all of their duties are performed in the courtroom or in their 
nearby office space.  There is no office space for interpreters or attorneys who represent 
immigrants.  Immigration attorneys, expert witnesses, and immigrant plaintiffs meet in public 
spaces such as the downstairs coffee shop next to the front entrance and in waiting rooms located 
on all court floors.  While observing court proceedings, I noticed that interactions among judges, 
attorneys, and interpreters reflected their shared workplace experiences.  They regularly discuss 
cases interjected with personal exchanges among each other while applicants are excluded from 
these workplace-based discussions.  Prior to morning hearings, it is common to find interpreters 
gathering in the lobby of the clerk's office on the fifteenth floor.  Their transformation of a public 
space into make-shift offices for filling out paperwork and socializing with other interpreters is 
an example of how they have established the lobby as their workplace. 
Immigration courts are located on the fourteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth floors.  The 
fifteenth floor houses the clerk’s office and serves as the general administrative floor.  The back 
wall is covered with printouts of the day’s hearings in columns headed by the name of the judge 
and location of the courtroom.  Information from the printouts include the start and end time of 
the hearings, the hearing location, the immigrant's name and A-number (alien number), the type 
of hearing, the immigrant's representative’s name, and abbreviated terms for the language and 
nationality of the immigrant.  Copies of these printouts are also posted outside individual 
courtrooms.  There is also an Immigration Court Information System kiosk for locating 
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immigrant information.  The initial screen on the kiosk reads “The Immigration Court 
Information System is provided as a means to access hearing date clock, decision, case appeal, 
and filing information.  All information is obtained by providing an A-number.”  Upon entering 
an A-number, which is available from the posted printouts, a screen appears allowing the user to 
access information such as the full name of the immigrant and the status and decision of 
adjudicated cases.  On one occasion, I approached a clerk working behind a glass partition and 
asked if there were full citations available for the language, nationality, and other abbreviated 
terms on the hearing printouts.  When she asked me who I was and why I wanted the 
information, my reply that I was a student writing a dissertation on immigration did not persuade 
her to provide me with the requested form.  She replied: "that is more information than you need 
to know."   
The kiosk and printouts are a vehicle whereby immigration court controls the flow of 
information.  No identification is required for entering the building, and although security guards 
are staffed at metal detectors on the fourteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth floors, anyone may 
enter the fifteenth floor administrative lobby.  Consequently, the kiosk and computer printouts 
are more than sources of information for attorneys and interpreters locating the day's case.  The 
information available on the kiosk and printouts contribute to the unequal ruling relations in the 
courtroom, and subsequently in society, based on the vulnerability of migrants whose personal 
information is readily available for viewing.  The availability of information poses a potential 
threat to immigrants whose case information and whereabouts is displayed on the back wall of 
kiosk.  In particular, asylum seekers, such as those fleeing an honor killing, are in a potentially 
vulnerable position because anyone who enters the courthouse may locate their case information.  
While I was able to access private information such as asylum seekers' names, alien numbers, 
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and their attorney's names, I had to take educated guesses about the nationality and language of 
applicants. The clerk's unwillingness to provide me the information was an example of her 
control of texts to assert authority in immigration court. 
The spatial layout of an immigration courtroom is like most other courtrooms, but  
significantly smaller.  All parties except the judge enter through a door at the back of the 
courtroom.  There are three benches on either side of the aisle and a small wooden lattice gate 
separating the six benches from the front of the courtroom.  There are two tables in front of the 
judge, one table is for the immigrant, his/her representative, and an interpreter, if required, and 
the other is designated for the assistant district counsel.  Like some other court proceedings, 
witnesses are sequestered during the trial; however, asylum hearings are unique in that there tend 
to be few or no witnesses.  Expert witnesses who testify in asylum hearings tend to be those with 
professional knowledge of a pertinent component regarding the asylum application.  These 
witnesses include physicians who testify about documentation of torture, psychologists who 
account for their clients' flat affect when discussing violence with diagnoses such as Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and anthropologists who advise about cultural practices and 
the hypothetical legitimacy of the social circumstances described in the application.34   
5.1.2 Pre-Hearing Interactions 
During my first visit to immigration court, I was waiting in the courtroom with an attorney and 
her client, a young man seeking asylum from Honduras, when the assistant district counsel 
questioned my identity and my reason for being in the courtroom.  Not knowing who she was, 
                                                 
34 Expert witnesses who testify on country conditions tend to be scholars living in the United States.  When I 
inquired about this with immigration attorneys, they cited cost and ability to locate experts as the reasons why 
scholars in the U.S. were preferred.  When expert witnesses are not available to testify in court, attorneys may 
include their affidavits in the asylum application.    
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and being my first day in court, I assumed she was a clerk and that her inquiry was standard 
procedure.  When I told her I was a graduate student studying immigration, she told me that I 
would have to leave once the hearing began because visitors were not allowed in the courtroom.  
She then turned to the applicant and told him to go home because his file was lost, and she could 
not do anything without the file.  She informed his attorney that she should go to the INS 
administrative office to locate the file.  Soon after the hearing commenced the judge ordered a 
continuance based on the INS assistant district counsel's lack of access to the applicant's file and 
advised the assistant district attorney to locate the file in time for the next hearing.   
 This scenario demonstrates how an assistant district counsel engaged power tactics in her 
query about my identity, and her dictating of my removal by attempting to regulate information 
and attendance of courtroom visitors.  Immigration court hearings are public proceedings, 
contrary to the statement of the assistant district counsel.  There are no laws or policies that 
govern the presence of visitors in asylum hearings except for witnesses who are sequestered until 
they are called to testify.  During my observations of immigration hearings, assistant district 
counsels often questioned my attendance in court.  For the entirety of my observations in 
immigration court, judges, the paramount source of authority in the courtroom, never asked me 
to leave the courtroom.  Moreover, asylum seekers and their attorneys, those who arguably have 
the greatest stake in discerning the identity of courtroom observers, did not request that I identify 
or excuse myself during the proceedings.  In another asylum hearing, the assistant district 
counsel requested that the judge inquire about my identity and reason for attending.  The judge’s 
response was that “it is the place of the (immigrant’s) attorney to ask this.”  When the assistant 
district counsel retorted with fears that I was a reporter, the judge stated: “immigration court is 
open and it doesn’t matter who she is.”  And in another courtroom I had frequented and met 
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several times with a supportive judge to discuss my project, an assistant district counsel during 
one asylum hearing requested that the judge order me to leave to which the judge responded: 
"she is here at my request."  
Assistant district counsels, immigrant representatives, and interpreters often talk with one 
another while waiting for the judge to enter the courtroom.  These conversations may be specific 
to the case, may concern other cases, or may be friendly banter about their personal lives.  These 
pre-hearing interactions provide a lens for viewing how assistant district counsels engage tactics 
that can facilitate rather than impede asylum seeker's claims.  For example, during one hearing, a 
Liberian woman was seeking asylum based on rape by government officials who claimed their 
attack was retribution for her father's political activities.  Prior to the official hearing 
proceedings, the assistant district attorney informed the respondent’s attorney that the court 
referral was due to insufficient evidence of her entry to the United States.  Because the asylum 
seeker was smuggled across the U.S. southern border and was not processed by a Border Patrol 
official, there were no records of her entry date.  In the pre-hearing discussion, the assistant 
district counsel informed the applicant's attorney that the government was not planning to appeal 
the case based on the substance of the claim.  Instead, the assistant district counsel needed to 
question the applicant only on matters of identify and date of entry. 
In his celebrated account of social interaction, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 
Erving Goffman (1959) outlines how individuals' performances influence observers.  In the pre-
trial asylum hearing interactions, assistant district counsels, attorneys, and language interpreters 
engage what Goffman referred to as "back stage" performances while waiting for the judge 
whose entrance into the courtroom ushers in their "front stage" performance.  It is during these 
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back stage performances that government and applicant’s attorneys assert their authority over the 
trial as they negotiate how they will proceed during the asylum hearing.    
The following example shows how a psychologist engaged tactics of control in her access 
to back stage authority while the judge exerted his front stage authority over the psychologist as 
an expert witness.  While an assistant district attorney and asylum seeker's attorney strategized 
about a case while waiting for the judge, a psychologist scheduled to testify as an expert witness 
was sitting in the courtroom between the asylum seeker and me.  I had spoken with the applicant 
about attending her hearing and notified her attorney and psychologist that she had agreed.  
While we were waiting for the judge, the psychologist asked her client repeatedly whether she 
was sure that she wanted me to be present during the hearing.  The applicant followed the 
questioning with a repetitive "Yes, it's okay" that continued until the judge entered.  When the 
judge inquired about the presence of courtroom visitors, the attorney identified the psychologist 
as an expert witness and the judge ordered her sequestered.  As the psychologist continued 
asking her client if it was acceptable for me to be in the courtroom, the judge stated with 
irritation: "all witnesses must be sequestered. I don't care who else stays."  Later in the hearing 
when the applicant was excused to collect herself after a grueling examination by the judge over 
the details of her rape, I was the only one allowed to accompany her because the judge ordered 
her attorney to remain seated.  The psychologist later thanked me for staying with her client and 
expressed gratitude that I was available to provide her with for moral support.  I interpreted the 
psychologist’s repeated questioning of her client about my presence as patronizing to the asylum 
seeker.  A few weeks later, the psychologist asked me to omit her client’s name in my 
dissertation.  While I had informed the psychologist numerous times that I was assigning all 
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participants in this research project a pseudonym prior to the court hearing excerpted above, I 
again reiterated that I would not reveal her client’s identity.  
One dimension of the ruling relations of the immigration courtroom is the differential 
ability to command authority over access to asylum seekers and their hearings.  In this example, 
the psychologist asserted her professional authority in her relentless questioning about my 
presence with the intended goal of assuring her client's best interests.  The psychologist was 
familiar with graduate student dissertations and knew that I would be taking notes on the hearing 
that might appear in documents such as academic publications.  Having volunteered with the 
organization that employed the psychologist and having worked with her many times, I am fairly 
certain that her concern for her client was genuine and that her behavior was exemplary of 
professional ethics.  If she had convinced her client to request that I excuse myself during the 
hearing, I would have acquiesced to the psychologist's back stage authority regulating courtroom 
visitors.  In the ruling relations of the courtroom, however, the judge's directive for expert 
witnesses, not observers, to leave the courtroom demonstrates how interactions shift from back 
stage to front stage once the source of authority is converted from the immigrant service provider 
to the judge. 
Once the judge enters the courtroom, these discussions are suspended and the court is 
officially in order.  On occasion, a court clerk will enter and utter the "all rise" request to cue 
courtroom attendees to stand.  More often, however, judges enter unannounced and are greeted 
by differential conformity among those present in the courtroom regarding the respectful 
standing position. 
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5.1.3 Asylum Hearings   
The initial hearing for an asylum seeker is a master calendar hearing.  Like arraignment hearings, 
plaintiffs enter a plea and have an opportunity to notify the judge of problems such as access to 
legal representation or ability to produce required documentation.  Immigrant representatives 
may request additional master calendar hearings until all problems are resolved and the plaintiff 
is prepared for a merits hearing.   
Master calendar hearings, like merits hearings, have numerous cases scheduled 
simultaneously.  For master calendar hearings, plaintiffs are typically called in the order they 
appear on the computer printout sheet posted outside the courtroom and on the fifteenth floor 
clerk's lobby wall.  Master calendar hearings tend to be crowded and there is no privacy for the 
plaintiff during these proceedings.  The exchanges among judges, assistant district counsels, 
attorneys, interpreters, and migrants in master calendar hearings are audible to everyone in the 
courtroom.   
All documentation must be entered into evidence during the master calendar hearing.  
Rarely do judges admit additional evidence during a merits hearing.  Documentation in the 
asylum applications include the I-589 asylum application form; a declaration, that is a statement 
outlining applicant's narrative of persecution; identity documents, if available, such as birth and 
marriage certificates; expert witnesses’ affidavits; and the U.S. State Department and human 
rights organization reports on country conditions.  In The Conceptual Practices of Power, 
Dorothy Smith (1990a) criticizes claims to knowledge that sociologists make based on "data 
generated by the state in the course of its practices of governing" (85).  The application materials 
are a kind of data that judges, assistant district counsels, and asylum seekers' attorneys use to 
make arguments about the legitimacy of the claim.  The documentation frames the discourse in 
  123 
the courtroom and restricts migrant's ability to discuss their case outside of the boundaries 
circumscribed by the documentation.  For example, part of the documentation is the migrant’s 
own declaration which is assumed to contain an accurate account of the persecution the migrant 
experienced.  As discussed in chapter 4, asylum seekers are often reluctant to discuss sexual 
violence with their attorneys.  If an asylum seeker did not disclose that she was raped to her 
attorney (and therefore this information would not be in the declaration), but during her hearing 
reveals that she was raped, the client may be deemed non-credible because her declaration is 
assumed to contain an accurate account of why she left her country. 
The merits hearing is the part of the asylum trial when the assistant district counsel and 
immigrant representative have opportunities to make their case before the judge.  Once the 
hearing begins, all parties are sworn in and asylum seekers usually testify from their seat.  
Sometimes judges insist that testimony is given from the witness stand and then the asylum 
seeker and the interpreter, if present, will sit together at the witness stand.  Sometimes expert 
witnesses testify during merits hearings. Expert witnesses always testify from the witness stand.  
At the beginning of the hearing, judges ask if there are any witnesses in the courtroom and order 
them to be sequestered in one of the nearby waiting rooms.   
Like other venues in the American judicial system, immigration court hearings are 
structured by a series of questions and answers. The applicant’s attorney asks questions and the 
applicant answers; the assistant district counsel asks questions and the applicant answers; the 
applicant’s attorney may ask further questions on re-direct and the judge may interject at any 
time during the proceedings.  In asylum hearings, immigrants tell their stories through a 
controlled exchange of questions and answers, moderated by the judge and attorneys. 
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5.1.4 Interpretation of Cultural Practices 
Because most plaintiffs in immigration court do not have English as a first language and many 
do not speak English, language translators provide interpretation during the hearings.  The 
immigration court in Los Angeles has an exclusive contract with the interpretation service 
Berlitz International Inc.  Interpreters are Berlitz consultants and are not employees of the U.S. 
government.  In 1991, a lawsuit brought forth by several legal service organizations made the 
Los Angeles court responsible for providing language interpreters during all hearings (El Rescate 
Legal Services v Executive Office of Immigration Review).  This contrasts with interviews 
conducted by the INS asylum office where applicants are responsible for providing their own 
translators and often bring a family member or friend.  Interpreters are contacted by Berlitz and 
report to the administrative clerk’s office prior the hearing.   
During an interview with Ben, an interpreter, I asked how he responded to situations 
when he suspected that asylum seekers did not understand what was asked of them by judges and 
attorneys during hearings.  He replied, "There is not much an interpreter can do. We do not exist. 
We are only the tongue. Sometimes the question is not clear or does not make sense.  It may be a 
poor question, but we still have to interpret, we have no choice."  Yet another interpreter, Luxmi, 
described a different reaction to communication misunderstandings.  She articulated a cultural 
practice in Sri Lanka of head nodding such that a side-to-side nod indicated a positive response 
and a forward nod indicated a negative response.  She described her frustrated response during a 
hearing for a Tamil asylum seeker: "the judge told the asylum seeker, 'you are saying yes to the 
interpreter but you are shaking your head no.' There was no way I would not let the judge give 
him asylum because of the nod.  I told the judge what was happening."  These examples illustrate 
how differential understandings of one's role as interpreter induce varying reactions, from 
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complicity (remaining silent in one's powerless status as "tongue") to intervention (asserting 
one's authority as an interpreter of cultural acts).  In this case, the judge accepted the interpreter’s 
explanation of the nod and granted asylum to the Sri Lankan applicant.   
Asylum seekers have a legal right to language translators, if needed (Germain 2000).  
While the INS has policies that govern language translation (I discussed these policies in chapter 
4), there are no immigration court policies that dictate whether translators are limited to 
interpreting an asylum seeker’s testimony.  The repercussion for non-English speaking asylum 
seekers is that their ability to articulate the required narration of persecution often depends on 
their translators' willingness to engage authority on their behalf.  In this example, a language 
translator used a non-legal criterion (intervention beyond official guidelines) to facilitate the 
judge’s understanding of the Sri Lankan asylum seeker’s behavior while testifying during court.   
In this section, I have offered my data as a contribution to the scholarship on institutional 
ethnography by identifying how non-legal criteria and non-legal sources of authority contribute 
to the ruling relations in immigration court.  In the next section, I excerpt six asylum hearings 
that show how immigration judges, assistant district counsels, and immigration attorneys engage 
visible, legal authority and invisible relations of ruling that are based on other criteria of 
persecution.  The first three hearings represent how the subtexts of gender, race, and class invoke 
assumptions about migration motivation and discrimination.  The last four hearings show how a 
specific line of interrogation invokes assumptions about document acquisition, perceptions of 
harm, temporal recall, and sensory perception. 
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5.2 RULING RELATIONS IN IMMIGRATION COURT ASYLUM HEARINGS 
Sociolegal scholarship has explored the implication of how stories, or narratives, are told in legal 
settings (Coutin 2001; Delgado 1989; Delgado and Stefancic 2004; Ewick and Silbey 2003; 
1998; 1995).  Richard Delgado (1989) argues that the legal framework for storytelling is 
characterized by neutrality but actually serves the status quo.  A narrow examination of asylum 
grants and approvals is limited in that it only indicates the outcome of a case, not the social 
interactions that organize the ruling relations of the hearings.  In this section, I expand on 
sociolegal scholarship by using Smith's argument about ruling relations to explore how non-legal 
criteria, in addition to legal criteria  emerge during the implementation of asylum law.  I focus on 
five narrative forms by which such criteria are introduced: migration motivation, discrimination, 
document acquisition, perception of harm, and temporal recall.   
5.2.1 Migration Motivation 
In order to gain asylum, an applicant must be viewed as credible, as discussed in chapter 4.  
During my observations of immigration court hearings I found that any assumption of 
incredibility invokes suspicion that the applicant’s motivation to migrate was based on economic 
or other reasons, not fear for his or her life, a crucial component for claiming persecution.  Once 
an applicant is deemed non-credible, the language of work enters into the line of questioning by 
judges and attorneys concerning how the applicant is surviving in the United States.  If the 
applicant is surviving by working, he/she is seen as having migrated for economic reasons.  Yet 
in order to survive, most people are working.  It is only the economically privileged who enjoy 
the luxury of not working until their claim is adjudicated.   
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Asylum seekers are often privileged in their class status vis-à-vis persecuted populations, 
demonstrated in their ability to migrate based on human rights abuses.  Persecution per se does 
not result in the ability to gain asylum; instead one must marshal resources to cross nation-state 
boundaries and claim relief from harm.  Because asylum seekers tend to be economically 
solvent, immigration judges and assistant district counsels often assume that asylum seekers who 
are working at the time of their hearing migrated for economic reasons, not because they had a 
well-founded fear of persecution, as I show in this section. 
Like other venues in the American judicial system, immigration court hearings are 
structured by a series of questions and answers. The applicant’s attorney asks questions and the 
applicant answers; the assistant district counsel asks questions and the applicant answers; the 
applicant’s attorney may ask further questions on re-direct and the judge may interject at any 
time during the proceedings.  Assistant district counsels prosecute all immigration cases.  Like 
assistant district attorneys who represent the people by prosecuting criminal cases, assistant 
district counsels are charged with the responsibility of litigating on behalf of the government.  In 
asylum hearings, immigrants tell their stories through a controlled exchange of questions and 
answers, moderated by the judge and attorneys.  The following hearing demonstrates how 
migration motivation via discourses of work and family are intrinsic in the asylum process.  In 
May of 2002, an Afghan asylum seeker testified in immigration court that he left Afghanistan 
“because the Taliban killed my parents and someone told me that the Taliban was after me 
because of my association with the anti-Taliban Watan party.”  The following is the exchange 
among the assistant district counsel (ADC), the immigration judge, and the respondent: 
 ADC: Are you aware of the change in government in Afghanistan? 
 Respondent: I don’t know that. 
ADC (sounding hostile, which continues throughout hearing): Is it your testimony  
that you don’t know anything about Afghanistan in the last two years? 
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 Respondent: Yes. 
 ADC: What about your wife and children? 
 Respondent: I am worried about them. 
 ADC: Are you in contact with your wife and children? 
 Respondent: No. 
 ADC: Where are your wife and children? 
 Respondent: They were going to Pakistan. 
 ADC: Your statement says that you are afraid to go back because of the interim  
  government.  How do you know about it if you don’t know anything  
about  Afghanistan in the last two years? 
 Respondent: I’ve had no contact with Afghanistan in two years and no English. 
Judge interjects: Mr. ____, no one has told you that the Taliban is no longer in  
power? 
 Respondent: But they are still fighting. 
Judge (now shouting and emphasizing every word): Answer my question with a  
yes or no; No one has told you that the Taliban is no longer in power? 
 Respondent: No. 
In the example offered, the applicant obviously knows more about Afghanistan than the 
judge.   `Yet the judge’s perception of the asylum seeker’s lack of knowledge of world political 
events makes him suspect as a non-credible witness of basic knowledge that eight months after 
the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, he was oblivious to the regime change.  Moreover, he 
insinuated that official regime change does not constitute peace in his response that "they are still 
fighting."  The questioning between the assistant district counsel and respondent resumed and 
after a few questions pertaining to his ethnic identity the subject turns to work: 
ADC: Who is ______? 
Respondent: He repairs carpets. 
 ADC: Is he related to you? 
 Respondent: No, he’s just a friend. 
 ADC: What was your occupation in Afghanistan? 
 Respondent: Weave rugs. 
 ADC: How long have you been in the profession of weaving carpets? 
 Respondent: Nine years. 
 ADC: Is that why you are here in the United States today, to have a rug business? 
 Respondent: No, no business. I weave for others. 
 ADC: Are you weaving in the United States? 
 Respondent: No. I stayed with ______ for 16 months. I’m not working. 
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In this case, even though he testified that he has a well-founded fear of persecution, the applicant 
became suspect as an economic migrant because he appeared to lack political knowledge.  
Ultimately, he was denied asylum.  His responses about the whereabouts of his wife and 
children, however, went unquestioned.   
Consider a Chinese woman seeking asylum because of her arrest and beatings for 
practicing Falun Gong.  She testified that she was diagnosed with a neurological disease and her 
symptoms dissipated after six months of daily practice in a public park. After the Chinese 
government banned Falun Gong in 1999, she, along with others, continued to practice it in 
private homes. One day the police arrested her and, during her interrogation, she was hit, 
slapped, and forced to sign a confession letter admitting she was a reactionary element and 
agreeing to cease the practice and report weekly to the police.  She stated that she was harassed 
by the neighborhood committee and that she feared she would be “thrown in jail with more 
beatings” if she returned to China. The following are excerpts from her hearing:  
ADC: How old are your children? 
 Respondent: 15, 18, 19 
 ADC: You left your family and came all the way to the United States?  
 Respondent: Yes 
 ADC: You left your children? 
 Respondent: Yes 
 ADC: And all this over Falun Gong? 
 Respondent: Yes 
 
After questioning her about how she was able to leave China, the assistant district 
counsel turned to the subject of work. 
 ADC: Did you come to the United States to work? 
 Respondent: Yes, I work. 
 ADC: Isn’t it true that you came to the United States to work? 
 Respondent: No. 
 ADC: Are you in contact with your mother, husband, or children? 
 Respondent: Yes. 
 ADC: What does your mother have to say? 
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 Respondent: She asked me if she can see me again before her death. 
Judge interjects: If I understand what you’re saying, you left your husband,  
daughter, and sons to come to the United States because you didn’t want 
to report to the police one time per week? We’re done. 
 
Unlike the earlier example of the male asylum seeker whose familial abandonment goes 
uncritiqued, this female asylum seeker is vilified for leaving her husband and children.  
Moreover, it is the very act of her abandonment that makes her suspect as non-credible: real 
mothers would never leave their families.  Yet this gendered logic does not lead to questions of 
whether she is indeed a mother or a wife.  Instead, the questions turn to her motivation for 
coming to the United States.  The judge’s decision to end the hearing and, subsequently, to deny 
her asylum demonstrates the complexity of defining persecution.  For the judge, her case was 
frivolous because reporting weekly to a police station seemed an unreasonable explanation for 
departure even though she testified that contact with the authorities resulted in physical harm. 
These examples show how migration motivation emerges as a non-legal criterion through 
discourses of family and work in the controlled exchange moderated by judges and attorneys.  
People migrate for complicated and seemingly contradictory reasons that may include fleeing 
human rights abuses and desire for better (or at least different) working conditions.  Yet the class 
and gender subtext of the asylum hearings subordinate narratives of harm to stories of work and 
lead to questions of credibility.  The ruling relations of immigration court accept narratives of 
persecution only from economically solvent asylum seekers, evidenced in the use of the non-
legal criterion of migration motivation instead of asylum law based on a well-founded fear of 
persecution. 
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5.2.2 Discrimination  
A second example of how non-legal criteria emerge in asylum hearings is when persecution is 
believed to be discrimination.  To establish asylum, migration must be based on persecution, not 
discrimination.  Asylum law is clear that harassment or discrimination alone does not rise to the 
level of persecution (Germain 2000:32).  Examples of behavior that are considered 
discrimination but not persecution include rock throwing, damage to property, and burglary of 
homes (Germain 2000:32).  In the following example of a Sri Lankan couple, extreme 
discrimination by Sinhalese against Tamils and interracial couples led not only to a persecutory 
act (rape) but to the refusal of the police to respond.  An interracial Sri Lankan couple (male 
applicant is Eurasian, female applicant is Tamil) received phone calls by unidentified Sinhalese 
men threatening to kidnap their son, rape the wife, and kill the husband.  One of these threats 
was carried out as the wife experienced multiple rapes in her home by a Sinhalese man who told 
her she should not have married a white man.  The following is the testimony of the male 
applicant:  
Respondent’s Attorney: Do people know you are Eurasian? 
 Respondent: Yes. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: How? 
 Respondent: Complexion. English.  
 Respondent’s Attorney: Did you have problems? 
 Respondent: Yes. I was abused and called names. 
 Judge interjects: Discrimination as a child is not a basis for asylum. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: What race is your wife? 
 Respondent: Tamil. 
Respondent’s Attorney: After you were married, how did Sri Lankan society treat  
you? 
 Respondent: They did not accept us. They treated us like foreigners.  
 Respondent’s Attorney: Instances? 
 Respondent: My wife was sexually harassed and violated when I wasn’t there. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Who did this? 
 Respondent: A Sinhalese person. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Why did he do this? 
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 Respondent: Said I couldn’t be married to her because I was Eurasian. This guy  
was raping her in my house. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Did you report this to the police? 
 Respondent: Yes. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Did they do anything? 
 Respondent: No. The police are all Sinhalese. 
The judge denied the case and in his oral decision repeated that discrimination is not a basis for 
asylum and that “criminal activities are common in Sri Lanka.”  The questioning of the rape was 
in the context of general discrimination instead of rape as persecution on account of race, an 
alternative approach.  The Sinhalese police’s refusal to respond to the rapes was a legally 
acceptable reason to grant asylum.  Asylum includes harm committed by the government or 
those the government cannot or will not protect one from.  In this example, the government 
(Sinhalese police) did not protect the Tamil woman from the intruder's rapes.  Moreover, the 
male applicant testified that the police's non-responsiveness was because of the ethnic majority 
status of the police ("the police are all Sinhalese").  Like Richard Delgado’s (1989) critique of 
how hegemonic narratives reinforce the racial status quo, this case demonstrates how 
discrimination conceals persecution demonstrated in the judge’s reasoning of racial persecution 
as criminal normalcy.  This example demonstrates how the law is subordinated to a non-legal 
criterion of discrimination through the judge's refusal to interpret the events as persecution. 
5.2.3 Document Acquisition  
The third theme is document acquisition. Asylum seekers are viewed as non-credible when they 
enter with fraudulent documents.  During the asylum interview asylum officers and immigration 
judges interrogate migrants about their identity and identity documentation.  Unlike Americans 
who bring forth a grievance or request within the U.S. legal system, asylum seekers 
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overwhelmingly lack proof or evidence regarding their claim.  In addition to not being able to 
prove that they were persecuted, they often cannot offer proof of their own identity.  Asylum 
seekers often travel or are smuggled across national borders with no identity documents or false 
documents.  Migrants often gain exit from and/or entry into a country by any means necessary in 
order to flee persecution.  Yet entering with false documentation can prove problematic for 
immigrants who must be deemed credible during their interview or hearing.   
When asylum seekers acquire fraudulent documents in order to flee, their credibility is 
often undermined.  The following is excerpt is from an immigration court hearing I witnessed in 
Los Angeles.  A government-employed Armenian physician reported bribes and corruption by 
the Armenian government.  As a consequence, he was arrested and tortured, his son kidnapped, 
and his daughter killed. Upon his release, he applied for, and was granted, a visitor’s visa from 
the United States Consulate.  The following excerpt is from his hearing and is an example of how 
fraudulent acquisition of documentation was the basis for an immigration judge’s denial of 
asylum.   
Judge (hostile tone): I want to understand what happened at the United States  
Consulate. What kind of visa did you ask for? 
Respondent: They did ask that question, why are you going. I said I just want to  
see that country. 
Judge: Is that true? 
Respondent: No. Not the real reason. But if I did they would not let me go. 
Judge: So you made a false application to enter the country? 
Respondent: So I could flee. 
Judge: Why didn’t you ask to come as a refugee, as a persecuted person? You  
lied.  
Respondent: I came because this is a free country. 
Judge: There are a lot of free countries. Why come so far, there are many much  
closer, why pick one so far away? 
Respondent: Because none of those countries are America. 
Judge (sarcastic tone and emphasizing each word): So you came here because it’s  
a freedom-loving country and you thought you could just disappear? 
Respondent: Yes, I’ve always loved this country. 
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During his decision, the judge questions the applicant’s credibility based on the fraudulent 
acquisition of identity documentation:  
Entry is a concern of the court.  If an alien comes by means to circumvent the asylum 
process the court should look at this. He gave false information to obtain visa and 
obtained visa by fraud. The court agrees with the government [INS] that this is incredible 
that anyone who claims fear would be given a tourist visa. The court believes this is an 
attempt to deceive the court. The court finds this grounds for denial. But he has 
established persecution and a probability of future persecution. To grant would encourage 
others to enter fraudulently. I am denying your claim for asylum and granting 
withholding of removal.35
 
Credibility is central to the outcome of the case.  The applicant’s fraudulent means of acquiring 
documentation makes him appear non-credible as someone fleeing persecution.   
 Immigration judges are legally bound to grant some form of relief that prevents asylum 
seeker’s from being deported if the applicant has proven a well-founded fear of persecution.  
Asylum is one form of relief.36  If the judge did not think that the applicant had shown a well-
founded fear of persecution, he could have denied him asylum.  Instead, he granted a form of 
relief with fewer benefits than asylum.  The judge introduces an interesting logic when he shifts 
the blame to the applicant by assuming that the U.S. Consulate would never have issued a travel 
visa to someone fleeing persecution.  It is certainly true that had he articulated fear he would 
probably not have been issued a tourist visa because fleeing persecution assumes a more 
permanent migration than tourism.  According to the applicant’s testimony, however, the 
Consulate did not know he feared persecution; thus, issuing a travel visa was in order. 
                                                 
35 The immigration judge in this case granted withholding, not asylum, to the Armenian asylum seeker.  A 
withholding grant allows immigrants to remain in the country without being deported.  Unlike a grant of asylum that 
allows immigrants the opportunity to apply for permanent residence one year after their approval and eventually for 
citizenship, withholding offers no status advancement.  Nor does withholding allow immigrants the option of 
petitioning for relatives.  As discussed in chapter 2, the applicant may appeal the judge’s decision to the BIA. 
36 In chapter 2, I discussed the principle of nonrefoulment that protects all asylum seekers from deportation to a 
country where they fear they would experience persecution. Other forms of relief, in addition to asylum, include 
withholding of removal and provisions found in the Convention against Torture, the Nicaraguan Adjustment and 
Central American Relief Act (NACARA), the ABC Settlement, and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act 
(HRIFA). 
  135 
 Susan Coutin's (2001) work on accounts of political violence by Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan immigrants finds that those that do not conform to a specific legal discourse of 
persecution result in denial of asylum.  One expected narrative in asylum hearings is that asylum 
seekers whose documentation was obtained under deception are non-credible.  Unfortunately, for 
the asylum seeker, the judge’s suspicions of the asylum seeker’s motivation for coming to the 
U.S. for reasons in addition to fleeing persecution, persuaded the judge not to grant him asylum.  
The problem with the judge’s decision is that there was no legal basis for granting him 
withholding of removal instead of asylum.  Instead, the judge’s decision appears to be rooted in a 
non-legal criterion based on an asylum seeker’s acquisition of fraudulent document that allowed 
him to flee persecution. 
5.2.4 Perception of Harm 
Perception of harm is the fourth non-legal criterion that is often used in addition to legal criteria 
during asylum hearings.  Legally, acts constituting persecution are considered as such regardless 
of the applicant’s perception of the act.  For example, if a woman has been circumcised she has 
experienced persecution based on female circumcision according to asylum law. Yet in the 
courtroom, perception of the act can be as important as the act itself.  Patricia Ewick and Susan 
Silbey (1995) argue that specific stories emerge as hegemonic in legal narratives.  For example, 
in asylum hearings, female circumcision is hegemonic vis-à-vis other types of harm, such as 
political activism.  In cases of  female applicants who claim multiple types of persecution, 
political activism is made invisible, and subordinate to, narratives of harm based on female 
circumcision.  The following are excerpts from Helima's hearing, a Nigerian woman seeking 
asylum based on two separate types of persecution: female circumcision and torture as a result of 
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her political activities in Nigeria.  Of the asylum seekers excerpted in this chapter, she is the only 
one whom I interviewed personally.  During our interview, she told me that she left Nigeria 
because she feared further retribution after being detained and tortured and only learned of 
female circumcision as a means for gaining asylum after arriving in the United States.  Her 
family lived in the United States during her early childhood, and when she was seven, they 
returned to Nigeria.   
 
Respondent’s Attorney: What happened when you returned to Nigeria? 
Respondent: Family decided I should have FGM [Female Genital Mutilation] for  
honor. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Did they inform you of this decision? 
 Respondent: Henna and jewelry, but they did not tell me. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Did you want to be circumcised? 
 Respondent: No. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Any anesthesia used? 
 Respondent: No. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Physical discomfort? 
Respondent: Yes, first my elder sister came in and when I heard her screaming [I]  
ran away. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: At present do you have any symptoms as a result of  
   circumcision? 
 Respondent: Yes. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: What are they? 
 Respondent: Fear of adults can do anything to you for any reason. 
The attorney’s questioning demonstrates that it is insufficient to have experienced circumcision; 
an interrogation of its meaning is also necessary.  If the act itself was sufficient, the attorney 
could submit a medical affidavit or have a medical expert testify that the applicant was 
circumcised (this is common as means of proof in these cases).  Instead, the asylum seeker’s 
perception of the harm is questioned in terms of her consent, physical (medical) complications, 
and symptoms.  I was surprised that she used fear of adults as a symptom of her circumcision 
since the attorney's line of questioning infers medical complications, not social repercussions.  
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Susan Coutin’s (2001) account of Salvadoran and Guatemalan migrants shows how defecting 
from the expected hegemonic narrative oftentimes leads to a denial of asylum.  Fortunately for 
this asylum seeker, her deviation from the medicalized narrative of female circumcision was not 
used to deny her asylum.  The hearing then turned to her political activities in Nigeria.  
 
 Respondent’s Attorney: What else happened in Nigeria? 
Respondent: At the end of high school we decided, my friends and I, to wear what  
we want and came wearing trousers. A van came to school and out came 
five men, and they arrested us and forced us to enter the van. They took us 
somewhere unknown, and we went to a room and they locked us in the 
room. They beat us and tortured us and taught us how we should be 
dressed. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: When you say you were beaten, what do you mean? 
 Respondent: I was taken to a bench and people would come by and hit. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Were you actually hit? 
 Respondent: Yes. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: For how long? 
 Respondent: 2 hours. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: And then what happened? 
 Respondent: Took us to a room and we could hear people screaming. They told us  
would take us away and we would be disappeared. 
 
In the judge's oral decision, he stated that female genital mutilation was clearly covered 
under Matter of Kassinga (1996), the precedent case establishing female circumcision as a basis 
for asylum, and that he was granting asylum based on that harm, not the account of being 
detained and beaten. The Nigerian asylum seeker's narrative of beatings and threats of 
disappearance is subordinated to the narrative of female circumcision making her political 
activism and its retribution invisible in the hypervisibility of persecution based on female 
circumcision.37  This example demonstrates how female immigrants' own experiences and 
                                                 
37 Refusal to wear clothing deemed appropriate for women may not seem obvious as form of political activism.  The 
act of wearing of pants was not political because Helima and her friends decided to “wear want they wanted,” but 
because refusal to dress in ways deemed appropriate by the Nigerian government resulted in her being arrested and 
tortured. 
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understandings of political activism are rendered invisible when their claim also includes 
persecution based on circumcision.  In this example, the non-legal criterion of perception of 
harm is crucial for determining persecution even though the act of female circumcision is legally 
considered persecution regardless of the applicant’s view of her circumcision. 
5.2.5 Temporal Recall 
A fifth means by which immigrants' experiences are made invisible is temporal recall.  Asylum 
seekers are often asked “what was happening while . . . ” during their account of being beaten, 
tortured, or raped.  The common line of questioning, “What was happening while,?” is meant to 
demonstrate the connection between events and the act of persecution.  Even after a detailed 
account of physical violence, they are almost always asked what was happening while they were 
being beaten, tortured, or raped.  This line of questioning is problematic for at least two reasons.  
First, it assumes that something separate from the act of persecution was happening, often 
nothing else is happening.  Second, it assumes that the asylum seeker is capable of an awareness 
of this event even though he/she is being persecuted while it is happening.  More importantly, 
there is no legal foundation for this line of questioning.  Instead, it is a non-legal criterion for 
determining persecution.   
The following court hearing demonstrates how temporal perception of events serve as 
evidence of persecution.  An Armenian woman sought asylum because her husband had 
converted to the Jehovah’s Witness faith and had begun beating her because she would not agree 
to convert too:   
 
Respondent’s Attorney: Why did you leave Armenia? 
 Respondent: Not on good terms with husband, wanted a certain period of time in  
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peace with cousins. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Why not on good terms with husband? 
 Respondent: He had changed his religion and wanted me to change to his. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Did husband do anything? 
 Respondent: He beat me and gave me a hard time. Beating, kicking, using his  
punches on my arms, on my legs. 
Respondent’s Attorney: Were you injured as a result? 
 Respondent: Yes, on foot and leg when he hit on my face, my eye was swollen  
and nose, he pushed me and I fell onto the ground and when I got 
concussion I was hospitalized. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Other injuries? 
 Respondent: Once I fell and he fell onto me and I heard a sound and a part of my  
   abdomen got torn. 
 Respondent’s Attorney: Describe what was happening while your  husband was  
hitting  you. 
 Respondent (looks confusingly at her attorney): He was hitting me. 
Based on the hearings I observed in court, the woman’s response is typical given that she has 
already described the act of persecution and the injuries she suffered as a result of his beatings.  
A contemporaneous account of events is an invisible criterion of persecution in asylum hearings.  
While a narration of physical violence is necessary, it is not sufficient in that questioning such as 
“what was happening while” assumes additional germane information to the act of persecution.  
This line of questioning assumes a dual consciousness of persecution: the harm or act of 
persecution which asylum seekers are required to describe, and some assumed extra-persecutory 
event(s) salient to the persecution.  Her narrative of harm ("he was hitting me") is eclipsed by the 
attorney's questioning about additional accounts while she was being hit.  In this example, 
temporal recall emerges as a non-legal criterion, in addition to the legal criterion of physical 
violence, that is used for determining persecution.     
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5.3 UNEQUAL RULING RELATIONS 
A legal-based narrative of persecution alone is insufficient for gaining asylum when the ruling 
relations of the courtroom include non-legal criteria such as migration motivation, 
discrimination, document acquisition, perceptions of harm, and temporal recall, in addition to 
legal criteria.   
  Like Justice Stewart's directive of "knowing it when I see it, and this isn't it," 
immigration judges often deem the testimony of immigrants as insufficient to constitute 
persecution.  Accounts of persecution are insufficient if immigrants are suspected of coming to  
the United States so as to work; if a woman migrates without her husband and children; if a 
member of an ethnic minority is raped and physically threatened in a country assumed prey to 
discriminatory violence; if one acquires fraudulent documentation in order to flee his country, if 
the practice of female circumcision is not perceived as harm; and if simultaneous events beyond 
an attack are not recounted during a domestic violence dispute.  In only two of the six asylum 
hearings excerpted above was the applicant  granted asylum.  The Nigerian applicant was 
granted asylum because of female circumcision, even though this was not the reason for her 
departure, and the Armenian applicant was granted asylum because of religious persecution 
based on her refusal to convert to her husband's religion.  Three cases were denied and one was 
granted withholding of removal.   
Asylum seekers are legally responsible for articulating a narrative of harm that is 
satisfactory to a court in which visible legal authority, as well as hidden criteria operate.  These 
criteria, such as migration motivation, discrimination, document acquisition, perceptions of 
harm, and temporal recall influence the implementation of asylum law.  Together with the visible 
sites of authority these constitute the ruling relations of immigration court.  These ethnographic 
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data reveal some of the inner workings of immigration court and the multifarious forms of 
authority that constitute its ruling relations, unmasking concealed subtexts that produce unequal 
ruling relations.  In the everyday world of asylum hearings, restrictions on the immigrants' 
narratives result in an institutional structure that is unfair and unjust.  
This chapter seeks to contribute to institutional ethnography by offering immigration 
court as a site of organized practices and power relations.  I also seek to advance Dorothy 
Smith's (1987) theory of the everyday world as problematic by including the standpoint of 
immigrants.  I offer three examples of visible sites of authority that include spatial arrangement, 
interpretation of cultural acts, and scheduling of hearings that immigration judges, language 
interpreters, and immigration attorneys exercise over and above the legitimate authority of 
asylum law.  Together, the sites of authority and the criteria for persecution constitute the hidden 
ruling relations of immigration court asylum hearings that circumscribe migrants' subjectivity.  
Smith (1987) argues that sociological inquiry should create knowledge for women in order to 
understand the social world from our location.  I also argue that social relations should be viewed 
from the standpoint of the less powerful, but add that in order to understand how migrants' 
subjectivity is circumscribed in immigration court asylum hearings invisible, non-legal criteria 
must be illuminated.  
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6.0  THE GENDER REGIME OF ASYLUM 
In this chapter, I draw from sociological, postcolonial, and subaltern feminist theories to provide 
a conceptual framework for understanding how protectionism and victimization are rooted in 
assumptions about gendered harm.  I argue that the implementation of gender-based persecution 
laws and policies reveals the continued contestation over what I term “a gender regime” in 
asylum practices. 
6.1 THE GENDER REGIME OF ASYLUM 
Relying on feminist sociologist R. W. Connell’s (1987) understanding of a gender regime as “the 
state of play in gender relations in a given institution,” I argue that a gender regime structures 
asylum practices (120). Connell’s formulation is useful for thinking about asylum practices  
because it focuses on gender as a dynamic process in institutions, rather than on gender roles or 
status. Institutions are important because they are sites of power. I substitute “state of play” with 
“practices” to call attention to the behaviors and discourses of specific individuals. Those who 
contribute to the gender regime of asylum practices are situated in various institutional positions: 
asylum officers and immigration judges adjudicate asylum claims, immigration attorneys and 
service providers prepare asylum applications, language interpreters translate testimony, and 
asylum seekers articulate narratives of persecution that resist and reproduce legally and culturally 
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accepted explanations of harm. I use the term practices in an effort to reveal the social dynamic 
among differently located individuals and their access to power and authority. 
I begin with Connell because his definition of regime situates institutions as the structural 
basis for understanding gender relations. The limitation to Connell, however, as Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty (2003) observes, is that his discussion of institutional regimes in general, and 
state regimes in particular, is silent on “racial formation” (65). Connell’s formulation is limited 
because its two-dimensional analysis of gender and sexuality does not address the racial and 
national composition of gender regimes.  The gender regime of asylum consists of nationally 
ordered constellations of protectors and victims.  
Postcolonial feminist Gayatri Spivak’s (1985) discussion of subaltern subjectivity and 
global imperialism in her often-quoted statement that “white men are saving brown women from 
brown men” (121) provides a point of departure for deciphering some of asylum’s shifting 
images of protector and victim. First, there is a national gender regime in which judges, 
attorneys, and others in power (American men and women) are seen as protecting female asylum 
seekers (noncitizen women) from the cultural practices of noncitizen men. These cultural 
practices may include forms of gender-based persecution such as domestic violence and rape. 
Second, there is a national gender regime organized by American men and women protecting 
female asylum seekers (noncitizen women) from the cultural practices of noncitizen women. 
These cultural practices may include female circumcision and honor killing. Third, there is a 
national gender regime in which American men are seen as protecting noncitizen women from 
American women. In this third gendering order, female asylum officers are often the authority on 
what constitutes gender harm.  For example, ethnocentric assumptions about contraceptive use 
on the part of female asylum officers can inform how they adjudicate claims based on coercive 
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population control.  Spivak argues that race and gender are linked in ways that yield racialized 
and gendered protectors and victims. Gender-based persecution cases, however, often exhibit 
slightly different orderings of protectors and victims since they are also structured by citizenship 
differences. Not all immigration judges and asylum officers are white, but they are all U.S. 
citizens. Thus, the racialized dimension of asylum is often rendered mute in its subordination to 
national difference.  
 The gender regime of asylum is also structured by an insecurity of ethnocentric harm and 
a fear of exotic harm. A key assumption in asylum practices is the bifurcation of ethnocentric 
and exotic harm.  The demarcation between ethnocentric and exotic reflects the cultural 
assumptions embedded in the practices of judges, asylum officers, attorneys, and service 
providers—not objective differences of gendered harm.  I make use of the binary 
exotic/ethnocentric to show how gendered harm is often articulated as one or the other by 
immigration judges, asylum officers, immigration attorneys, and immigrant service providers – 
not because all forms of gendered harm “fit” into one category or the other.  For example, forced 
sterilization is overwhelmingly discussed in terms of harm that happens to non-American women 
even though many American women have been subjected to this practice.  Angela Davis (1983) 
traces the history of racism and reproductive rights for African American women who 
experienced forced sterilization and resisted racism through “self-imposed abortions” (205). 
Unlike domestic violence, forced sterilization was not articulated as national gendered harm 
during my interviews with immigration judges and asylum officers.  Instead, it was depicted as a 
practice that happens exclusively to non-American women.   
In her critique of Western feminist knowledge, Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) 
accounts for the production of ethnocentric universalism in “feminist discourse on women in the 
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Third World” (21). One problem with some Western feminist scholarship, according to 
Mohanty, is that it assumes nonWestern experiences as monolithic. Mohanty offers examples of 
how some Western feminists assume a singular third-world experience in the Zed Press series 
she criticizes. In this section, I offer asylum practices as an example of differential—not 
monolithic—treatment of female asylum seekers.38
For example, those who measure domestic violence by U.S. standards are ethnocentric in 
that the American experience of domestic violence serves as the yardstick for adjudicating 
asylum claims. Unlike other forms of gender-based harm, domestic violence invokes a 
floodgates discourse from immigration judges and asylum officers. “What are we supposed to 
do, let everyone in?,” one judge responded when I asked about domestic violence asylum claims.  
The ethnocentric assumption in the judge’s response is that like the United States, all nations of 
the world are plagued by domestic violence. Yet the floodgates discourse as applied to domestic 
violence contradicts numerical evidence of these claims. Immigration courts are hardly filled 
with domestic violence claimants, and when I inquired with the same judge about the number of 
domestic violence cases she had adjudicated, her response was “none.” Were it the case that the 
judge had adjudicated numerous domestic violence claims, her questioning, “What are we 
supposed to do, let everyone in?” assumes a widespread occurrence of the practice. The 
discrepancy between the judge’s response of “none” and fear of domestic violence claims 
opening a floodgate may be due to her anticipation that laws recognizing valid bases for asylum 
claims will increase the volume of those claims. This phenomenon may be demonstrated in other 
asylum claims when new laws or policies are introduced. However, the notion that “everyone” is 
                                                 
38 Asylum seekers in the United States are from both Western and nonWestern nation-states. Binaries of 
West/nonWest and first/third world are inaccurate representations of the asylum-seeking population. 
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eligible for asylum from domestic violence assumes a global prevalence of harm. The state of 
insecurity over domestic violence creates anxiety in the regime of asylum by calling into 
question the protectionism of American women demonstrated in the following reprise of asylum 
officers and immigration judges about American women who experience domestic violence: 
“Where will they go to for asylum?”39
The gender regime of asylum practices is also structured by a fear of exotic harm. Female 
circumcision claims, unlike other gender-based claims, are met with the resounding assurance 
that they constitute persecution prior to an asylum seeker’s account of harm. For example, during 
an immigration hearing on female circumcision, the applicant’s attorney requested that a medical 
doctor offer expert testimony. The judge retorted: “The form that the government accepted says 
that she had FGM [female genital mutilation]. Why do we need a medical doctor to testify? This 
is superfluous. We don’t need a psychiatrist to tell us about FGM; it’s common knowledge that 
it’s a horrific practice.” In an e-mail exchange with a medical doctor who documents evidence of 
torture for asylum applicants, she stated, “I think female genital mutilation is one of the great 
travesties of our time, and we need to get the word out.” One difference between domestic 
violence and female circumcision claims is that the latter are almost automatically assumed to 
constitute persecution. This is demonstrated in the service provider’s affirmation of the practice 
of female circumcision as a “great travesty.” 
Postcolonial feminists Uma Narayan (2000) and Lata Mani (1998) provide examples of 
how sati, or the South Asian practice of widow burning, constitutes exotic harm in various 
contexts. Narayan focuses on Western constructions of third-world societies as “totalizing 
cultures” in which cultural practices are seen as essentially tied to place. She cites the ahistorical 
                                                 
39 Based on my field notes, 5 judges and 4 asylum supervisors made this statement to me. 
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and apolitical appropriation of sati by Western feminists who see this practice as central to 
women’s subordination in India. In her historiography of sati, Lata Mani (1998) argues that 
Indian women were the “ground for a complex and competing set of struggles over Indian 
society and definitions of Hindu tradition” (2). Narayan’s focus on Western feminists and Mani’s 
account of colonial officials provide a parallel framework for understanding how immigrant 
advocates and asylum adjudicators regard female circumcision as exotic harm.40 Female 
circumcision, unlike domestic violence, signifies cultural backwardness—a cultural practice 
exclusive to migrant women.  Similar to Indian women who were burned, circumcised female 
migrants provide the “ground” for assumptions about women’s oppression. 
6.2 GENDERED ASYLUM PRACTICES 
Four themes recur in interviews and documents reflecting how protectionism and victimization 
structure a gender regime in asylum practices.  The first theme, gender synonymy, is the 
assumption that women, but not men, experience gender-related persecution. The second theme, 
cultural essentialism, is the idea that harm is associated with essentialist assumptions of cultural 
practices. The third theme, women’s agency and private harm, is the notion that private harm is 
fundamentally different from public harm. The fourth theme, gender authority, is the gendered 
character of authority and knowledge. 
                                                 
40 Criticism of practices such as sati is not exclusive to Western feminists.  While this topic is beyond the arguments 
I make in this dissertation, it is important to note that many South Asian feminists, in addition to Western feminists, 
construct essentialist frameworks as a platform for criticizing the practice.     
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6.2.1 Gender Synonymy 
The first theme is demonstrated in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
memorandum informing asylum officers that women may have “asylum claims based wholly or 
in part on their gender,” thereby equating gender with women (Coven 1995). As a synonym for 
women, gender, a relational concept, is reduced to descriptive status.41 This has practical 
implications for how gender is understood among those working with asylees. Not a single 
person I interviewed could provide me with an example of gender-based persecution faced by 
heterosexual men.  In many inquiries to the INS, judges, and attorneys about whether there were 
examples of men who experienced gender-related persecution, I was met with the following 
refrain: “What do you mean, like the gay cases?” I was amazed at this response since 
heterosexual men experience coercive family planning through forced sterilization practices and 
are raped as political prisoners.42 Certainly, it is no coincidence that heterosexual men’s 
persecution, although in fact gendered, does not resonate with immigration authorities as gender-
specific, since they assume that only women experience gender-related harm. 
Asylum claims by gay men are far more easily understood in terms of issues of gender by 
INS employees, judges, and attorneys than gendered claims of heterosexual men since gay men 
are assumed to have the potential for gender-specific persecution claims. In 1994, Attorney 
General Janet Reno affirmed, and ordered published, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
decision that granted asylum to Fidel Armando Toboso-Alfonso, a gay man from Cuba. This 
case set a legal precedent that “homosexual status” established membership in a social group, a 
                                                 
41 The omission of men as a group who may have “asylum claims based wholly or in part on their gender” in the 
INS memorandum demonstrates how women, but  not men, or assumed to have the potential to experience gendered 
harm, therefore equating women with gender. 
42 These examples are not gender-based forms of harm to the exclusion of sexually-based or politically motivated 
forms of harm. I include them here because in practice, men are overwhelmingly considered to not experience 
gender-based harm. 
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victory for gay rights fueled by U.S. anti-Communist foreign policy reflecting how insecurity 
and fear of communism continues to circumscribe U.S. asylum law (Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 
20 I. and N. Dec. 819 BIA 1990).43  Immigration attorneys and service providers elicit a specific 
account of persecution based on legal precedent to enhance the chances of winning.  For gay 
men, the legally accepted narrative of persecution is homosexual identity. Yet a narrative of 
gender nonconformity is often how applicants describe persecution. 
One afternoon, during a meeting with an immigration attorney, we were interrupted by a 
client who wanted to talk about his anxiety over the possibility of being denied asylum. He had 
an appointment with the INS asylum office the following day to receive the results of his 
interview. “I can’t believe I did it, I wasn’t thinking. There won’t be time for it to grow back; 
now they will kill me for sure!,” he breathlessly exclaimed as he paced across the room. “What 
do you mean? What are you talking about?,” the attorney replied. After a few more outbursts, the 
client sat down and tearfully described how he had plucked the hair between his eyebrows and 
was worried that if he were to be deported that there would not be time for his hair to grow back. 
He continued by introducing himself to me as being from a Middle Eastern country where, 
according to him, “men do nothing to care for themselves.”  Therefore, his newly manicured 
brow would identify him unequivocally as homosexual. The asylum seeker’s account of 
persecution was not one of homosexual identity per se.  Instead, like other gay men seeking 
asylum I interviewed, he articulated a narrative of gender nonconformity. In his understanding, 
plucking one’s eyebrow represents a deviation from accepted forms of masculinity.  
                                                 
43 During my interviews with several immigration attorneys (Sarah, Paul, Marcos, and John) they stated that the only 
reason that Matter of Toboso-Alfonso was ordered published was because the asylum seeker was Cuban, therefore 
creating legal precedent for communist-based homophobia. 
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 R. W. Connell (1995) uses Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to demonstrate that 
within any gender regime there are institutional practices that construct and govern the 
relationships among masculinity, femininity, and sexuality such that some gendered and sexual 
practices are dominant and others subordinated. According to Connell, femininity is 
subordinated to masculinity and male homosexuality is subordinated to male heterosexuality. In 
the gender regime of asylum practices, gender transgression is subordinated to homosexual 
identity.  Asylum claims of homosexuals are typically granted because of legal precedent, a 
positive outcome for asylum seekers and their advocates. However, the subordination of gender 
transgression erases the applicant’s agency and reinscribes victimization in the “forced” account 
of homosexual persecution.  Asylum seekers are not limited to claiming one ground of 
persecution.  In this case, the asylum seeker could have claimed a fear of persecution based on 
gender transgression and sexual identity.44  Instead, his attorney submitted an application based 
on sexual orientation.  Neither gender nor sexuality need be subsumed under the other.  
However, in practice, immigration attorneys tend to argue that men who transgress expected 
norms of masculinity be considered for asylum because of their homosexual identity, not as a 
form of gender-based persecution.  
The INS memorandum specifying that women experience gender-specific persecution 
was meant to provide guidance for dealing with female applicants. Immigration policymakers 
assumed that men would never require gender protection. Yet, as the example of the asylum 
seeker’s gender transgression of Middle Eastern cultural expectations of masculinity 
demonstrates, men too may need the protection of gender-based persecution policies. 
                                                 
44 I use the categories of gender and sexual identity as two distinct categories of persecution because that is how they 
exist in the law. 
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6.2.2 Cultural Essentialism 
The second theme that emerges in the gender regime of asylum practices is that essentialist 
assumptions of cultural practices dominate understandings of harm. Ethnocentric forms of harm 
are often subordinate to exotic forms of harm in gender-based persecution claims. For example, 
in all of the interviews with asylees who had been granted asylum because of female 
circumcision, I found that although their own account of persecution did not center on the act of 
genital circumcision, this emerged as the primary basis on which their claim was granted. 
Like most of the women I interviewed who had been granted asylum because of female 
circumcision, Sahara did not leave Ethiopia because of this. In fact, Sahara did not consider her 
circumcision harm at all as it was performed in infancy and she has no memory of it. Instead, 
Sahara left Ethiopia after she was jailed and tortured for being an Eritrean national while she 
lived within the territorial boundaries of the Ethiopian nation-state. Sahara spoke extensively to 
me about the detention and torture she endured as an Eritrean minority. She discussed her rapes 
while being imprisoned in the context of being Eritrean, not in the context of being female. 
Having lived most of her life in Ethiopia, unaware of how nationality served as a marker of 
difference, she tearfully concluded her narration of imprisonment with the realization “that is the 
day I knew I was Eritrean.”  When the conversation turned to female circumcision, she told me 
that she didn’t understand why “they” (her attorney and service providers) were talking about 
“that” (female circumcision) when it had nothing to do with why she left Ethiopia. She explained 
that they told her it would help her with the asylum case and that she only talked about it to gain 
asylum. She stated, “In my tradition, it’s normal, it’s private; we don’t talk about it. When they 
told me I had to talk about it, I said okay, if it helps me. I was shy about it. It was embarrassing. 
It was hard for me. But I had done so much to get here [the United States] so I did it.”  
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Nuha, a married woman with three children, came from Sudan. Nuha’s husband was 
politically active in a pro-democracy group, and although never harmed, was threatened 
repeatedly, which prompted their departure. Nuha and her family knew nothing of the possibility 
of asylum prior to arriving in the United States. It was only after meeting other Sudanese in Los 
Angeles that her husband filed an asylum application based on his political activities. While 
waiting to hear the outcome of her husband’s case (he had filed an application and was 
interviewed by an INS asylum officer), the attorney suggested the entire family enter therapy 
with a local group that worked with persecuted populations. A therapist questioned Nuha about 
whether she had been circumcised, and upon discovering that she had, encouraged Nuha to 
notify the attorney and file a new claim for asylum with her as the primary applicant. The asylum 
officer denied her husband’s claim, and he was referred to immigration court. However, a 
different INS asylum officer approved Nuha’s claim based on female circumcision.  According 
to my interview with Nuha and transcripts from her health care provider, she spoke openly with 
her health care provider about how she “felt about the experience.” “It was awful. I have so 
many problems now with my periods. It took two months for my husband to open me—and 
much pain after we were married. We have lots of problems with this in my country.”  
A transcript from the dialogue between Margaret, the health care provider, and Nuha 
shows that: 
I asked her if she would want this tradition continued on her daughters. She  
replied, “Never.” Asked if she were sent back to Sudan, “Could anyone do this  
to them?” She responded, “Yes. They would take them when I wasn’t home.”  
“Who would?,” I inquired. “My grandmother,” she replied. 
 
Similarly, Margaret’s notes indicated that: 
 
It is clear from her statements that Nuha had a traumatic experience during  
her genital mutilation. It had profound impact on the eventual sexual relations  
with her husband. As female genital mutilation of young girls is a customary  
  153 
practice in her country of origin, Nuha is understandably fearful for her children.  
Should she be forced to return to the Sudan with her family, she believes  
her two young daughters would be similarly subjected to the practice, despite  
her sincere objections and efforts to prevent its occurrence. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Helima, an asylum seeker from Nigeria, was 
detained and tortured for wearing pants with a group of women at her high school graduation. 
After much difficulty obtaining a travel visa, she was able to leave the country after her release 
from prison. Helima knew about asylum and left the country with the intent of applying for 
asylum upon arriving in the United States. Some of her family members were already in the 
United States, and a family friend assisted with her initial asylum application. At her asylum 
interview, she was asked about female circumcision but would not discuss it because her family 
sent a male interpreter. Her case was denied by the INS asylum officer and referred to 
immigration court. Helima’s family blamed the attorney for her asylum denial and sought new 
legal assistance. Her second attorney was familiar with female circumcision cases and 
questioned Helima with the aid of a female interpreter. Although reluctant, Helima admitted that 
she had been circumcised at the age of eight along with her sister by her mother, two aunts, and 
her grandmother. During our interview, Helima spoke little of her circumcision and was very 
concerned about women’s rights in Nigeria and how the Islamic government was “oppressing” 
women in ways that did not conform to the “true” teachings of Islam.  Margaret recorded the 
following notes from Helima’s visit: 
She experienced a sustained laceration to the left heel when she was 22 and was  
roughly shoved into a van by police who were opposed to her attire of slacks.  
Having spent her early years in the USA with her family, she recalls returning  
to Nigeria where the clothes she wore in America were frowned upon. But  
more remarkably, she experienced the ritual of female genital mutilation with  
her sister at age 8. Her sister was mutilated before her and when she heard her  
sister’s scream she tried to escape but was caught and held down. 
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Margaret referred to her case as “not much,” and before the trial, her attorney, Sarah stated, 
“nothing really happened, I doubt she’ll win.” [referring to the incident of being arrested and 
tortured]. Conversely, the health care provider told me that Nuha “had a very strong case and 
was pleased to hear that she didn’t want to mutilate her daughters.”  
As mentioned earlier, none of the women I interviewed claimed to me that they left their 
country because they were fleeing a forced circumcision or because they considered their own 
circumcision a form of persecution. Instead, they left because they were detained, tortured, 
and/or lived with the threats of detention or torture of a spouse. Upon their arrival in the United 
States, however, immigration attorneys and service providers instructed them that past 
persecution based on female circumcision would facilitate their ability to gain asylum. 
These examples demonstrate how asylum seekers from cultures that practice female 
circumcision are encouraged by immigration attorneys and service providers to claim their own 
circumcision as persecution regardless of the actual motivation for fleeing their country.  This  
cultured discourse of fear creates a hypervisibility to exotic practices such as female 
circumcision and decreases visibility of less exotic practices such as political activism, torture, 
and detention in the asylum application. Immigration attorneys and health care providers claim 
they are acting in the applicant’s best interest by working toward the goal of gaining asylum. 
Their strategy is often effective since they have limited options in the current anti-immigrant 
climate. However, such practices intensify a gendered regime in which immigration attorneys 
and service providers become protectors of women faced with exotic harm and create a new 
gendered victim based on a cultural act the asylum seeker may not consider to be persecution.   
Immigration attorneys and service providers who assist asylum seekers with their 
applications encourage the subordination of ethnocentric accounts of rape, imprisonment, and 
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political activism to exotic stories of female circumcision. The differential treatment of female 
circumcision cases counters the claim of a monolithic reaction to gendered harm. Female asylum 
seekers who have been circumcised provide the “ground” for cultural assumptions about 
women’s oppression. Unlike other types of gender-based harm, female circumcision is always 
persecution. Conversely, other types of gender abuses are only considered persecution if the 
claimant articulates the act as harm. During my interview with Nuha, she described conditions of 
her arranged marriage that would legally qualify her for asylum based on forced marriage. Yet 
her attorney and service providers did not inquire about her marriage. Moreover, unlike the 
adverse reaction from Nuha’s physician about her circumcision, there was no such reaction about 
her marriage. The gender regime of protectionism re-victimizes circumcised women and erases 
alternative stories of female asylum seekers’ political agency. These examples demonstrate how, 
unlike the examples of how men seeking asylum are assumed to never experience gendered 
harm, women, conversely, are worthy of asylum usually in terms of narratives of exotic 
practices. 
6.2.3 Women’s Agency and Private Harm 
The third theme of the gender regime of asylum is women’s agency and private harm. The types 
of persecution that female asylum seekers may flee, which include domestic violence, forced 
marriage, female circumcision, and honor killings, overwhelmingly take place in “private” 
institutions such as the family. As many feminists contend, the types of harm women face often 
are erased, deemed unproblematic, and assumed natural when they occur in a sphere of privacy 
that renders such acts invisible. Susan Moller Okin (2000) argues that the fundamental problem 
with incorporating women’s human rights into an existing human rights framework is that 
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theories, laws, and ideas of what constitutes human rights follow an androcentric model. Men’s 
experiences provide the framework for human rights, and the types of persecution women face 
are rendered invisible as legitimate cases of harm. Several immigration attorneys provided 
examples of the “early days” when judges and asylum officers were suspicious of rape as a form 
of persecution. During our interview, Paul, an immigration attorney, stated that: 
My recollection of the rape cases [is that we] were losing them because it was a crime;  
it was a terrible thing that happened to you, but clearly a soldier raped you it’s  
just like being raped by an off-duty LAPD [Los Angeles Police Department] cop.  
We would present evidence about women who were raped by Haitian soldiers  
and how the military is used in Haiti. But the gut reaction of the immigration  
court or the BIA [Board of Immigration Appeals] or the circuit court was that  
it’s personal, it’s a terrible thing, but it’s a personal problem, you’re a victim  
of crime.  
 
Immigrant advocates emphasize the struggles they encountered in convincing immigration 
judges and asylum officers that violence against women is persecution. 
A key transition in the legal scholarship on gender-based asylum and in interviews with 
immigrant advocates is the assumption that people in positions of power are becoming more 
sympathetic to gender-based persecution claims as laws and policies have made these claims 
acceptable forms of persecution. Although changes in laws and policies have been beneficial for 
immigrant women in many ways, assumptions of “public” harm continue to circumscribe the 
relationship between the persecuted and persecutor. In gender-based asylum claims, the 
relationship between the persecuted and persecutor is fundamentally different because a relative 
is often the persecutor. Mothers and grandmothers perform circumcisions, husbands abuse their 
wives, and fathers and brothers commit honor killings. An additional battle for immigrant 
advocates has been to convince judges and asylum officers that a family member can be the 
persecutor.  
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What is absent in this documented struggle is the continuity of familial relationships. 
Embedded in assumptions about “public” harm is the supposition that the persecuted would 
never continue a relationship with the persecutor. All of the women I interviewed who were 
granted asylum because of domestic violence, honor killing, and female circumcision were in 
contact with their persecutors because they were in contact with their family members. In the 
example of Helima, her mother, who was present at her circumcision, was living with Helima 
and other family members at the time of Helima’s asylum hearing. This relationship counters 
assumptions of discontinuity that inform relationships based on public harm. 
Sophia, a Jordanian asylum seeker, described to her attorney how she was kidnapped, 
forced to marry her husband at the age of fifteen and suffered extensive abuse. Sophia’s case was 
based on forced marriage, domestic violence, and threats of honor killing. The following is a 
statement from her asylum declaration: 
My life of slavery, filled with continuous beatings, rape, torture, and psychological  
and mental abuse had started. From the beginning he abused me; for my  
religious beliefs, for being a woman who dared to defy his authority and control,  
for any actions that made him look like he did not have complete power  
over me. He has almost beaten me to death in the past. Now that I have dared  
to escape from slavery and from his control I have served him with divorce  
papers. I am sure he will carry out his threats to kill me and the authorities  
will do nothing to protect me.  
 
Yet during our interview she told me that she had spoken with him over the telephone to arrange 
travel for their daughter to come to Los Angeles. Now, this man—described in her declaration 
narrative as the persecutor—has her new address and phone number. Gender-based persecution  
laws and policies are intended to protect women from private harm. However, protecting women 
from private harm can alter familial relationships and narrow  women’s agency. 
 Restrictions on agency are the cornerstone of the gender regime of asylum practices. The 
following is an example of how asylum practices of immigration attorneys subordinate women’s 
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agency to a narrative of victimization. Most of the asylum-related documents I was able to 
collect were from the final asylum application. These include the I-589 INS application form, 
photocopies of identifying documents, such as birth certificates and marriage certificates, a 
declaration that outlines the applicant’s reasons for applying for asylum, medical and 
psychological reports, and human rights reports of country conditions. I came upon an 
unexpected goldmine when I befriended a paralegal who, with the approval of two attorneys, 
allowed me access to the preliminary notes on three cases. With these, I was able to see how an 
attorney puts together an application and the changes that are made from the initial to the final 
drafts of the packet. In the attorney’s file on Sophia, there was an application where the answers 
were filled in with Sophia’s handwriting. I interviewed the attorney and Sophia, and they both 
affirmed that the attorney prefers clients to fill out the application first and then bring it back so 
that they can work on it together. Her application detailed beatings and sexual violence, leaving 
her with permanent hearing loss in one ear, complete with photographs of her abuse and one of 
the AK-47s her husband placed between them at night.   
 Question six on the application asks, “What do you think would happen to you if you 
returned to the country from which you claim you would be subjected to persecution?” In the 
initial handwritten application, the answer to this question is: “I will kill my husband.” This 
answer stands in stark contrast to the typed one in the final and submitted application: “My 
husband will kill me.” In the physician’s assessment of Sophia, he wrote, “Wants to kill her 
husband, needs Valium.” 
Sophia exercised agency (and perhaps honesty) by writing that she wanted to kill her 
husband. Sophia’s attorney changed her answer to avoid the likely possibility of the denial of her 
asylum application. Additionally, her physician pathologized Sophia’s response to her husband’s 
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abuse in his recommendation for medication. The gender regime of asylum provides few 
opportunities for women to voice outrage and desire for retribution toward their persecutors. 
Asylum seekers must therefore articulate an account of victimization in order to make the claim 
that they have been persecuted. Intrinsic in the claim to persecution is a claim of victimization; it 
is a fundamental dimension of the regime of asylum practices. Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) 
argues that “defining women as archetypal victims freezes them into ‘objects who defend 
themselves,’ men into ‘subjects who perpetuate violence,’ and every society into powerless 
(read: women) and powerful (read: men) groups of people” (24).  This example suggests that 
women are expected not to defend themselves, but even worse, that they should be victims until 
someone else helps them.  In the gender regime of asylum practices, migrant women are victims 
in need of protection from their abusive families. The outcome of Sophia’s case was positive; the 
granting of asylum afforded her legal status in the United States. However, like so many other 
examples of asylum grants I have offered, it comes with the expectation of a narrative of victim 
status. 
6.2.4 Gender Authority 
The fourth theme of gender authority discussed in this article demonstrates how female asylum 
officers and immigration judges appropriate authority based on assumptions of ethnocentric 
harm.  Dorothy Smith’s (1987) primary contention in The Everyday World as Problematic is that 
society is organized by androcentric ruling relations that render women’s experiences and forms 
of knowledge “invisible” (4).  One problem with Smith’s argument is that she assumes that men 
are exclusively responsible for androcentrism without exploring the ways in which women 
perpetuate androcentric ruling relations.  In gender-based claims such as rape, forced 
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sterilization, and forced abortions, women emerge as agents of authority in the gender regime of 
asylum practices. While female asylum officers and judges most likely have not experienced 
forced sterilizations or abortions, their experiences with consensual abortions and birth control 
can provide an ethnocentric venue for exerting power in asylum adjudications. During asylum 
interviews and hearings of female circumcision claims, the veracity of the applicant is not 
interrogated based on the act of exotic harm. Because female circumcision is almost 
automatically considered persecution, evidence of its occurrence is sufficient as demonstrated in 
the example offered earlier of the judge who responded to female circumcision as a “horrific 
practice.” Conversely, acts of ethnocentric harm are not automatically considered persecution 
and female asylum officers and judges assume a gendered authority in differentiating “real” 
victims.  
During an interview, Jeffrey, an asylum officer, discussed how female asylum officers 
were suspicious of Chinese asylum seekers who claimed persecution based on forced 
sterilization because of unexpected pregnancies caused by their faulty intrauterine devices 
(IUDs). He stated: 
At one point we heard people testify that the IUD that had been implanted by  
the medical people didn’t fit right. It would fall out. How was that possible?  
Women officers would tell you that it was impossible. Then we found somewhere,  
an independent source, that IUDs used by the Chinese government  
were notorious for not fitting and causing problems, causing complications,  
falling out, causing unwanted pregnancies. 
 
According to Jeffrey, female asylum officers denied these cases because the asylum seekers did 
not appear credible. In order to gain asylum, an applicant must be viewed as credible. Arguably, 
credibility is the most important feature of asylum. Credibility includes demeanor, specificity,  
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detail, and consistency. In short, credibility is a kind of believability, and asylum officers are 
legally bound to question whether the asylum seeker’s testimony is believable. In the example of 
the faulty IUDs, American female asylum officers appropriate gendered authority in determining  
what constitutes a believable story of persecution.  This example demonstrates a national gender 
regime in which American men are seen as protecting noncitizen women from American women.  
A second example shows how a female judge appropriated authority in the following oral 
decision of a Chinese woman seeking asylum because of forced abortions: 
The applicant testified that she had four abortions. The first in April of 1988  
and the last in January of 1995 but did not file an application for asylum until  
September of 2000. If the last abortion was in January of 1995, why wait until  
September of 2000? The Court finds it incredible that the applicant had four  
abortions. The Court does not believe that any woman would suffer through  
four abortions. The Court believes that this woman would say anything to  
remain in this country. 
 
Similar to other Chinese asylum seekers fleeing forced sterilization practices, this applicant was 
deemed noncredible because her account of persecution did not support the assumptions of the 
adjudicator.  The judge’s assumptions may not necessarily be rooted in an ethnocentric 
framework, although nonetheless asinine.  The judge engaged assumptions about the reasonable 
number of abortions a woman would “suffer” and invoked her gatekeeping role as protector of 
the American citizenry by refusing admittance to dishonest migrants. 
A third example of how gendered authority structures the decisions of asylum officers 
and supervisors is the following exchange between a former asylum officer, Walter, and his 
female supervisor. According to Walter, he had approved an application where a female 
applicant had disclosed that she was raped. His female supervisor would not approve his 
decision, arguing that the applicant was lying. Walter’s account of the interaction was that: 
Most of my supervisors were women and they seemed to be harder on women  
than the male supervisors. I had one supervisor who told me she’d been raped.  
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She said, “I don’t think that is the way that a woman who has been raped acts.”  
What am I going to say about that? I’m a guy. I have no clue about that at all.  
She never saw the woman; she was looking at the file. 
 
A female supervisor’s personal experience of rape and her comparison of it to what is believable 
testimony of an asylum seeker’s rape claim reflects women’s gendered authority. Walter’s 
deference may be explained, in part, because of his subordinate position in the workplace 
bureaucratic hierarchy. However, Walter articulates his acquiescence to his supervisor in 
gendered terms, as a “guy” who is unable to provide an acceptable rebuttal to the female 
gendered experience of sexual violence. 
These examples demonstrate how female asylum officers and immigration judges can 
perpetuate androcentric assumptions about gendered harm that impedes female asylum seekers 
ability to gain asylum.  The harm of forced sterilization, forced abortions, and rape is 
appropriated by women in an effort to establish gendered authority that can be based on 
ethnocentric assumptions.  Male asylum officers often respond to women’s essentialist notions of 
experience by intervening on behalf of female asylum seekers. Protectionism takes on a gendered 
character demonstrated in men’s protectionism of female asylum seekers and women’s 
protectionism of their own position of power and authority. 
6.3 PROTECTIONISM AND VICTIMIZATION 
The passage of gender-based persecution laws and policies laid the groundwork for gender 
equity in asylum adjudication. The implementation of these laws and policies, however, reveals 
how assumptions about ethnocentric and exotic harm inform asylum practices. A narrow 
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examination of asylum grants and approvals is limited in that it only indicates the outcome of a 
case, not the social interactions that organize asylum practices. 
Based on ethnographic data, I have argued that the institution of asylum is structured by a 
gender regime of protectionism and victimization based on insecurity of ethnocentric harm and 
fear of exotic harm. Assumptions about masculinity and femininity, sexuality, cultural 
essentialism, women’s agency, and authority create a gender regime based on principles of 
protectionism and victimization found in the practices of asylum officers, immigration judges, 
immigration attorneys, and asylees. These data show that asylum is regulated by a gender regime 
based on four themes of asylum practices: women, not men, experience gendered harm; the 
narratives of women that include political activism, detainment, and torture, subordinates them to 
the practice of female circumcision; women are usually worthy of asylum if they articulate 
traditional narratives of sexual victimization; American women police gendered harm through 
acts of ethnocentric authority. 
Asylum seekers are legally responsible for articulating a narrative of harm that is 
satisfactory to asylum officers and immigration judges. Those who do not conform to an 
acceptable legal discourse of persecution may jeopardize their chances of gaining asylum. 
Therefore, it is always in the best interest of an individual asylum seeker to conform to the 
hegemonic narrative of persecution. The reward for asylum seekers is considerable — protection 
against deportation and the frightening possibility of violence and death. However, this 
conformity has serious consequences for reproducing a structural dynamic of inequality through 
the subordination of subversive stories to hegemonic narratives of gender and persecution that 
may undermine gender justice. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
 
Gender is important for understanding transnational migration, human rights discourses, and 
citizenship policies.  The implementation of gender-based asylum policies and laws reveals the 
ways in which gender structures the social processes and practices that shape immigration, 
citizenship, and human rights in the United States.  Through the lens of gender-based persecution 
claims, I have identified how immigration practices are mediated through certain assumptions 
about race, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, and class that certain groups, including asylum 
seekers, immigration attorneys, service providers, immigration judges, and asylum officers, 
engage in when making, preparing, and adjudicating these claims.   
This study situates the U.S. in global and local space by illuminating how its immigration 
policies and practices are a visible and contested site of power in transnational processes.  
Gender-based asylum claims show how, based on Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan’s critique, 
the global can hardly be considered “somewhere else”; to the contrary, the global is here.   
A key theme in the globalization literature is that human rights discourse and movement 
of people pose a threat to national sovereignty.  Proponents of this position argue that 
international law and policy provide universal standards of personhood and notions of 
humanness that ostensibly transcend how any particular nation-state might conceptualize and 
make policy decisions.  Consequently, a nation-state’s sovereignty is eroded because power and 
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control comes from somewhere other than the nation-state.  This study contributes to this debate 
by offering gender-based asylum claims as an example of how nation-states are still the primary 
force shaping citizenship.  My data show how migration, one of the two global forces that Arjun 
Appadurai (1998) argues will bring about the demise of the nation-state, strengthens, not 
weakens, the nation-state.45  Therefore, my research contradicts predictions of the demise of the 
nation-state (Appadurai 1998). The United States is not weaker because of transnational human 
rights movements and discourses operating outside of the nation-state.  To the contrary, its 
strength lies in its ability to determine who may gain entry and under what circumstances. 
Another contribution this project makes is that it is the first empirical study of how 
gender affects asylum in the United States.  Instead of focusing on the passage of gender-based 
asylum policies and laws as a final outcome, as found in much of the legal scholarship on this 
topic, I took gender-based laws and policies as a point of departure to inquire about their 
implementation.  The data gleaned from research design of this project allowed me to show how 
these laws and policies are implemented rather than focus exclusively on their passage. 
I have argued that the role of narrative is central to understanding asylum proceedings. 
This project makes explicit that the way in which a story of persecution is told is often more 
important that the story itself.  This ethnographic project captured data regarding asylum seeker’s 
narratives.  A narrow examination of grants and rejections is limited in that it only indicates the 
outcome of a case, not the social interactions that organize asylum practices.   
Asylum seekers must be deemed credible in their asylum interviews and hearings. I have 
focused on what constitutes credibility for those with gendered harm as a significant component 
to their claim.  Credibility is often based on extra-legal criteria that include acquisition of identity 
                                                 
45 The second global force is the media. 
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documentation, recall of dates and events, emotional testimony about sexual violence, 
employment status, and actions regarding familial abandonment.  These criteria contribute to a 
hegemonic narrative in asylum adjudication that is hegemonic through both its social control and 
its conformity regarding how stories of persecution must be told; that is, the telling of the 
narrative is hegemonic as well its content.   
This dissertation contributes to the literature on sociolegal studies, institutional 
ethnography, and postcolonial feminist theory.  I contribute to the sociolegal literature by 
expanding Ewick and Silbey’s framework of hegemonic stories in arguing that even though the 
content of a particular story may be hegemonic, the story may be narrated in such a way that its 
telling is either hegemonic or subversive.  Additionally, my work emphasizes agency among 
differently situated participants, in addition to the claimants who bring forth grievances, such as 
asylum officers, immigration attorneys, and immigrant service providers, who engage in acts of 
resistance and confront hegemonic power structures on behalf of those who are unfamiliar with 
the INS asylum bureaucracy.   
My data contributes to institutional ethnography by offering immigration court as a site 
of organized practices and power relations.  I advance Dorothy Smith's (1987) theory of the 
everyday world as problematic by including the standpoint of immigrants.  I refine her idea of 
androcentrism by arguing that women, in addition to men, contribute to a gender regime of 
asylum practices that circumscribe female asylum seeker’s ability to articulate their own 
narratives of persecution.   
Finally, these ethnographic data contribute to postcolonial feminist theory.  In her critique 
of Western feminists’ depiction of third world women as monolithic, Chandra Talpade Mohanty 
(1991) teases out the nuances of how Western feminist discourse serves as a hegemonic 
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framework for understanding women’s lives outside of the West.  Instead of treating gender-
based cases as a unified whole, I have shown how different types of gendered harm are 
adjudicated in the United States.  Throughout the dissertation, I have argued that a central 
component to understanding how gender-based persecution claims are adjudicated is that gender 
alone is an insufficient category of analysis for examining and critiquing asylum practices.  
Instead, race, class, nation and sexuality inform the practices of asylees, immigration attorneys, 
immigrant service providers, asylum officers, and immigration judges when applying for, 
preparing, and adjudicating gender-based asylum claims. 
The analytical potential of gender-based asylum claims as a means of understanding 
migration, citizenship, and human rights discourse and activism is far reaching.  The study of 
these claims does much more than illuminate androcentric immigration policies.  These claims 
provide proof that the nation-state is racialized, that human rights discourses and activism do not 
erode national sovereignty, and that asylum is an endeavor in nation building regarding who 
gains entry and which migrants become potential citizens.  Gender is the analytical lens through 
which all of these transnational processes become visible in the local space of the United States. 
Immigrant advocates view the passage of gender-based asylum laws and policies as a 
feminist victory.  In many ways, they are correct.  The introduction of these laws and policies 
was monumental.  Gender-based persecution laws and policies allow immigrant women to claim 
asylum based on forms of harm that historically were not considered persecution.  The INS, the 
institution that determines who gains entry into the United States, recognized sex equality as 
central to its mission.  These laws and policies are certainly a victory for those who interpret 
their passage as institutionalizing feminist social policy.  Yet these gains are bitter sweet.  Their 
application shows a limited understanding of gender on the part of those who implement these 
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laws and policies.  When asylum officers and immigration judges assume that only women 
experience gender-based persecution, take for granted that women are persecuted solely on the 
basis of their gender, and engage ethnocentric understandings of harm in their decisions, the 
feminist victory that immigrant advocates champion looks more like a gendered defeat.  
However, the anti-immigrant policies and practices introduced after September 11th temper 
criticisms of the gender-based policies and give pause to the more frightening possibility of the 
abolition of asylum in the United States.    
7.1 GENDERED ASYLUM POLICIES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH 2001 
The Bush Administration responded to the September 11th terrorist attacks through institutional 
changes that affected immigrants.  The first programmatic change was the suspension of the 
United States Refugee Resettlement program.  The postponement of refugee processing left 
approximately 22,000 refugees with approved applications to enter the U.S. stranded in refugee 
camps across the globe until the program was reinstated on November 22nd 2001 (IRC 2002).  
Once refugee processing was restored, 70,000 refugees were authorized to enter the U.S. in 
2002.  Yet only 27,000 refugees gained admission to the United States, reflecting a discrepancy 
between institutional policy and the practice of receiving immigrants (IRC 2003).  Unlike the 
refugee program that was closed in an effort to prevent terrorists from entering the U.S., the INS 
asylum offices and immigration courts continued to process asylum applications after September 
11th 2001.  During my interviews with INS supervisors at the Anaheim asylum office and with 
the supervisor for the assistant district attorneys who represent the federal government in 
immigration court hearings, I inquired about how the attack affected immigration policy and 
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practices.  Unfortunately, none would discuss policy changes that were implemented in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks and accounted for their silence as necessary in the interests of 
national security. 
 On August 12th 2002, the INS announced that men from select Middle Eastern and 
African countries who were already in the U.S. on non-immigrant visas were required to register 
with the INS by January 10th 2003 for any of the following reasons:  if they were born on or 
before December 2nd 1986, were a citizen of one of a select list of countries, entered the United 
States on or before certain dates in 2002, or planned to stay in the United States through the date 
on their original visa application.  Men were exempt from registration if they were diplomats, 
legal permanent residents, asylees, refugees, or an asylum applicant who filed before November 
22nd 2002.46
In Los Angeles, like many other U.S. cities, many men who obeyed the order were 
arrested at the INS office (McDonnell 2003b).  The INS initially estimated that 500 men were 
detained nationwide as a result of the registration process, with 200 of those from the southern 
California region.  Conversely, immigrant advocate groups estimated the number to be as high as 
1,500 (Watanabe 2003).  A few days after the initial INS projected figures of detained immigrant 
men were made public, the Department of Justice estimated that as many as 24,000 men 
nationwide were required to register and that 10% of those faced deportation (McDonnell 
2003a).  Arrests at the Los Angeles INS office galvanized support for immigrants among human 
rights groups.  A number of groups worked together to monitor the treatment of Middle Eastern 
                                                 
46 The list of countries includes Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. See the United States Citizen and Immigration Website 
(www.uscis.gov) for announcements about the registration process.  
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and African men who appeared for the required questioning, fingerprinting, and photographing 
(McDonnell and Mena 2003; Watanabe 2003). 
Interpal Grewal (2005) argues that in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks 
and subsequent immigration policy changes, citizenship has taken on new meanings in response 
to the gendering and racialization of immigrant deportation.  Her examples show how male 
immigrants draped themselves and their property in the American flag in an effort to signify 
solidarity among other Americans and deter scrutiny from the INS that would identify them as 
potentials terrorists.  She argues that this practice was racialized because of its pervasiveness 
among non-white, non-Christian, immigrants, including those who were U.S. citizens.   
The implementation of asylum law since September 11th reflects the Bush 
administration’s anxiety over the masculine character of asylum in the United States.  The 
vetting effort to segregate terrorist migrants has resulted in a policy of registration for men but 
not women, from select nation-states, thus invoking an interplay among gender, nation, and 
religion for acceptable migrants.  The Bush administration’s anti-terrorism policies based on 
third world male suspects and American imperial protectionism reorganizes the continued fear of 
immigrants taking root in a new gender regime of asylum practices. 
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INTERVIEW TABLES 
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Table 11: Interviews: Asylees 
Name Sex Nation Seeking 
Asylum from 
Ground of  
Persecution47
Substance of the Claim48
Nuha Female Sudan Social Group Female Circumcision 
Kadi  Female Sierra Leone Social Group Female Circumcision 
Arranged Marriage 
Sahara Female Ethiopia Social Group 
Nationality 
Female Circumcision 
Eritrean Minority 
Rape 
Helima Female Nigeria Social Group 
Political Opinion 
Female Circumcision 
Women’s Rights Activism 
Aisha Female Ethiopia Social Group 
Political Opinion 
Female Circumcision 
Imputed Political Opinion 
Rape 
Zeinab Female Somalia Social Group Domestic Violence 
Carmen Female Peru Social Group Domestic Violence 
Sophia Female Jordan Social Group 
 
Domestic Violence 
Honor Killing 
Arranged Marriage 
Sharifa Female Egypt Social Group Arranged Marriage 
Honor Killing 
Nadine Female Not Included49 Social Group Honor Killing 
Mary Female Uganda Political Opinion Political Activism 
Rape 
Elizabeth Female Cameroon Political Opinion Political Activism 
Rape 
Miriam Female Iran Political Opinion Women’s Rights Activism 
Robert Male Slovenia Social Group Sexual Orientation 
Billy Male Guatemala Social Group Sexual Orientation 
Dana Female Romania Social Group Sexual Orientation 
Rivka Female South Africa Political Opinion 
Race  
Anti-Racist Activism 
 
Chen Male China Political Opinion Human Rights Activism 
Lucine Female Armenia Political Opinion Political Activism 
Samy Male Egypt Religion Religious Activism 
Shing Male China Political Opinion Falun Gong 
 
                                                 
47 The Ground of Persecution refers to the five legal grounds on which the claim was adjudicated (e.g. race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, membership in a social group). 
48 The substance of the claim refers to the specific form of harm, type of activism, or reason for applying for asylum. 
49 I do not include the country Nadine sought asylum from because she remained in danger after arriving in the U.S. 
As mentioned in chapter 3, her family contacted a relative in California who attempted another honor killing after 
her arrival. 
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Table 12: Interviews: Refugees, Trafficking, VAWA 
Name Sex Nation Seeking Relief 
from 
Form of Relief 
Taline Female Iran 
(Armenian Nationality) 
Refugee 
Carina Female Iran 
(Armenian Nationality) 
Refugee 
Sadija Female Bosnia Refugee 
Tim Female Thailand Trafficking 
Chioma Female Nigeria VAWA 
Maggie Female Cameroon VAWA 
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Table 13:  Interviews: Immigrant Service Providers50
Name Sex Position Population Served 
Nicole Female Psychologist Asylees 
Torture Survivors 
Maria Female Therapist Asylees 
Torture Survivors 
Margaret Female Physician Asylees 
Torture Survivors 
Leah Female Case Worker Asylees 
Torture Survivors 
Snezana Female Case Worker Asylees 
Refugees 
Julie Female Case Worker 
(paralegal) 
Asylees 
Torture Survivors 
VAWA Claimants 
Stephen 
 
Male NGO Administrator Asylees 
Torture Survivors 
Alaya Female NGO Administrator Thai Immigrants 
Tracy Female NGO Administrator Trafficking Survivors 
Masha Female Refugee Resettlement Administrator Refugees 
Joseph Male Priest Central and South 
Americans 
Brian Male Priest Detained Immigrants 
 
                                                 
50 All immigrant service organizations provide direct services to migrants. 
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Table 14: Interviews: Immigration Attorneys 
Name Sex Type of Practice 
Karen Female Private Practice 
Richard Male Private Practice 
Susie Female Private Practice 
Judith Female Private Practice 
Sarah Female NGO 
John Male NGO 
Marcos Male NGO 
Gloria Female NGO 
(paralegal) 
Mai Female NGO 
Detention Only 
Martha Female NGO 
Detention Only 
Paul Male University Clinic 
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 Table 15: Interviews: Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) 
Name Sex Organization/Position 
Daniel Male EOIR 
Immigration Judge 
Jacob Male EOIR 
Former Immigration Judge 
Jose Male INS 
Service Processing Center (Detention Facility) 
Supervisor 
David Male INS 
Service Processing Center (Detention Facility) 
Deportation Officer 
Bob Male INS 
Service Processing Center (Detention Facility) 
Deportation Officer 
Michael Male INS 
Asylum Office 
Supervisor, Former Asylum Officer 
Cindy Female INS 
Asylum Office 
Supervisor, Former Asylum Officer 
Jeffrey Male INS 
Asylum Office 
Supervisor, Former Asylum Officer 
Ann Female INS 
Asylum Office 
Supervisor, Former Asylum Officer 
Deborah Female INS 
Asylum Office 
Supervisor, Former Asylum Officer 
Alice Female INS 
Asylum Office 
Supervisor, Former Asylum Officer 
Kathleen Female INS 
Assistant District Counsel 
Supervisor 
Marilyn Female INS 
Former Asylum Supervisor 
Walter Male INS 
Former Asylum Officer 
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Table 15 Continued 
Name Sex Position 
Jack Male INS 
Former Asylum Officer 
Fred Male INS 
Former Border Patrol Agent 
James Male INS 
Former Border Patrol Agent 
Doug Male INS 
Former Border Patrol Agent 
Mark Male INS 
Former Border Patrol Agent 
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Table 16:  Interviews: Human Rights Activists and Organization Employees 
Name Sex Organization/Position 
Phyllis Female Amnesty International 
Activist 
Women’s Rights 
Thomas Male Amnesty International 
Activist 
Immigration Detention Monitoring 
Barbara Female Human Rights Watch 
Activist 
Immigration Detention Monitoring 
Jane Female Captive Daughters 
Activist 
Child Trafficking 
Starr Female Sanctuary Movement 
Activist 
Anthony Male Amnesty International 
Former Employee 
Refugee Program 
Katie Female Human Rights Watch 
Employee 
Women’s Rights Division 
Amanda Female Human Rights Watch 
Employee 
Refugee Program 
Rafael Male International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission 
Employee 
Asylum Program 
Libby Female International Rescue Committee 
Employee 
Women’s Commission 
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Table 17: Interviews: UN and U.S. Federal Government Employees, Policy Analysts, Legal Scholars, 
Language Interpreters 
Name Sex Organization and Position 
Adam Male United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
Protection Officer 
Susan Female United Nations 
Consultant on Violence Against Women 
Charles  Male Office of Refugee Resettlement 
Refugee and Asylee Benefits Officer 
Becky Female Office of Refugee Resettlement 
California Services 
Refugee and Asylee Benefits Officer 
Akiko Female Department of Justice 
Trafficking Victims Unit 
Former Employee 
Carol Female Georgetown University 
Institute for the Study of International Migration 
Policy Analyst 
Linda Female Center for Gender and Refugee Studies 
Attorney 
Nicholas Male Center for Gender and Refugee Studies 
Attorney 
Frank Male  U.S. Attorney 
Former Trafficking Investigator 
Ben Male Interpreter  
Immigration Court 
Luxmi Female Interpreter   
Private Practice Attorney 
Ted Male Los Angeles Times 
Reporter 
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Table 18: Interviews: Immigration Reform Activists and Organization Employees51
Name Sex Involvement 
Cynthia Female California Coalition for Immigration Reform 
Activist 
Samuel Male California Coalition for Immigration Reform 
Activist 
Xiomora Female  California Coalition for Immigration Reform 
Activist 
Erin Female California Coalition for Immigration Reform 
Activist 
Charlie Male California Coalition for Immigration Reform 
Activist 
Lucy Female Ranch Rescue 
California Chapter  
Activist 
Linda Female Limits to Growth 
Activist 
Howard Male No Organizational Affiliation 
Property Owner 
Kevin Male No Organizational Affiliation 
Marlene Female Californians for Population Stabilization 
Employee 
Wayne Male American Border Patrol 
Employee  
James Male INS 
Former Border Patrol 
Doug Male INS 
Former Border Patrol 
Mark Male INS 
Former Border Patrol 
Fred Male INS 
Former Border Patrol 
 
                                                 
51 Former INS Border Patrol Agents appear twice because they are also immigration reform activists. 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
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B.1  ASYLEES  
How did you decide to come to the United States to apply for asylum? 
How did you know the United States accepted persons applying for asylum? 
Did you know the U.S. accepted persons fleeing gender-based persecution? 
What do you know about gender-based persecution in the U.S.? 
What was your experience leaving _________ and coming to the U.S.? 
What happened when you arrived in the U.S.? 
Do/did you have an attorney? 
If yes, how did you find him/her? 
If no, how are you/did you getting through the legal system in the U.S.? 
Have you been in detention since being in the U.S.? If so, what were your experiences there? 
Are you/did you seeking asylum through INS? If so, what were your experiences with INS? 
How is/did the INS interpret your claim of gender-based persecution?  
Are you/did you seeking asylum through an immigration judge? If so, what were your 
experiences with the immigration judge? 
How is/did the immigration judge interpret your claim of gender-based persecution? 
Do you think you have a claim based on gender-based persecution? Why/why not? 
What makes your claim gender-based? 
What makes your claim persecution? 
How did you understand persecution when you first arrived in the U.S.? 
Has it changed since living here? If so, how? 
What have been your experiences with talking about persecution since living in the U.S.? 
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Are these experiences different with different people/organizations (e.g. lawyers, judges, service 
organizations, etc.)? If so, how? 
Are you connected to other asylees or persons applying for asylum? 
If so, do you discuss your claims of gender-based persecution with each other? 
Do the ways other asylees understand gender-based persecution similar or different from the way 
you understand gender-based persecution? How is it similar or different? 
How do you understand persecution? 
How do you understand gender-based persecution? 
Is there anything I haven’t asked that is pertinent to how you understand persecution? 
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B.2 ADMINISTRATORS, STAFF, AND VOLUNTEERS WITH NGO’S 
When did you being employment with _______? 
What type of work did you do before working here? 
What is your educational background/professional training? 
What positions have you held since working here? 
What are your responsibilities? 
What type of training did you receive for working with asylees and asylum seekers? 
What type of training did you receive with regard to understanding the notion of persecution? 
What type of training did you receive with regard to understanding gender-based persecution? 
How do you use this training when working with clients? 
Are there times when the training insufficient? If yes, what do you do in those cases? 
What procedure do you follow if you need assistance/clarification from a supervisor? 
What types of services does your organization provide? 
What types of services for women does your organization provide? 
What types of services does your organization provide for persons making gender-based claims 
of asylum? 
How do clients locate your organization? 
How do you decide if/when clients need referral to other organizations? 
If this is because of the type of persecution they have experienced or fear, how do you decide 
where to refer them? 
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How does this organization understand persecution, what is the organization’s philosophy toward 
understanding persecution? 
How does this organization understand gender-based persecution, what is the organization’s 
philosophy toward understanding persecution? 
How do you determine that the client was persecuted or has a fear of future persecution? 
How do you determine that the client experienced gender-based persecuted or has a fear of future 
gender-based persecution? 
What sources of information do you rely when you need clarification for determining if a client 
is eligible for your services? 
Are there differences between how you understand persecution for cases of past and future 
persecution? If yes, what are those differences? 
Are there differences between cases of past persecution and those where the fear of persecution 
is futuristic in terms of the services clients need? If yes, what are those differences? 
How do clients talk about persecution? 
How do clients talk about gender-based persecution? 
Are there differences between how the clients talk about persecution with regards to past or 
future persecution? 
How do clients talk about navigating the legal system in the United States with regard to the 
asylum application process? 
Do you provide legal services? 
Do you refer clients to legal services? 
How do you understand persecution? 
How do you understand gender-based persecution? 
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Is there anything I haven’t asked that is pertinent to how you determine gender-based 
persecution? 
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B.3 IMMIGRATION ATTORNEYS  
What is your educational background/professional training? 
How did you come to practice immigration law? 
What type of cases do you represent? 
How do clients locate you? 
How do you decide whether to take a client’s case of asylum? 
Are there differences between cases of past persecution and those where the fear of persecution 
is futuristic? If so, what are those differences? 
Does legal representation influence the likelihood of gaining asylum? If so, why might this be 
the case? 
What is the process of representing clients in detention? 
Is this different for persons making gender-based claims? If so, how? 
What is the process of representing clients not held in detention? 
Is this different for persons making gender-based claims? If so, how? 
How do conduct interviews with clients to determine the persecutory nature of the case? 
Is this different for persons making gender-based claims? If so, how? 
What factors go into your understanding of persecution when deciding to accept a case? 
What sources of information do you rely when building a case of persecution? 
Is this different for persons making gender-based claims? If so, how? 
How do you determine that the claimant was persecuted or has a fear of future persecution? 
How do you establish credibility? 
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Is this different for persons making gender-based claims? If so, how? 
Are there differences between cases of past persecution and those where the fear of persecution 
is futuristic in terms of how they are adjudicated? If yes, what are those differences? 
Are there differences between how you understand persecution for cases of past and future 
persecution? If yes, what are those differences? 
Are there differences between how the claimants talk about persecution with regards to past or 
future persecution? 
Is this different for persons making gender-based claims? If so, how? 
Does the presence of an attorney in immigration court influence the applicant’s claim? If yes, 
how so? 
Is this different for persons making gender-based claims? If so, how? 
Does the presence of an attorney in INS proceedings influence the applicant’s claim? If yes, how 
so? 
Is this different for persons making gender-based claims? If so, how? 
How do you understand persecution? 
How do you understand gender-based persecution? 
Is there anything I haven’t asked that is pertinent to how you determine persecution in an asylum 
application? 
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B.4 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS) EMPLOYEES 
B.4.1 Asylum Supervisors/Former Asylum Officers 
When did you begin employment with INS? 
What type of work did you do before working at INS? 
What is your educational background/professional training?  
What positions have you held since working here? 
What are your responsibilities? 
What type of training did you receive from INS? 
How do you use this training when making decisions? 
Are there times when the training insufficient? If yes, what do you do in those cases? 
What type of training did you receive with regards to gender-based persecution? 
How do you use this training when making decisions? 
Are there times when the training insufficient? If yes, what do you do in those cases? 
What is the procedure for making adjudications on cases when you are unclear about the 
persecutory nature of the case? 
What procedure do you follow if you need assistance/clarification from a supervisor? 
When/how do you decide to ask for that assistance? 
What procedure do you follow when the category of persecution is not clear? 
Are there times when it is unclear if the type of persecution is gender-related? If so when?   
What factors go into your understanding of persecution when adjudicating a case? 
What sources of information do you rely to make your decision? 
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What sources of information do you rely for gender-related persecution? 
Do you compare cases with each other when making your decision? 
How are gender-related cases similar or different across cases? 
How do you establish credibility? 
How do you establish credibility for gender-based claims? 
How do you determine that the claimant was persecuted or has a fear of future persecution? 
Are there differences between cases of past persecution and those where the fear of persecution 
is futuristic in terms of how they are adjudicated? If yes, what are those differences? 
Are there differences between how you understand persecution for cases of past and future 
persecution? If yes, what are those differences? 
Are there differences between how the claimants talk about persecution with regards to past or 
future persecution?  
Are there differences between how claimants talk about gender and non-gendered forms of 
persecution? If so, what are those differences? 
Does the presence of an attorney influence the applicant’s claim? If yes, how so? 
Does the presence of an attorney influence anything about your decisions? If yes, how so? 
Do you follow the cases that you deny if appeal(s) are is/are made? If yes, how does that 
influence future decisions you make for similar cases? 
How do you understand persecution? 
How do you understand gender-based persecution? 
Is there anything I haven’t asked that is pertinent to how you determine gender-based persecution 
in an asylum application? 
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B.4.2 INS Processing Center (San Pedro) Employees 
When did you begin employment with INS? 
What type of work did you do before working at INS? 
What is your educational background/professional training?  
What positions have you held since working here? 
What are your responsibilities? 
What type of training did you receive from INS? 
What type of training did you receive with regards to understanding the notion of persecution? 
What type of training did you receive with regards to understanding gender-based persecution? 
What is a typical day for detainees at this facility? 
Is this different for inmates who are not applying for asylum? If yes, how? 
How familiar are you with the claims of asylum detainees make? 
What types of services are available for detainees? 
Is this different for inmates who are not applying for asylum? If yes, how? 
Are there specific services for female detainees? 
Are there specific services for persons making gender-based claims of persecution? 
How do you understand persecution? 
How do you understand gender-based persecution? 
Is there anything I haven’t asked that is pertinent to how you determine persecution in an asylum 
application? 
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B.5 IMMIGRATION JUDGES 
What is your educational background/professional training?  
What type of positions have you held prior to being an immigration judge? 
What type of training did you receive with regards to understanding the notion of persecution? 
What type of training did you receive with regards to understanding gender-based persecution? 
How do you use this training when making decisions? 
Are there times when the training insufficient? If yes, what do you do in those cases? 
What is the procedure for making adjudications on cases when you are unclear about the 
persecutory nature of the case? 
What is the procedure for making adjudications on cases when you are unclear about the gender-
based persecutory nature of the case? 
What factors go into your understanding of persecution when adjudicating a case? 
What factors go into your understanding of gender-based persecution when adjudicating a case? 
What sources of information do you rely to make your decision? 
Do you compare cases against each other? 
How do you establish credibility? 
Is this different for gender-based claims? If so, how? 
How do you determine that the claimant was persecuted or has a fear of future persecution? 
How do you determine that the claimant experienced gender-based persecution or has a fear of 
future gender-based persecution? 
Are there differences between cases of past persecution and those where the fear of persecution 
is futuristic in terms of how they are adjudicated? If yes, what are those differences? 
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Are there differences between how you understand persecution for cases of past and future 
persecution? If yes, what are those differences? 
Are there differences between how the claimants talk about persecution with regards to past or 
future persecution? 
Is this different for gender-based claims? If so, how? 
Does the presence of an attorney influence the applicant’s claim? If yes, how so? 
Do you follow the cases that you deny if appeal(s) are is/are made? If yes, how does that 
influence decisions in similar cases? 
Do you consider international human rights and refugee law when adjudicating cases? Why/why 
not and how does this influence your decisions? 
How do you understand persecution? 
How do you understand gender-based persecution? 
Is there anything I haven’t asked that is pertinent to how you determine persecution in an asylum 
procedure? 
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B.6 HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION EMPLOYEES AND ACTIVISTS 
What type of activism are you involved with? 
What type of activism have you been involved with in the past? 
How/Why did you get involved with Human Right’s Activism? 
How/Why did you get involved with asylee and refugee issues?  
What are you experiences with working with asylee and refugee populations? 
What are your experiences with working with persons making gender-based claims of 
persecution? 
How does your organization understand persecution? 
How does your organization understand gender-based persecution? 
How do you understand persecution? 
How do you understand gender-based persecution? 
What are your networks with other human right’s groups in Los Angeles? 
Does your group differ with those groups with respect to understanding persecution? If so, how? 
Does your group differ with those groups with respect to understanding gender-based 
persecution? If so, how? 
What are your networks with other human rights’ groups in the United States?  
Does your group differ with those groups with respect to understanding persecution? If so, how? 
Does your group differ with those groups with respect to understanding gender-based 
persecution? If so, how? 
What are your networks with international human rights’ organizing? 
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Does your group differ with those groups with respect to understanding persecution? If so, how? 
Does your group differ with those groups with respect to understanding gender-based 
persecution? If so, how? 
Which cases do you decide to follow and how do you locate these cases? 
What are you affiliations with non-activist organizations, groups, or persons working with asylee 
populations? 
Does your group differ with those groups with respect to understanding persecution? If so, how? 
Does your group differ with those groups with respect to understanding gender-based 
persecution? If so, how? 
How do you understand persecution? 
How do you understand gender-based persecution? 
Is there anything I haven’t asked that is pertinent to how you understand persecution? 
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